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The authors would like to acknowledge with gratitude the contri-
bution of our friend and colleague, Elizabeth (“Beth”) C. Weimar, 
Esq.  We have been greatly enriched by Beth’s knowledge and ex-
perience, but it was her enthusiasm, good humor, and most of all her 
courage that inspired our efforts in completing this Article.  All who 
knew her were saddened by her untimely passing in 2007.  This Arti-
cle is dedicated to her memory. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the pages that follow, we initially review and summarize the 
evolving landscape of U.S. patent law as interpreted, expounded 
upon, and altered by each of the three branches of the U.S. govern-
ment.  We then follow with summaries of the patent decisions of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Cir-
cuit”) for the calendar year 2007.  We conclude with an appendix 
presenting statistical data regarding the 2007 decisions of the Federal 
Circuit and its judges. 
One important note is that the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure,1 and similarly the Federal Circuit’s rules,2 have been changed so 
as to remove the prohibition on a party’s citation of nonprecedential 
opinions issued after January 1, 2007.  An opinion may be designated 
nonprecedential because it does “not add[] significantly to the body 
of law.”3  The Federal Circuit “may look to a nonprecedential disposi-
tion for guidance or persuasive reasoning, but will not give one of its 
own nonprecedential dispositions the effect of binding precedent.”4  
Because of the non-binding nature of these cases, our case summaries 
address only the Federal Circuit’s 2007 precedential decisions.  Our 
statistical data in the appendix, however, include details on both pre-
cedential and nonprecedential decisions. 
A. Twenty-Five Years of the Federal Circuit 
This year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of 
the Federal Circuit.  One of the primary goals in creating the court 
was to foster uniformity in the application of the patent laws in order 
                                                          
 1. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) (“A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of 
federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have 
been:  (i) designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not 
precedent,’ or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.”). 
 2. See FED. CIR. R. 32.1(c) (“Parties are not prohibited or restricted from citing 
nonprecedential dispositions issued after January 1, 2007.  This rule does not pre-
clude assertion of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, law of the 
case, and the like based on a nonprecedential disposition issued before that date.”). 
 3. Id. 32.1(b). 
 4. Id. 32.1(d). 
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to promote innovation and further technology.5  “National uniformity 
in the application of the patent laws was perceived as a way of reduc-
ing uncertainty regarding the validity of patents[,]” thereby increas-
ing their value and the incentives to invent and disclose, ultimately 
enhancing technological innovation in the United States.6  Such in-
novation would “benefit[] consumers through the development of 
new and improved goods, services, and processes.”7  “An economy’s 
capacity for invention and innovation helps drive its economic 
growth and the degree to which standards of living increase.”8  
“Competition and patents stand out among the federal policies that 
influence innovation.”9 
The idea of granting exclusive rights to inventors in order to stimu-
late innovation was well-established when the Constitution was 
drafted in 1789.  Indeed, among the explicit powers granted to Con-
gress by the Constitution is the power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries.”10  “The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need 
to encourage innovation and [to avoid] monopolies which stifle 
competition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.’”11  The same balance has been embodied in 
the federal patent laws since their inception, for they reward innova-
tion while recognizing that imitation and refinement of those innova-
tions are also necessary both to “invention itself and to the very life-
blood of a competitive economy.”12 
The establishment of a national court for all patent appeals is an 
idea that also dates back over 100 years,13 but it was finally achieved 
                                                          
 5. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (noting that the uniformity in patent law 
resulting from the creation of the Federal Circuit will prevent the forum-shopping 
that is so prevalent in patent litigation and, in turn, decrease the “number of appeals 
resulting from attempts to obtain different rulings on disputed legal points”). 
 6. HERBERT SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 5 (5th ed. 2006). 
 7. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION:  THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1 (2003). 
 8. Id. (citing Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Patent 
Policy in a Broader Context, Remarks at the 2003 Financial Markets Conference of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Apr. 5, 2003)). 
 9. Id. 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 11. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147, 9 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1847, 1850 (1989). 
 12. Id., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850. 
 13. MARGARET M. CONWAY, STUDY OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, 
AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., SINGLE COURT OF 
PATENT APPEALS—A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1 (Comm. Print 1959) (explaining that in 
the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction over patent 
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on April 2, 1982, when President Ronald Reagan signed into law the 
Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982.14  The intent of the Fed-
eral Courts Improvements Act was to revitalize the American econ-
omy and ensure continued economic growth and development by 
correcting perceived defects in the federal appellate court structure.15  
Contrary to the perceptions of some, the Federal Circuit is not fairly 
characterized as a “specialized” court.  The jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit includes appeals from final decisions of the federal district 
courts on patent matters, as well as final decisions of the United 
States Court of Federal Claims, the United States Court of Interna-
tional Trade, the United States International Trade Commission, and 
the United States Court of Appeals for Veteran Claims.16 
Unlike other appellate courts, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is 
based on subject matter and not on geography.  Prior to the creation 
of the Federal Circuit, the regional courts of appeals were individu-
ally charged with the task of hearing patent appeals from their re-
spective district courts.17  However, because the decision of one appel-
late court is not binding on another appellate court, layers of 
ambiguity and inconsistency overshadowed the patent laws, inconsis-
tencies that could only be resolved by the United States Supreme 
Court.18  Yet only rarely did the Supreme Court interject itself into 
patent issues.19  The Federal Circuit was thus created to provide a 
level of certainty, predictability, and stability to the patent system, to 
restore the integrity of the patent system, and to provide the basis for 
                                                                                                                                      
appeals, but after 1891, when the U.S. circuit courts of appeals obtained jurisdiction 
over patent issues, the “section of patent, trademark and copyright law of the Ameri-
can Bar Association consistently supported the establishment of a special court of 
patent appeals with jurisdiction throughout the United States”). 
 14. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 15. See FRANK P. CIHLAR, THE COURT AMERICAN BUSINESS WANTED AND GOT:  THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 11 (1982) (describing 
how important the integrity of the patent system is to technological growth and in-
dustrial innovation). 
 16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000) (setting forth the jurisdiction of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
 17. See Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:  More than a 
National Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 61 (1984) (noting that many federal appeals 
judges do not regret losing jurisdiction over patent cases). 
 18. See id. at 50 (stating that intercircuit conflicts in patent law made the en-
forcement of patents unpredictable and thus public confidence in the patent system 
waned). 
 19. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the 
Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 275–76 (2002) (observing that by the middle of 
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s patent docket declined drastically, hear-
ing on average only one patent case per year, which was significantly less than during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). 
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reasoned business judgments about the risks and rewards associated 
with the development of a patented invention.20 
The creation of the Federal Circuit has had an enormous impact 
on the development of the patent laws of the United States.  The 
Federal Circuit, in attempting to create a uniform understanding of 
patent law, has focused and refined the law on every important issue 
of patent law, not the least of which has been the implementation of 
holdings by the Supreme Court in such landmark patent cases as 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,21 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton 
Davis Chemical Co.,22 Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,23 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd.,24 Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air 
Circulation Systems, Inc.,25 and Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,26 
to name a few.  The Federal Circuit continues to reexamine many ar-
eas of patent law, including claim construction, written description, 
jurisdiction, remedies, declaratory judgments, and the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
While the importance of the Federal Circuit is indisputable, its ef-
fectiveness in achieving Congress’s primary goal of increasing uni-
formity of patent law has been the subject of debate.27  Many people 
believe that Federal Circuit jurisprudence has increased patent law 
certainty and consistency compared to what existed before its crea-
tion.28  Others, however, have “questioned the extent to which the 
Federal Circuit has succeeded in achieving this goal,”29 while still oth-
ers believe the Federal Circuit has “conformed [certain areas of] pat-
ent law, but in unhelpful ways.”30 
No matter what one thinks of the Federal Circuit’s success in 
achieving its seminal purpose, one thing is clear—the Federal Cir-
                                                          
 20. See CIHLAR, supra note 15, at 11 (discussing how detrimental uncertainty and 
forum shopping are to patent law, where stability and predictability provide the basis 
for reasoned business judgments). 
 21. 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996). 
 22. 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997). 
 23. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998). 
 24. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002). 
 25. 535 U.S. 826, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2002). 
 26. 545 U.S. 193, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2005). 
 27. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 15 (describing how some panel-
ists view the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence as bringing “certainty and consistency” to 
patent law, while others continue to question whether the Federal Circuit has been 
successful). 
 28. Id.; see also id. at 15 n.89 (noting that the President of the Industrial Research 
Institutes, Ross Armbrecht, felt that the IRI members thought that the Federal Cir-
cuit brought more stability and predictability to the patent process). 
 29. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 15; see also id. at 15 n.90 (listing sev-
eral commentators who express doubt as to the Federal Circuit’s success). 
 30. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 15. 
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cuit’s twenty-fifth anniversary was marked by one of the most active 
years in the history of U.S. patent law.  All three branches of the U.S. 
government were actively involved in 2007 in shaping and revising or 
attempting to revise several areas of patent law.  For example, the Ex-
ecutive Branch, through the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”), attempted to promulgate new rules of practice before the 
office (but is presently enjoined from enacting the rules), which 
would dramatically affect patent prosecution and continuation prac-
tices.31  The U.S. House of Representatives passed significant patent 
reform legislation, which, at the time of this writing, is still awaiting 
action by the U.S. Senate.32  The U.S. Supreme Court has stepped up 
its involvement in patent law by reviewing, and often dramatically al-
tering, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of existing patent laws.33  
The following sections provide a brief overview of the actions taken 
by each of the branches of government in the sphere of patent law. 
B. The Executive Branch:  The Rules Promulgated by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office 
On August 21, 2007, the PTO published new rules regarding con-
tinuation filings and examination of claims (“new rules”).34  The new 
rules limit the number of continuation applications that can be filed 
from a patent application without justification, as well as the number 
of claims an applicant can include in a patent application without in-
cluding an examination support document.35  The new rules also re-
quire applicants to disclose related patents and patent applications, 
as well as to distinguish between claims in related patents and/or ap-
plications.36  The new rules apply to:  (1) any new applications filed 
after November 1, 2007, and (2) any applications that were pending 
                                                          
 31. See infra Part I.B (discussing in detail the new rules and the current injunc-
tion on enforcing those rules). 
 32. See infra Part I.C (comparing and contrasting in detail the proposed legisla-
tion from both the House and the Senate). 
 33. See infra Part I.D (surveying some of the Supreme Court’s most important pat-
ent decisions of the year). 
 34. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications 
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Appli-
cations, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) [here-
inafter Changes to Practice]. 
 35. See id. (outlining the new revisions to the rules of practice for continued ex-
amination practices and for the examination of claims in patent applications). 
 36. See id. at 46,721–22 (providing that applicants must identify other pending 
applications that have been filed within the previous two months, as well as rebut the 
presumption that the multiple filings are indistinct by explaining how the various 
applications have distinct claims). 
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as of November 1, 2007, but had not received a first office action on 
the merits as of that date.37 
The new rules contain several marked changes from the status quo.  
While the current rules permit applicants to file an unlimited num-
ber of continuation applications, the new rules limit applicants to 
only two continuation applications, including continuation-in-part 
(“CIP”) applications, from a single patent application, and only one 
request for continued examination (“RCE”) without justification.38  
These rules would apply to any application filed after November 1, 
2007, including those claiming priority to an earlier filed non-
provisional application.39  In order to file more than two continua-
tions or more than one RCE, an applicant has to explain why the re-
quest, amendment, argument, or evidence could not have been pre-
viously submitted.40 
The new rules also limit an applicant’s right to file continuation 
applications from pending applications with an existing priority claim 
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 121, or 365(c) that were filed before August 
21, 2007.41  In such a case, the applicant can file only “one more” con-
tinuation application without justification and without regard to the 
number of continuations previously filed in that application family.42  
Specifically, the rules limit an applicant who filed more than two con-
tinuation or CIP applications of an initial application before August 
21, 2007, to the filing of only “one more” continuing application on 
or after November 1, 2007, without a petition and showing, provided 
no other application was filed on or after August 21, 2007, that claims 
the benefit of the prior-filed application.43 
The new rules require an applicant to identify support for all 
claims in the parent of a CIP application.44  Any claims for which such 
support is not identified would be entitled only to the filing date of 
the CIP and would be subject to prior art based on the actual later fil-
ing date.45  Moreover, because a CIP application is included in the 
definition of “continuation application,” only two CIP applications 
                                                          
 37. Id. at 46,716–17. 
 38. Id. at 46,716. 
 39. Id. at 46,716–17. 
 40. Id. at 46,716. 
 41. Id. at 46,717. 
 42. Id. at 46,717, 46,733. 
 43. Id. at 46,717. 
 44. Id. at 46,723. 
 45. Id. 
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can be filed in an application family.46  In an October 10, 2007, clari-
fication, the PTO waived this identification requirement for applica-
tions in which an office action on the merits was received before No-
vember 1, 2007.47  In applications in which a first office action on the 
merits was not mailed by November 1, 2007, the PTO delayed the re-
quirement for identification until February 1, 2008.48 
The rules also restrict the number of claims that can be filed in a 
single patent application in the absence of additional information.49  
For example, applications that included more than twenty-five claims 
or more than five independent claims (the so-called “5/25 rule”) 
would have to include an examination support document and prior 
art search report with an explanation as to how each claim differs 
from the prior art. 
For applications filed on or after November 1, 2007, applicants also 
have to identify by application number and patent number (if appli-
cable) each other pending application or patent, in which:  (1) the 
application has a filing date or priority claim that is the same as the 
filing date of the other pending or patented application;50 (2) “the 
application names at least one inventor in common with the other 
pending or patented application; and (3) the application is owned by 
the same person, or subject to an obligation of assignment to the 
same person, as the other pending or patented application.”51  Appli-
cants would have to identify the other applications or patents by the 
later of four months from the filing date of the non-provisional appli-
cation (or national phase application) or February 1, 2008.52 
Under the new rules, the PTO takes the position that there is a re-
buttable presumption that a non-provisional application contains at 
least one claim that is not patentably distinct from at least one of the 
                                                          
 46. See id. at 46,716 (grouping together “continuation application” and “con-
tinuation-in-part application” in all references, thus treating them as equivalents for 
the purposes of the new rules). 
 47. See John Love, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy, U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office, Clarification of the Transitional Provisions Relating to Con-
tinuing Applications and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims 2 
(Oct. 10, 2007), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/preognotice/cl 
mcontclarification.pdf (“[F]or any continuation-in-part application in which a first 
Office action on the merits has been mailed before November 1, 2007, the require-
ment . . . that an applicant must identify the claim . . . in the continuation-in-part ap-
plication for which the subject matter is disclosed . . . in the prior-filed application is 
hereby waived.”). 
 48. Id. at 3. 
 49. Changes to Practice, supra note 34, at 46,721. 
 50. See Love, supra note 47, at 3 (waiving the “or within two months of” require-
ment, previously required by this part of the new rules, in certain instances for appli-
cations filed on or after November 1, 2007). 
 51. Changes to Practice, supra note 34, at 46,734. 
 52. Id. at 46,717. 
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claims in another patent application if:  (1) the application has a fil-
ing date and/or priority date that is the same as the filing date of the 
other application; (2) the two applications have at least one common 
inventor; (3) the two applications are owned by the same entity or 
subject to an obligation of assignment to the same entity; and (4) the 
applications contain substantially overlapping subject matter.53 
The applicant could rebut this presumption by explaining how all 
the claims are patentably distinct or by submitting a terminal dis-
claimer.54  Where patentably indistinct claims are identified, the ap-
plicant would have to submit good and sufficient reasons for having 
multiple applications.55  The PTO could require elimination of the 
indistinct claims from one of the applications without such a show-
ing.56 
It is noteworthy that the final rules provide that if multiple applica-
tions, including applications having a continuity relationship, contain 
patentably indistinct claims, the PTO would treat the multiple appli-
cations as a single application for purposes of determining whether 
each of the multiple applications exceeds the threshold of five inde-
pendent claims or twenty-five total claims (the “5/25” limitation).57 
The final rules also allow an applicant to file a divisional applica-
tion if the application was subject to a restriction requirement.58  Mul-
tiple divisional applications can be prosecuted in series or in paral-
lel.59  An applicant can file two continuation applications (but not a 
CIP) for each divisional application plus one RCE without justifica-
tion.60 
Alternatively, an applicant can “suggest” a restriction requirement 
and elect a group of claims that meets the 5/25 claim requirement.61  
If accepted by the examiner, this would permit the applicant to pur-
sue the remaining nonelected claims in one or more divisional appli-
cations.62  If the examiner refused the suggestion, the applicant would 
be given two months in which to reduce the number of claims or to 
file an examination support document.63 
                                                          
 53. Id. at 46,735. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 46,745. 
 59. Id. at 46,718. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 46,726. 
 62. Id. at 46,726–27. 
 63. Id. 
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On October 31, 2007, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia granted a preliminary injunction in favor of 
plaintiffs Triantafyllos Tafas and SmithKline Beecham Corporation, 
enjoining the PTO from implementing the changes to the patent 
rules on November 1, 2007.64  In a detailed opinion, the district court 
found in favor of the plaintiffs on all four prongs of the legal test for 
granting a preliminary injunction.65 
First, the court found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likeli-
hood of success on the merits on its allegations that the rules exceed 
the Patent Office’s statutory authority.  The court concluded that the 
rules are contrary to the Patent Act, the PTO’s application of the 
rules to pending applications implicates the prohibition on retroac-
tive application of agency regulations, and the standards for submit-
ting an examination support document are impermissibly vague.66  
Second, the district court found that plaintiffs would be irreparably 
harmed by implementation of the new rules due to the uncertainty 
that the regulations would create and the negative impact on invest-
ment to file future patent applications.67  The district court found the 
third prong, “balance of the hardships,” to be in favor of the plain-
tiffs, stating that “the uncertainty and loss of investment suffered im-
mediately by [the plaintiffs] tilts the balance of hardships in their fa-
vor.”68  Finally, the court found “the public interest [was] most served 
by continuing the status quo and granting the TRO.”69 
On April 1, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia issued an order permanently enjoining the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office from implementation and enforcement of the new 
rules related to claims and continuation practice in patent applica-
tions.70  The ruling held that the PTO exceeded its rule-making au-
thority in attempting to implement what the district court deemed to 
be substantive rules.71 
                                                          
 64. Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 671 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
 65. Id. at 670. 
 66. Id. at 663–68. 
 67. Id. at 668–69. 
 68. Id. at 670. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Tafas v. Dudas, No. 1:07CV846, 2008 WL 859467, at *10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 
2008). 
 71.  Id. 
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C. The Legislative Branch:  The Patent Reform Act of 2007 
The Patent Reform Act of 2007 is currently being considered for 
passage by the United States Congress.72  As amended, H.R. 1908 was 
passed by the House on September 7, 2007, by a vote of 220 (ayes) to 
175 (nays).73  The Senate version, S. 1145, was reported out of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee on July 19, 2007, and is presently pend-
ing in the Senate.74 
Regarded as the most significant piece of patent legislation since 
the 1952 Patent Act,75 the Patent Reform Act of 2007 would affect 
many fundamental and long-established patent law provisions, in-
cluding the loss of right provisions in § 102,76 the best mode require-
ment,77 inequitable conduct, injunctive relief, damages, and willful 
infringement.78 
Most dramatically, the House-passed bill would change the U.S. 
patent system from a first-to-invent system to a first-to-file system, con-
tingent upon a finding that major patenting authorities have adopted 
a grace period having substantially the same effect as that in the bill.79  
The Senate bill contains a similar first-to-file provision, but it is not 
contingent upon such a finding.80 
The House bill would also change the apportionment of damages 
in infringement cases.  In particular, H.R. 1908 would allow judges to 
select the method of calculating a reasonable royalty from:  (1) the 
economic value attributable to the patent’s specific contribution over 
prior art; (2) its entire market value; or (3) if neither (1) nor (2) is 
appropriate, the terms of any nonexclusive marketplace licensing of 
the invention and other relevant factors, such as the fifteen factors set 
forth in Georgia Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.81  The Senate 
                                                          
 72. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1145, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
 73. THOMAS (The Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquer 
y/z?d110:HR01908:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 14, 2008). 
 74. THOMAS (The Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquer 
y/z?d110:SN01145:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 14, 2008). 
 75. 1952 Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 76. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
 77. Id. § 112(1). 
 78. Id. §§ 284, 298. 
 79. See H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2007) (“The effective filing date of a 
claimed invention is:  (1) the filing date of the patent or application for patent con-
taining the claim to the invention . . . .”). 
 80. S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007). 
 81. H.R. 1908 § 5(a)(3); see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. 
Supp. 1116, 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing fifteen fac-
tors to consider when determining the amount of a reasonable royalty for a patent 
license). 
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bill would allow the court to select the method of calculating a rea-
sonable royalty from:  (1) the “entire market value”; (2) “an estab-
lished royalty based on marketplace licensing”; or (3) if neither 
(1) nor (2) is appropriate, “the economic value of the infringing 
product or process properly attributable to the claimed invention’s 
specific contribution over prior art[,]” with special rules for combina-
tion inventions.82 
Both H.R. 1908 and S. 1145 would heighten the standard for willful 
infringement.  Both bills would also provide for a post-grant opposi-
tion proceeding in the PTO.  The House version would establish a 
first window post-grant review proceeding but no second window.83  
For the purpose of such a proceeding, the patent would not be enti-
tled to a presumption of validity, and the burden of proof would be 
lessened to a preponderance of evidence.84  The Senate version, in 
contrast, would establish both first and second window post-grant re-
view proceedings, with different presumptions and burdens of 
proof.85  To trigger a second window, a petition would have to be filed 
within twelve months of notice alleging infringement and would have 
to show that “the continued existence of the challenged claim . . . 
causes or is likely to cause the petitioner significant economic 
harm.”86  Under the Senate bill, a patent would be entitled to a pre-
sumption of validity in the second window but not in the first win-
dow.87  The burden of proof of invalidity in the first window would be 
by the preponderance of evidence, but a showing of invalidity in the 
second window would require clear and convincing evidence.88 
The House bill would expand inter partes reexamination in lieu of 
second window in post-grant and require that an administrative pat-
ent judge hear petitions rather than an examiner.89  The Senate ver-
sion would abolish inter partes reexamination entirely.90 
The House and Senate versions would both allow pre-issuance 
prior art submissions for at least six months after publication, a provi-
sion which would become effective one year after enactment.91  The 
House bill also includes defendant-based venue provisions and carve-
out provisions for certain plaintiffs, such as universities, inventors, 
                                                          
 82. S. 1145 § 4(a). 
 83. H.R. 1908 § 6(a)(1). 
 84. Id. § 6(f)(1). 
 85. S. 1145 § 5(c)(1). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. H.R. 1908 § 6(c)(1). 
 90. S. 1145 § 5(b)(1). 
 91. H.R. 1908 § 9(b); S. 1145 § 7(b). 
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and companies engaged in substantial research and development ac-
tivities.92  Venue for declaratory judgment actions would be the same 
as for infringement actions.93  In cases involving foreign defendants 
with a U.S. subsidiary, venue would be based on the location of in-
corporation or primary subsidiary; for foreign defendants without a 
U.S. subsidiary, venue would be proper in any district.94  The Senate 
version is similar to the House version on these points but does not 
address foreign corporations without a U.S. subsidiary.95  Both the 
House and Senate versions would require that the Federal Circuit 
hear an interlocutory appeal on claim construction upon certification 
by the district court.96 
H.R. 1908 would also codify a materiality standard similar to exist-
ing PTO Rule 1.56 of whether “a reasonable examiner would have 
made a prima facie finding of unpatentability.”97  The Senate version 
would codify the “important” to a “reasonable examiner” standard for 
materiality.98 
The House bill would also prohibit the use of “best mode” as a ba-
sis for invalidity in either litigation or post-grant proceedings.99  The 
House bill also provides more flexibility in completing the oath re-
quirements, particularly when it is difficult to reach an inventor.100  
The Senate bill is similar but specifically allows the assignee to apply 
for the patent.101  Other provisions of the Patent Reform Act would 
require mandatory search reports submitted by patent applicants and 
provide the PTO with advanced rule-making authority.102 
D. The Judicial Branch:  Supreme Court Patent Cases in 2007 
The Supreme Court has also continued to take an unusually active 
role in patent law, handing down three significant decisions in 2007 
alone.  These cases are discussed below.  The Supreme Court also 
granted certiorari to review a case on the first-sale doctrine, Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.103 
                                                          
 92. H.R. 1908 § 11(a). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. S. 1145 § 8(a). 
 96. H.R. 1908 § 11(b); S. 1145 § 8(b). 
 97. H.R. 1908 § 12(b)(4). 
 98. S. 1145 § 12. 
 99. H.R. 1908 § 13. 
 100. Id. § 4(a)(1). 
 101. S. 1145 § 3. 
 102. Id. § 11. 
 103. LG Elec., Inc. v. Bizcom Elec., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443 
(Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 28 (2007). 
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1. Declaratory judgments—the MedImmune decision 
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,104 the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that a patent licensee in good standing need not terminate or 
breach its license before filing a declaratory judgment action seeking 
patent invalidity, unenforceability, or non-infringement.105  The deci-
sion thus allows patent licensees to challenge the patent while putting 
nothing more at risk than the royalties they would have paid during 
the pendency of the litigation. 
In 1997, MedImmune licensed a patent and then-pending patent 
application from Genentech.106  In 2001, after the patent application 
had matured into a U.S. patent, Genentech notified MedImmune 
that MedImmune’s drug was covered by the newly issued patent and 
that MedImmune would be responsible for paying royalties on that 
drug in accordance with the license agreement.107  MedImmune be-
lieved that no royalties were due because the patent was invalid, un-
enforceable, and not infringed by the subject drug.108  MedImmune 
thereafter paid the demanded royalties under protest and with reser-
vation of all its rights but filed an action in the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California for declaratory judgment 
that the newly issued patent was invalid or unenforceable.109 
The district court dismissed MedImmune’s declaratory judgment 
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in accordance with Gen-
Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc.,110 which held that a patent licensee in good 
standing cannot establish the requisite “case or controversy” with re-
gard to the validity, enforceability, or scope of a patent because the 
license agreement “obliterate[s] any reasonable apprehension” that 
the licensee would be sued for infringement.111  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of MedImmune’s declaratory 
judgment claims.112 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s 
ruling.113  Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion, while Justice 
Thomas was the lone dissenter.  The Court held that Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution does not require a patent licensee to terminate or 
                                                          
 104. 127 S. Ct. 764, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (2007). 
 105. Id. at 777, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 106. Id. at 767–68, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. 
 107. Id. at 768, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. 
 108. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. 
 109. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. 
 110. 359 F.3d 1376, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 111. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227 (alterations in 
original) (citing Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1381, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091). 
 112. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. 
 113. Id. at 777, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
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breach its “license agreement before seeking a declaratory judgment 
of invalid[ity], unenforceab[ility], or [non]-infringe[ment].114  The 
Court analogized this situation to a suit challenging the basis for a 
governmental action, wherein the plaintiff need not expose itself to 
liability before contesting the constitutionality of the law threatened 
to be enforced.115  The Court also cited its decision in Altvater v. Free-
man,116 in which it held that Article III’s requirements were satisfied 
where a licensee brought a declaratory judgment action seeking inva-
lidity of two patents arguably covered by a license agreement while 
continuing to pay royalties under protest.117  The Federal Circuit’s 
Gen-Probe decision had distinguished Altvater because it concerned a 
privately obtained injunction.118  The Supreme Court dismissed this 
distinction because the coercive actions in Altvater were not govern-
mental but those of a private party.119 
The Supreme Court also rejected Genentech’s argument that the 
parties’ license agreement had effectively settled their dispute and 
that permitting MedImmune to contest the validity of the patent 
without terminating the agreement would alter the parties’ bargain.120  
While the license did obligate MedImmune to pay royalties on pat-
ents that have not been held invalid, the Court found that such a 
promise “does not amount to a promise not to seek a holding of their 
invalidity.”121  Thus, there was no contractual prohibition against chal-
lenging the validity of the patents.122 
The MedImmune decision, which effectively overrules the Federal 
Circuit’s Gen-Probe decision, has implications for patent licensees and 
licensors alike.  Patent licensees may now simultaneously bring de-
claratory judgment claims to challenge licensed patents while con-
tinuing to pay contractual royalties, thereby risking nothing more 
than the royalties paid during the pendency of the litigation.  Licen-
sors must thus consider whether to press for the inclusion of express 
prohibitions on future patent challenges and must draft any such po-
tential prohibitions with an eye to MedImmune and other court deci-
sions evaluating such provisions. 
                                                          
 114. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 115. Id. at 772, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 116. 319 U.S. 359, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 285 (1943). 
 117. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 773, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231. 
 118. Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381–82, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1087, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 119. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231–32. 
 120. Id. at 775–76, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 121. Id. at 776, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 122. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
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2. Exportation and infringement—the Microsoft decision 
In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,123 the Supreme Court analyzed 
“the applicability of § 271(f) [of the Patent Act] to computer software 
first sent from the United States to a foreign manufacturer on a mas-
ter disk, or by electronic transmission, then copied by the foreign re-
cipient for installation on computers made and sold abroad.”124  The 
Court concluded that defendant Microsoft was not liable for in-
fringement because it was not exporting copies of Windows and thus 
was not supplying “components” from the United States for installa-
tion on foreign-made computers, as that term is used in § 271(f).125 
Section 271(f), adopted in 1984, is an exception to the territorial 
limitations of U.S. patents, which generally cannot be infringed when 
a patented product is made and sold outside of the United States.126  
In pertinent part, § 271(f)(1) provides that infringement occurs 
whenever one 
without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the 
United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a 
patented invention, where such components are uncombined in 
whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combina-
tion of such components outside of the United States in a manner 
that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within 
the United States . . . .127 
In this case, AT&T sued Microsoft under § 271(f) for selling 
abroad a software “component” that was being used to make com-
puters that allegedly infringed AT&T’s patent on speech-processing 
devices.128  Microsoft argued it did not infringe AT&T’s patent be-
cause intangible information like software is not a “component” un-
der § 271(f).129  Microsoft also argued that it does not actually sell 
copies of Windows, or “components,” abroad for installation on for-
eign-made computers.130  Rather, Microsoft sends a foreign manufac-
turer a master version of Windows, either on a disk or via an en-
crypted electronic transmission, from which the manufacturer 
generates the copies it installs on the computer products it sells 
abroad.131  The district court rejected these arguments and found Mi-
                                                          
 123. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 
(2007). 
 124. Id. at 1750, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404. 
 125. Id. at 1756–57, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404. 
 126. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000). 
 127. Id. § 271(f)(1). 
 128. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1750–51, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406. 
 129. Id. at 1753, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406. 
 130. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406. 
 131. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406. 
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crosoft liable under § 271(f).132  A divided Federal Circuit panel af-
firmed.133 
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that an actual “copy of Win-
dows, not Windows in the abstract, qualifies as a ‘component’ under 
§ 271(f)”:134 
The provision thus applies only to “such components” as are com-
bined to form the “patented invention” at issue.  The patented in-
vention here is AT&T’s speech-processing computer. 
 Until it is expressed as a computer-readable “copy,” e.g., on a 
CD-ROM, Windows software—indeed any software detached from 
an activating medium—remains uncombinable.  It cannot be in-
serted into a CD-ROM drive or downloaded from the Internet; it 
cannot be installed or executed on a computer.  Abstract software 
code is an idea without physical embodiment, and as such, it does 
not match § 271(f)’s categorization:  “components” amenable to 
“combination.”  Windows abstracted from a tangible copy no doubt 
is information—a detailed set of instructions—and thus might be 
compared to a blueprint (or anything containing design informa-
tion . . .).  A blueprint may contain precise instructions for the con-
struction and combination of the components of a patented device, 
but it is not itself a combinable component of that device.135 
Whether or not encoding software onto a computer-readable me-
dium is easy, the answer remains the same.136  The copy-producing 
step is “what renders the software a usable, combinable part of a 
computer.”137  According to the Court, regardless of whether that ex-
tra copying step is easy or not, it is essential to liability.138  Section 
271(f) also contains no indication that if duplication is easy or cheap 
enough, the copy made abroad is deemed to have been “sup-
plie[d] . . . from the United States.”139  Many tools, in fact, “may be 
used easily and inexpensively to generate the parts of a device[,]” but 
inclusion of those parts does not render the tools “components” of 
the device, “at least not under any ordinary understanding of the 
term ‘component.’”140  Congress, moreover, declined to expand 
                                                          
 132. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406. 
 133. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406. 
 134. Id. at 1756, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408. 
 135. Id. at 1755, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407–08 (footnote omitted). 
 136. See id. at 1756, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408 (declining to accept AT&T’s ar-
gument that “[b]ecause it is so easy to encode software’s instructions onto a medium 
that can be read by a computer . . . [the copy-producing] step should not play a deci-
sive role under § 271(f)”). 
 137. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408. 
 138. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408. 
 139. Id. at 1757, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1409 (alteration in original). 
 140. Id. at 1756, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408. 
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§ 271(f)’s scope beyond supplying a patented invention’s “compo-
nents” to also include “information, instructions, or tools from which 
those components readily may be generated.”141 
The Supreme Court further held that under a conventional read-
ing of § 271(f), those copies must be supplied from the United 
States.142  Thus, Microsoft did not infringe AT&T’s patent because it 
did not “suppl[y] . . . from the United States” the foreign-made cop-
ies of Windows that were installed on the accused computers.143  In so 
holding, the Supreme Court rejected the majority opinion of the 
Federal Circuit panel, which had concluded that “in the case of soft-
ware the act of copying is subsumed in the act of supplying” because 
the master is identical to the copies, which are generated quickly, 
cheaply, and easily from the master.144  Judge Rader had similarly dis-
sented from that majority opinion on the basis that “‘supplying’ is or-
dinarily understood to mean an activity separate and distinct from 
any subsequent ‘copying, replicating, reproducing—in effect manu-
facturing.’”145  “[N]othing in § 271(f)’s text, Judge Rader maintained, 
renders ease of copying a relevant, no less decisive, factor in trigger-
ing liability for infringement.”146  The Supreme Court agreed, finding 
that liability is triggered only when the actual “components [are] 
supplied from the United States, and not foreign-made copies 
thereof,” and “combined abroad to form the patented invention at 
issue.”147  “The absence of anything addressing copying in the statu-
tory text weighs against a judicial determination that replication 
abroad of a master dispatched from the United States ‘supplies’ the 
foreign-made copies from the United States . . . .”148 
The Court added that “[a]ny doubt that Microsoft’s conduct falls 
outside § 271(f)’s compass would be resolved by the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.”149  Foreign conduct, explained the Court, 
“is [generally] the domain of foreign law,” which in the context of 
patent law “may embody different policy judgments about the relative 
rights of inventors, competitors, and the public in patented inven-
                                                          
 141. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408. 
 142. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408–09. 
 143. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408. 
 144. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408–09. 
 145. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1409 (citing AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 
F.3d 1366, 1372–73, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1506, 1510 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 146. Id. at 1757, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1409 (citing AT&T, 414 F.3d at 1374, 75 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511). 
 147. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1409. 
 148. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1409. 
 149. Id. at 1758, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410. 
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tions.”150  In short, the Court stated that “foreign law alone, not 
United States law, currently governs the manufacture and sale of 
components of patented inventions in foreign countries.”151  Thus, 
“the presumption tugs strongly against construction of § 271(f) to 
encompass as a ‘component’ not only a physical copy of software, but 
also software’s intangible code, and to render ‘supplie[d] . . . from 
the United States’ not only exported copies of software, but also du-
plicates made abroad.”152  The Court admonished that “[i]f AT&T de-
sires to prevent copying in foreign countries, its remedy today lies in 
obtaining and enforcing foreign patents.”153 
Although the Court acknowledged AT&T’s argument that “reading 
§ 271(f) to cover only those copies of software actually dispatched 
from the United States creates a ‘loophole’ for software makers[,]” 
the Court was “not persuaded that dynamic judicial interpretation of 
§ 271(f) [was] in order.”154  Rather, the Court noted that any “loop-
hole” is properly within the province of Congress to consider and 
close, if it deems it warranted.155  Section 271(f), the Supreme Court 
noted, 
was a direct response to a gap in [U.S.] patent law revealed by 
[Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,156 where] . . . the items ex-
ported were kits containing all the physical, readily assemblable 
parts of a . . . machine (not an intangible set of instructions), and 
those parts themselves (not foreign-made copies of them) would be 
combined abroad by foreign buyers.157 
In contrast, the Court found that Congress has not addressed other 
arguable gaps or taken into account the ease by which electronic me-
dia such as software can be copied.158  Any adjustments in the patent 
law to account for the realities of software distribution should be 
made only after focused legislative consideration and not by the judi-
ciary, the Court explained, especially in view of the extraterritorial 
implications of this issue.159 
                                                          
 150. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410 (internal citation omitted) (alteration in 
original). 
 151. Id. at 1759, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410. 
 152. Id. at 1758, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410 (alteration in original). 
 153. Id. at 1759, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410. 
 154. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410–11. 
 155. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411. 
 156. 406 U.S. 518, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 769 (1972). 
 157. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1759, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411. 
 158. Id. at 1759–60, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411. 
 159. Id. at 1760, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411; cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 673 (1984) (noting 
that as new technology comes about, Congress is the entity that creates the appropri-
ate and necessary new rules). 
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3. Obviousness—The KSR decision 
Overshadowing the Microsoft decision was the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
April 30, 2007, ruling in KSR International v. Teleflex Inc.160  In KSR, the 
Supreme Court did not just reverse another Federal Circuit decision 
but overturned the lower court’s supposedly “rigid” application of the 
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (“TSM”)161 test for evaluating 
combinations of references in an obviousness analysis.162  The Su-
preme Court clarified that an obviousness analysis “need not seek out 
precise teachings”163 but rather must take account of “the inferences 
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would em-
ploy.”164 
Teleflex, the exclusive licensee under the patent-in-suit, sued KSR 
for infringement of the claimed invention, which was “a mechanism 
for combining an electronic sensor with an adjustable automobile 
pedal” in order to transmit the pedal’s position to a computer that 
controls the throttle in the vehicle’s engine.165  KSR counterclaimed 
that claim 4 of the patent was invalid as obvious.166  The district court 
granted summary judgment in KSR’s favor by applying a Graham167 
analysis as well as the Federal Circuit’s TSM test.168  The Federal Cir-
cuit reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment of invalid-
ity because “the District Court had not been strict enough in applying 
the test.”169  According to the Federal Circuit, the lower court failed to 
make “‘finding[s] as to the specific understanding or principle within 
the knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with 
no knowledge of [the] invention’ . . . to attach an electronic control 
to the support bracket of the [prior art] assembly.”170 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by rejecting the “rigid ap-
proach” of the Federal Circuit in applying its TSM test.171  Justice 
Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court, stated, “[t]hroughout this 
Court’s engagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have 
                                                          
 160. 127 S. Ct. 1727, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007). 
 161. Id. at 1734, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
 162. Id. at 1739, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. 
 163. Id. at 1741, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
 164. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
 165. Id. at 1734, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
 166. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
 167. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 
(1966). 
 168. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1737–38, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393–94. 
 169. Id. at 1738, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394. 
 170. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394 (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 
F. App’x 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’d KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1385 (2007)). 
 171. Id. at 1739, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. 
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set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the 
way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here.”172  The Supreme 
Court explicitly warned that there was a “need for caution in granting 
a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior 
art”173 because “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to 
known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than 
yield predictable results.”174  As a result, the Supreme Court insisted 
that when adjudicating an obviousness issue, particularly when the 
analysis centers on a combination patent, “a court must ask whether 
the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art ele-
ments according to their established functions.”175  However, the Su-
preme Court cautioned that “[r]ejections on obviousness grounds 
cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements.”176 
Based on the reasoning above, the Supreme Court found that Tele-
flex’s patent for an adjustable gas pedal was invalid due to obvious-
ness.  In so holding, the Supreme Court found that although “[t]here 
is no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM 
test and the Graham analysis[,]”177 a court errs when it “transforms the 
general principle [of the TSM test] into a rigid rule that limits the 
obviousness inquiry.”178 
The Supreme Court proceeded to broaden the application of the 
TSM test in several ways.  The Supreme Court reiterated that “any 
need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of inven-
tion and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining 
the elements in the manner claimed[,]”179 not just the problem the 
inventor was trying to solve.180  Similarly, “in many cases a person of 
ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents to-
gether like pieces of a puzzle”—not just “those elements of prior art 
designed to solve the same problem” on which the inventor is work-
ing.181  Finally, and in the context of “a finite number of identified, 
predictable solutions,” the Supreme Court stated that “the fact that a 
                                                          
 172. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. 
 173. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. 
 174. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. 
 175. Id. at 1740, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
 176. Id. at 1741, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 
988, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 177. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
 178. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396–97. 
 179. Id. at 1742, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397. 
 180. See id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397 (asserting that the obviousness analysis is 
not conducted from the perspective of the patentee but from the perspective of any 
person with ordinary skill in the art). 
 181. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397. 
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combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under 
[35 U.S.C.] § 103,” which further blurred the line between invalidat-
ing obviousness and the non-invalidating “obvious to try” standard.182 
This “expansive” and “flexible” approach toward a defense of obvi-
ousness will potentially make it easier to find a patent invalid for ob-
viousness in court challenges, or for Patent Office examiners to main-
tain claim rejections for obviousness.  This is particularly true for 
those inventions that combine previously known elements without 
demonstrating any unexpected or synergistic results.  Additionally, 
the Supreme Court has broadened the definition of the legal con-
struct of a person of ordinary skill in the art by stating that “[a] per-
son of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity,”183 who may 
rely on “common sense” to render an invention obvious.184  The Su-
preme Court’s rationale was that “[g]ranting patent protection to ad-
vances that would occur in the ordinary course without real innova-
tion retards progress.”185 
It should be noted that one of the prior art references relied upon 
by the Supreme Court in rendering the patent-in-suit invalid was not 
mentioned in the patent’s prosecution.  While the Supreme Court 
did not address the question of whether the “failure to disclose” prior 
art during prosecution “voids the presumption of validity given to is-
sued patents,” it explicitly “note[d] that the rationale underlying the 
presumption . . . seems much diminished here.”186 
II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 
A. Appellate Jurisdiction 
The Federal Circuit is charged with the duty of increasing doctrinal 
stability in the field of patent law.187  To this end, Congress granted 
the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from a final 
decision of a federal district court when the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of that court was based, in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C. 
                                                          
 182. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397. 
 183. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397. 
 184. See id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397 (proposing that technological advances 
driven by design needs or market pressures are likely the result of common sense 
and not necessarily patent-worthy innovation). 
 185. Id. at 1741, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
 186. Id. at 1745, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399. 
 187. See generally S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2–7 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
11, 12–17 (explaining the purpose and structure of the new Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit). 
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§ 1338(a),188 and the case was not based solely on a copyright or trade-
mark claim.189 
Congress indicated that its grant of exclusive jurisdiction should 
not be manipulated: 
This measure is intended to alleviate the serious problems of fo-
rums [sic] shopping among the regional courts of appeals on pat-
ent claims by investing exclusive jurisdiction in one court of ap-
peals.  It is not intended to create forum shopping opportunities 
between the Federal Circuit and the regional courts of appeals on 
other claims.190 
Like all courts, the Federal Circuit “has inherent jurisdiction to de-
termine its own jurisdiction.”191  The court has strictly construed its 
jurisdiction in harmony with its congressional mandate.192  Substance, 
not form, controls the determination, and jurisdiction “cannot be 
conferred [on the court] by waiver or acquiescence.”193  Thus, implicit 
in the court’s mandate is the authority to recharacterize pleadings 
that would improperly evade the intent of Congress.  The following 
cases demonstrate the court’s scrutiny of its jurisdiction. 
In Biotechnology Industry Organization v. District of Columbia,194 two 
drug industry groups challenged a District of Columbia statute that 
regulated the price of patented prescription drugs.195  “Because this 
case [did] not pose the typical questions of patent law—
infringement, validity, enforceability, and the like[,]” the Federal 
Circuit “raised the issue of whether [its] statutory grant of jurisdiction 
encompasse[d] this case sua sponte at oral argument.”196  The Federal 
Circuit concluded that it did have jurisdiction over the matter, pursu-
ant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.197  
In Shaw, the Supreme Court stated: 
                                                          
 188. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) (providing original jurisdiction to federal dis-
trict courts for all federal actions relating to patents, plant variety protection, copy-
rights, and trademarks). 
 189. Id. § 1295(a). 
 190. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 19–20, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 29–30. 
 191. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 877, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 197, 200 
(Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 192. See C.P.C. v. Nosco Plastics, Inc., 719 F.2d 400, 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (recogniz-
ing—in an order granting motion to dismiss and denying motion to assess damages, 
costs, and attorney’s fees—that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is limited 
in its jurisdiction to certain appeals from district courts and that it does not have any 
supervisory authority over the district courts). 
 193. Coastal Corp. v. United States, 713 F.2d 728, 730 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 194. 496 F.3d 1362, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 195. Id. at 1366, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642. 
 196. Id. at 1367, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642. 
 197. Id. at 1368–69, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983)). 
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A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the 
ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute 
which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must 
prevail, thus presents a federal question which the federal courts 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.198 
The Federal Circuit determined that “[t]he phrase ‘arising under’ 
has the same meaning in § 1338 as it does in § 1331, the general fed-
eral-question provision.”199 
Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that the preemption ac-
tion at issue arose under an Act of Congress relating to patents, that 
the district court had jurisdiction based in part on § 1338, and that 
this case fell within its exclusive jurisdiction under § 1295.200  Thus, it 
determined that the appeal was properly before the court and should 
not be transferred back to the D.C. Circuit.201 
In Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP202 and Air Measure-
ment Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP,203 the 
Federal Circuit concluded that federal jurisdiction can extend even 
to patent malpractice suits arising under state law.204  As noted in Air 
Measurement, this was a question of first impression for the court.205 
The Federal Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.206 that federal district 
courts have jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338, over any case 
“in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal 
patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to 
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of 
federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of 
the well-pleaded claims.”207 
The “substantial question of federal patent law” in Immunocept and 
Air Measurement involved prosecution, claim construction, and litiga-
tion of the patents at issue.  In Immunocept, the patentee claimed that 
                                                          
 198. Id. at 1368, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14). 
 199. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644 (citing Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air 
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829–30, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801, 1801–02 (2002)). 
 200. Id. at 1369, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644. 
 201. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644. 
 202. 504 F.3d 1281, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 203. 504 F.3d 1262, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2002 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 204. See Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285–86, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087–88 (hold-
ing that the court has jurisdiction under § 1338 for determination of patent claim 
scope); Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1268–69, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2005–06 (hold-
ing that the court had jurisdiction under § 1338 because the malpractice claim in-
volved substantial questions of federal patent law). 
 205. 504 F.3d at 1267, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004–05. 
 206. 486 U.S. 800, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109 (1988). 
 207. Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1284, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087 (quoting 
Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1113). 
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the prosecuting attorney had made a “fatal flaw”208 by using the limit-
ing phrase “consisting of,” instead of “comprising,” in the claim pre-
ambles.209  This flaw allegedly caused the collapse of Immunocept’s 
and a Johnson & Johnson subsidiary’s negotiations to conduct clinical 
trials and commercialize the invention.210  In Air Measurement, the 
plaintiff alleged that it would have prevailed in an earlier litigation 
had it not been for certain errors committed by its attorneys during 
prosecution and litigation of the patent in question.211 
In both cases the Federal Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ state-law 
malpractice claims rested on substantial questions of patent law.  In 
Immunocept, for example, the Federal Circuit found that the determi-
nation of claim scope is a “complex” issue due to its diverse claim 
construction doctrines and thus would “benefit from federal judges 
who are used to handling these complicated rules.”212  In Air Measure-
ment, the court found that the issue of damages, which is not unique 
to malpractice or patent law, also invokes federal jurisdiction because 
the plaintiff must prove that its patent was infringed in order to re-
cover damages.213  Even the prior litigant’s invalidity defenses may be 
taken into account for jurisdictional purposes because the plaintiff 
must show that it would have prevailed in that suit had it not been for 
its attorneys’ alleged malpractice.214  Notably, the law firm’s own pat-
ent-based defenses were not relevant to jurisdiction, which under 
§ 1338 is limited to examining the “well-pleaded complaint.”215 
In Voda v. Cordis Corp.,216 the Federal Circuit, in a split decision with 
Judge Newman dissenting,217 addressed whether it had supplemental 
jurisdiction over infringement claims based on foreign patents.218  
                                                          
 208. Id. at 1283, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086. 
 209. Id. at 1286, 1285 n.3, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087 n.3, 1088. 
 210. Id. at 1283, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086. 
 211. Air Measurement Tech., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504 
F.3d 1262, 1266, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2002, 2003–04 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 212. 504 F.3d at 1285, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088.  Unfortunately for Immuno-
cept, the court affirmed that the two-year statute of limitations had run because Im-
munocept’s attorney knew or should have known of the limiting effects of the term 
“consisting of” when he examined the patents.  The attorney’s knowledge was im-
puted to Immunocept because he was acting within the scope of his authority when 
he reviewed the patents, even if he did not have the duty to communicate such 
knowledge to Immunocept.  Id. at 1286–89, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088–90. 
 213. 504 F.3d at 1270–71, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2007. 
 214. Id. at 1268–69, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2006. 
 215. See id. at 1268, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2005 (determining that under the 
well-pleaded complaint rule, jurisdiction arises only from statements appearing in 
the plaintiff’s claim); see also Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1284, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1087 (invoking the well-pleaded complaint rule to establish federal jurisdiction). 
 216. 476 F.3d 887, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 217. Id. at 905, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 218. Id. at 893, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (majority opinion). 
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The district court, having jurisdiction over Voda’s original patent in-
fringement claims, had granted leave for Voda to amend his com-
plaint to add infringement claims based on foreign patents.219  The 
district court rested its jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which grants 
federal district courts “supplemental jurisdiction over other claims 
within the same case or controversy, as long as the action is one in 
which the district courts would have original jurisdiction.”220  Pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the district court certified an order for inter-
locutory review to determine “whether the district court has supple-
mental subject matter jurisdiction over Dr. Voda’s five foreign pat-
ents.”221 
The Federal Circuit answered in the negative.  The court relied on 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 1367(a)’s requirement “that 
foreign claims be ‘so related to claims in the action within such origi-
nal jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or contro-
versy.’”222  The Federal Circuit explained that the Supreme Court had 
interpreted this provision as codification by Congress of the Court’s 
principles of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction by which the fed-
eral courts’ original jurisdiction over federal questions carries with 
it jurisdiction over state law claims that “derive from a common nu-
cleus of operative fact,” such that “the relationship between [the fed-
eral] claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the en-
tire action before the court comprises but one constitutional 
‘case.’”223 
Quoting Stein Associates, Inc. v. Heat & Control, Inc.,224 the Federal 
Circuit stated that “[w]ith regard to the relationship between foreign 
and U.S. patent infringement claims, . . . ‘the issues are not the same’ 
where ‘one action involv[es] United States patents and the other in-
volv[es] British patents.’”225  The court also cited Mars, Inc. v. Kabu-
shiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux,226 in which the Federal Circuit had con-
cluded that the district court did not have jurisdiction over Japanese 
patent claims because:  “[1] [t]he respective patents [were] different, 
[2] the accused devices [were] different, [3] the alleged acts [were] 
                                                          
 219. Id. at 889, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770. 
 220. Id. at 893, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Alla-
pattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558 (2005)). 
 221. Id. at 890, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770 (quoting Voda v. Cordis Corp., 122 
Fed. App’x 515, 515 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 222. Id. at 894, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 223. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (alteration in original) (quoting Chicago v. 
Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164–65 (1997)). 
 224. 748 F.2d 653, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 225. Voda, 476 F.3d at 894, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Stein, 748 F.2d at 658, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1280). 
 226. 24 F.3d 1368, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1621 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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different, and [4] the governing laws [were] different.”227  However, 
“the district court did not articulate any findings regarding the Mars 
factors.”228 
The Federal Circuit thus found several reasons why the district 
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign patent 
claims:  (1) there was no “common nucleus of operative fact” because 
the foreign patent claims were different, the accused devices were dif-
ferent, the alleged acts were different, and the governing laws were 
different;229 (2) nothing in patent treaties contemplates or allows one 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the patents of another;230 (3) Voda did not 
show that it would be more convenient for a U.S. court to assume 
supplemental jurisdiction;231 (4) Voda did not show that the foreign 
courts would inadequately protect his foreign patent rights;232 and 
(5) the act of state doctrine, which “requires that, in the process of 
deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own juris-
dictions shall be deemed valid,” given that the grant of a patent by a 
sovereign is an act of state.233 
The Federal Circuit also compared the limits of rights granted by 
patents to those conferred by land grants and found that “adjudica-
tion of Voda’s foreign patent infringement claims should be left to 
the sovereigns that create the property rights in the first instance.”234  
Supplemental jurisdiction over the foreign patent infringement 
claims would not further judicial economy due to the lack of institu-
tional competence of the U.S. courts in foreign patent regimes, and 
“the likelihood of jury confusion in applying the different patent re-
gimes could result in separate trials.”235 
Judge Newman dissented on the basis that U.S. courts routinely 
apply foreign law;236 there were probably not any differences between 
patents beyond the understanding of a U.S. court;237 judges should 
not avoid cases on the basis of complexity;238 granting a patent is not 
                                                          
 227. Voda, 476 F.3d at 895, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773–74 (quoting Mars, 24 
F.3d at 1375, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625–26). 
 228. Id. at 896, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 229. Id. at 895–96, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 230. Id. at 899–901, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777–79. 
 231. Id. at 901, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
 232. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
 233. Id. at 904, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781 (quoting W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. 
Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990)). 
 234. Id. at 902, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779. 
 235. Id. at 903, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780. 
 236. Id. at 906–10, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782–85 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 237. Id. at 911, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786. 
 238. Id. at 912–13, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786–88. 
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an act of state;239 and the case “does not raise issues of comity, treaty, 
and diplomacy, when judgments are sought to be enforced in an-
other country.”240 
In HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co.,241 the 
Federal Circuit was faced with an issue of first impression, namely, 
whether the district court’s decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to de-
cline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims and 
to remand to the state court was within the class of remands set forth 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and thus barred from appellate review under 
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).242  In pertinent part, defendants successfully re-
moved HIF’s original complaint from a California state court to a 
federal district court.243  HIF filed an amended complaint, in which it 
asserted a federal claim under the federal Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and eleven purported state-law 
claims, including claims for declaratory judgment of inventorship 
and ownership of various anti-cancer, anti-angiogenesis drugs.244  The 
district court dismissed the RICO claim, declined to exercise supple-
mental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, and re-
manded the case to state court.245 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit declined to consider whether HIF’s 
remanded claims raised a substantial issue of federal patent law—
inventorship—but disposed of the appeal “on a threshold issue—
whether [the] court ha[d] appellate jurisdiction to review the district 
court’s remand order.”246  While acknowledging that it had not yet 
addressed this particular issue, the Federal Circuit noted that several 
other Courts of Appeals, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill,247 have held that § 1447(d) 
does not bar review of a remand order based on declining supple-
                                                          
 239. Id. at 914–15, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788–89.  Newman explained: 
the common thread [in determining whether a particular governmental ac-
tion is an act of state] is whether the issue is one that is normally consigned 
to the executive branches, such that an international dispute is resolved by 
political negotiations between diplomats; or whether the issue is more suit-
able to the individual review that is given to litigants in judicial proceedings 
dealing with specific facts. 
Id. at 914, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788. 
 240. Id. at 915, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789. 
 241. 508 F.3d 659, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 242. Id. at 665, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244. 
 243. Id. at 661, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241. 
 244. Id. at 662, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241. 
 245. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242. 
 246. Id. at 663, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242. 
 247. 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
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mental jurisdiction.248  Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit further ob-
served that a concurring opinion by Justices Kennedy and Ginsberg 
in Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca249 introduced a degree of uncer-
tainty about this conclusion, when they explained that the Court in 
Cohill “did not find it necessary to decide whether [§ 1447](d) would 
bar review of a remand on these grounds.”250 
While there is “no decision that grapples with Justice Kennedy’s 
Things Remembered concurrence,”251 the Federal Circuit found that the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Ser-
vices, Inc.252 “made the uncertainty introduced by Justice Ken-
nedy’s . . . concurrence precedential.”253  In particular, Powerex stated, 
“[i]t is far from clear . . . that when discretionary supplemental juris-
diction is declined the remand is not based on lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction for purposes of § 1447(c) and § 1447(d)”254 and further 
that the Court has “never passed on whether Cohill remands are sub-
ject matter jurisdictional for purposes of post-1988 versions of 
§ 1447(c) and § 1447(d).”255 
Left to its own analysis, the Federal Circuit held that when a district 
court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to claims “over 
which it has no independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., 
state claims[,] . . . [it] strips the claims of the only basis on which they 
are within the jurisdiction of the court.”256  The court concluded: 
In short, because every § 1367(c) remand necessarily involves a 
predicate finding that the claims at issue lack an independent basis 
of subject matter jurisdiction, a remand based on declining sup-
plemental jurisdiction can be colorably characterized as a remand 
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Accordingly, a remand 
based on declining supplemental jurisdiction must be considered 
                                                          
 248. HIF Bio, 508 F.3d at 665, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244; see, e.g., Trans Penn 
Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 223–24 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing precedents in 
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits); see 
also 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3740 n.39 (3d ed. 1998) (listing examples of cases that dis-
cuss the appealability of removal orders by district courts on discretionary grounds). 
 249. 516 U.S. 124 (1995). 
 250. HIF Bio, 508 F.3d at 665, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 130 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 251. Id. at 665, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244. 
 252. 127 S. Ct. 2411 (2007). 
 253. HIF Bio, 508 F.3d at 666, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244. 
 254. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244 (alteration in original) (quoting Powerex, 
127 S. Ct. at 2418–19). 
 255. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244 (quoting Powerex, 127 S. Ct. at 2419 n.4). 
 256. Id. at 667, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245. 
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within the class of remands described in § 1447(c) and thus barred 
from appellate review by § 1447(d).257 
B. Final Judgment Rule 
Appellate courts have historically disfavored piecemeal litigation 
and thus, with limited exceptions, have permitted appeals only from 
complete and final judgments.258  In the case of the Federal Circuit, 
the “final judgment rule” for patent disputes arising under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338 is set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 1295, which states that parties may 
appeal only a “final decision of a district court.”259  The Supreme 
Court has defined a final judgment as a decision by the district court 
that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the 
court to do but execute the judgment.”260  By requiring parties to 
“raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment 
on the merits,”261 § 1295, like its counterpart § 1291, “forbid[s] 
piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a 
single controversy.”262  Thus, there is no “final decision” under 28 
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), and therefore no Federal Circuit jurisdiction, 
unless a case has been fully adjudicated as to all claims for all parties 
or there was an express determination that there is no just reason for 
delay or express direction for entry of judgment as to fewer than all 
of the parties or claims.263 
The finality of the judgment was a central issue in SafeTCare Manu-
facturing, Inc. v. Tele-Made, Inc.,264 in which the district court had en-
tered summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of appellee 
Burke and another defendant, and then proceeded to enter a “final 
judgment” and dismissed the action, even though it had not yet re-
solved the claims against the other defendants or their counter-
claims.265 
The Federal Circuit explained that a court of appeals has jurisdic-
tion over a “final judgment” only “when it terminates the litigation 
                                                          
 257. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245. 
 258. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1945) (pointing to the con-
servation of judicial energy and the prevention of delays as policy reasons for limiting 
appellate review to final judgments). 
 259. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). 
 260. Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233. 
 261. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). 
 262. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). 
 263. See Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prod., Inc., 320 F.3d 1354, 1362, 65 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1985, 1990–91 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that determining whether a dis-
trict court’s order constitutes a final judgment is a function of pragmatic and not 
formalistic analysis). 
 264. 497 F.3d 1262, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1618 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 265. Id. at 1266, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620. 
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between the parties on the merits of the case, and leaves nothing to 
be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.”266  
The “final judgment” in this case was premature because it did not 
resolve SafeTCare’s claims against the other defendants or their 
counterclaims.267  As a result, the district court’s purported “final 
judgment” did not establish appellate subject matter jurisdiction, re-
gardless of the district court’s own description of its order or any be-
lief, concession, or agreement by the parties.268 
Nonetheless, this issue became moot once the district court belat-
edly entered a Rule 54(b) judgment nunc pro tunc, following the 
Federal Circuit’s notification to the parties of the jurisdictional prob-
lem.269  A Rule 54(b) judgment is an exception to the final judgment 
rule, for it ripened SafeTCare’s appeal and vested the Federal Circuit 
with jurisdiction.270 
In Walter Kidde Portable Equipment, Inc. v. Universal Security Instru-
ments, Inc.,271 the Federal Circuit rejected Kidde’s argument that the 
court lacked jurisdiction because the district court’s dismissal order 
was not a final and appealable judgment.272  In limited circumstances, 
the court explained, it could also “entertain an appeal from an order 
deciding less than the entire case, such as . . . an interlocutory order 
certified by a district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).”273  In this 
case, the district court’s order stated “that the ‘action’ was dismissed, 
not simply the complaint.”274  The court interpreted the term “action” 
to encompass the entire proceeding, including termination of the de-
fendant’s counterclaims.275  “Accordingly, [the Federal Circuit] con-
strued the district court’s order granting Kidde’s motion for volun-
tary dismissal as disposing of the entire case, including [Universal’s] 
counterclaims, and [asserted] jurisdiction over th[e] appeal, pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).”276 
                                                          
 266. Id. at 1267, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621 (quoting Parr v. United States, 351 
U.S. 513, 518 (1956)). 
 267. Id. at 1266, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620. 
 268. Id. at 1267, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621. 
 269. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621. 
 270. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621. 
 271. 479 F.3d 1330, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 272. Id. at 1334–35, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932. 
 273. Id. at 1335, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932. 
 274. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932. 
 275. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932; cf. Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Work-
ers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The word ‘action,’ without 
more, is arguably broad enough to encompass any type of judicial proceeding, in-
cluding counterclaims.”). 
 276. Walter Kidde, 479 F.3d at 1335, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933. 
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In International Electronic Technology Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,277 
however, the Federal Circuit warned that “the parties and other 
members of the bar are hereby placed on notice that the court shall 
in the future begin to cite counsel for failure to determine whether 
or not the appealed judgment is final.”278  The district court had 
granted summary judgment to Hughes, but Hughes had not dis-
missed its outstanding counterclaims before the plaintiff filed a no-
tice of appeal.279  “A final decision, as defined by the Supreme Court, 
is a decision issued by the trial court which ‘ends the litigation on the 
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg-
ment.’”280  Under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
however, a district court may “direct the entry of a final judgment as 
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon 
an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and 
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.”281  Since the 
parties had failed to obtain such a partial judgment, the court found 
that the appeal was premature.282 
C. Interlocutory Appeals 
Although the Federal Circuit has the authority to hear interlocu-
tory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1),283 interlocutory appeals 
have not been widely pursued, due to the court’s reluctance to hear 
them.  However, in Regents of the University of California v. Dako North 
America, Inc.,284 the Federal Circuit took the unusual step of granting a 
petition for an interlocutory appeal from a claim construction rul-
ing.285  The claim constructions at issue had already been put before 
the court in two pending appeals from the district court’s denial of 
the appellant’s motion for preliminary injunction.286  After those ap-
peals had been filed, however, the district court revisited its claim 
construction rulings in light of new evidence.287  The Federal Circuit 
found that it would be “an efficient use of judicial resources and 
                                                          
 277. 476 F.3d 1329, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1543 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 278. Id. at 1331, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1544. 
 279. Id. at 1330, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1544. 
 280. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1543 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 
U.S. 463, 467 (1978)). 
 281. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
 282. Int’l Elec., 476 F.3d at 1331, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1544. 
 283. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1) (2000) (authorizing the Federal Circuit’s jurisdic-
tion over “an appeal from an interlocutory order or decree . . . in any case over which 
the court would have jurisdiction of an appeal under section 1295 of this title”). 
 284. 477 F.3d 1335, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 285. Id. at 1337, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927. 
 286. Id. at 1336, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926. 
 287. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927. 
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would facilitate resolution of all of the claim construction disputes” to 
grant the petition for interlocutory review and consider the district 
court’s revised claim construction in conjunction with the pending 
appeals.288  Indeed, denial of the interlocutory appeals would have left 
the merits panel to review an admittedly outdated claim construction 
order.289  “Because the matters in the recent [claim construction] or-
der [were] thus intertwined with the issues in the pending appeals, 
[the Federal Circuit] determine[d] that granting the petition in 
these unusual circumstances [was] warranted.”290 
The Federal Circuit declined to consider an interlocutory appeal of 
a civil contempt order in Entegris, Inc. v. Pall Corp.291  The district 
court had initially granted Entegris’s motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion but dissolved it after Pall had presented new evidence that chal-
lenged the validity of the patents at issue.292  Nonetheless, the district 
court held Pall in civil contempt for violating the (now dissolved) pre-
liminary injunction by continuing to sell the accused products after it 
had been ordered not to do so.293  Pall appealed the civil contempt 
order, while Entegris cross-appealed the dismissal of the preliminary 
injunction order.294 
The Federal Circuit concluded it did not have jurisdiction over the 
civil contempt order and dismissed Pall’s appeal.295  Pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292, the court’s jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals ex-
tends only to interlocutory orders “granting, continuing, modifying, 
refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify 
injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme 
Court.”296  Since Pall’s contempt order did not fall under any of these 
categories, and Pall did not allege that it would suffer “irreparable 
consequence” if it were unable to appeal the order, the Federal Cir-
cuit concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over Pall’s interlocu-
tory appeal.297 
Neither did the court find jurisdiction under the “final judgment 
rule” of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a).298  A contempt order against a party-
                                                          
 288. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927. 
 289. Id. at 1337, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927. 
 290. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927. 
 291. 490 F.3d 1340, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 292. Id. at 1341–42, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003. 
 293. Id. at 1342, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003. 
 294. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003. 
 295. Id. at 1345–46, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 296. Id. at 1343, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) 
(2000)). 
 297. Id. at 1345–46, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 298. Id. at 1348, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008. 
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litigant is appealable only from the final judgment in the litigation; in 
other words, it is not an appealable final judgment unless the party in 
contempt is not a party to the action.299  The Federal Circuit also 
found it would have been inappropriate to exercise pendent jurisdic-
tion over the civil contempt order because the facts underlying that 
order were not “inextricably intertwined” with those underlying the 
preliminary injunction order.300 
The Federal Circuit then held that it did have jurisdiction over 
Entegris’s cross-appeal of the order dissolving the preliminary injunc-
tion.301  That order, the court found, rested only on the alleged inva-
lidity of patents in view of newly discovered prior art.302  In so holding, 
the court rejected Pall’s argument that non-infringement was a sec-
ond, independent basis to support that order.303  Pall’s assertion that 
its new product was not infringing instead went to the question of ir-
reparable harm.304  Having satisfied itself of its jurisdiction over En-
tergis’s cross-appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected that appeal on its 
merits, finding that the district court had not abused its discretion in 
dissolving the preliminary injunction because Pall’s new invalidity de-
fense had substantial merit.305 
D. Declaratory Judgment 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech Inc.,306 which rejected the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable ap-
prehension of suit”307 test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction, the 
Federal Circuit has significantly lowered the bar for determining 
when “a case of actual controversy” exists within its jurisdiction.  The 
following cases highlight the Federal Circuit’s new standard for de-
termining whether declaratory judgment jurisdiction will arise. 
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.308 was the Federal Circuit’s 
first substantive examination of declaratory judgment jurisdiction af-
ter MedImmune.  While MedImmune examined declaratory judgment 
                                                          
 299. See Doyle v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 204 U.S. 599, 603 (1907) 
(holding that contempt orders were to be viewed as interlocutory and were only to 
be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment in the case); see also Fox v. Capital Co., 
299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936) (restating the rule that civil contempt orders may only be 
reviewed on appeal from a final judgment). 
 300. Entegris, 490 F.3d at 1349, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009. 
 301. Id. at 1350, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009. 
 302. Id. at 1351, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010. 
 303. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010. 
 304. Id. at 1350, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010. 
 305. Id. at 1352, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011. 
 306. 127 S. Ct. 764, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (2007). 
 307. Id. at 774 n.11, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 n.11. 
 308. 480 F.3d 1372, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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jurisdiction in the context of a signed license agreement,309 SanDisk 
took those principles one step farther by applying them to conduct 
prior to the existence of a license.310 
STMicroelectronics (“ST”) had contacted SanDisk in April 2004 to 
propose cross-licensing their patents on flash memory technology.311  
Despite extensive discussions over the next six months, including 
representations that the parties would not sue each other, the parties 
were unable to reach an agreement.312  SanDisk finally brought a 
complaint against ST for infringement of one of its patents and de-
claratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity with respect to 
fourteen ST patents.313  The district court granted ST’s motion to 
dismiss SanDisk’s declaratory judgment claims because SanDisk did 
not have a reasonable apprehension of suit under the pre-MedImmune 
standard.314  SanDisk appealed.315 
The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s opinion and re-
manded for further proceedings.316  In MedImmune, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the Declaratory Judgment Act, in light of Article 
III, to require “a substantial controversy, between parties having ad-
verse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the 
issuance of a declaratory judgment.”317  The dispute must be “‘definite 
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse 
legal interests’; and . . . be ‘real and substantial’ and ‘admi[t] of spe-
cific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distin-
guished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hy-
pothetical state of facts.’”318  A declaratory judgment plaintiff, 
however, is not required “to expose himself to liability before bring-
ing suit to challenge the basis for the threat” because “the declaratory 
judgment procedure is an alternative to pursuit of the arguably illegal 
activity.”319  “The dilemma posed by that coercion—putting the chal-
lenger to the choice between abandoning his rights or risking prose-
                                                          
 309. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 767, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. 
 310. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180 (holding that de-
claratory judgment jurisdiction can exist prior to the existence of a patent license). 
 311. Id. at 1374, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175. 
 312. Id. at 1374–76, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175–76. 
 313. Id. at 1376, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176. 
 314. Id. at 1376–77, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176–77. 
 315. Id. at 1377, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177. 
 316. Id. at 1383, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
 317. Id. at 1378, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178 (quoting MedImmune Inc. v. 
Genentech Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 771, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1229 (2007)). 
 318. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178 (second alteration in original) (quoting 
MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 771, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229). 
 319. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178 (quoting MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 772, 81 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230). 
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cution—is a dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act to ameliorate.”320 
With those principles in mind, the Federal Circuit explained that 
“Article III jurisdiction may be met where the patentee takes a posi-
tion that puts the declaratory judgment plaintiff in the position of ei-
ther pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandoning that which he 
claims a right to do.”321  While declining to set forth “the outer 
boundaries of declaratory judgment jurisdiction,” the court stated: 
We hold only that where a patentee asserts rights under a patent 
based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity of another 
party, and where that party contends that it has the right to engage 
in the accused activity without license, an Article III case or contro-
versy will arise and the party need not risk a suit for infringement 
by engaging in the identified activity before seeking a declaration 
of its legal rights.322 
The Federal Circuit concluded that ST’s pursuit of “a royalty under 
its patents based on specific, identified activity by SanDisk” gave rise 
to declaratory judgment jurisdiction.323  In particular, ST had made 
detailed infringement presentations to SanDisk, which included a 
“thorough infringement analysis . . . by seasoned litigation experts,”324 
an “element-by-element” analysis of each of SanDisk’s allegedly in-
fringing products,325 “liberal[] refer[ences] to SanDisk’s present, on-
going infringement of ST’s patents and the need for SanDisk to li-
cense those patents[,]”326 a 300-page “packet of materials” containing 
each of ST’s fourteen allegedly infringed patents,327 “reverse engi-
neering reports for certain of SanDisk’s products, and diagrams 
showing a detailed infringement analysis of SanDisk’s products[,]”328 
and related communications.329  In response, SanDisk “maintained 
that it could proceed in its conduct without the payment of royalties 
to ST.”330  Those facts were sufficient to evince the creation of “a sub-
stantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interest, of 
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declara-
                                                          
 320. Id. at 1378–79, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178 (quoting MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. 
at 773, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230). 
 321. Id. at 1381, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179–80. 
 322. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180. 
 323. Id. at 1382, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180. 
 324. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180. 
 325. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180. 
 326. Id. at 1382, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180–81. 
 327. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
 328. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
 329. See id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181 (relating that ST communicated to San-
Disk its determination of infringement and its assertion of the right to royalties). 
 330. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
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tory judgment.”331  Furthermore, borrowing language from MedIm-
mune, the court concluded that “SanDisk need not ‘bet the farm,’ so 
to speak, and risk a suit for infringement by cutting off licensing dis-
cussions and continuing in the identified activity before seeking a 
declaration of its legal rights.”332 
Declaratory judgment jurisdiction was not defeated by SanDisk’s 
assertions that it would not sue ST 
because ST has engaged in a course of conduct that shows a pre-
paredness and willingness to enforce its patent rights despite [this] 
statement.  Having approached SanDisk, having made a studied 
and considered determination of infringement by SanDisk, having 
communicated that determination to SanDisk, and then saying that 
it does not intend to sue, ST is engaging in the kinds of “extra-
judicial patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run tac-
tics” that the Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to obviate.333 
The Supreme Court, moreover, has rejected the “reasonable ap-
prehension” test, which had provided the only “sound basis” for the 
district court’s refusal to adjudicate SanDisk’s declaratory judgment 
claims.334  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated that decision and 
remanded the case.335 
SanDisk figured prominently in the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Guardian Media Technologies, Ltd.336  Defendant-
patentee Guardian had contacted a number of companies about al-
legedly infringing its patents on “methods and apparatuses for block-
ing the viewing of certain television programs.”337  Guardian provided 
each company with detailed claim charts setting forth its infringe-
ment contentions and engaged in protracted discussions and corre-
spondence.338  None of the companies accepted Guardian’s offer of a 
license, however, and instead filed separate actions for declaratory 
judgment of non-infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability.339  
The complaints were consolidated and dismissed by the district court 
                                                          
 331. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil 
Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). 
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Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 774 n.11, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1232 n.11 (2007)). 
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Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1688 (1988)). 
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 335. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181. 
 336. 497 F.3d 1271, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 337. See id. at 1274–81, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800–06 (documenting the corre-
spondence between Guardian and Sony, Matsushita, JVC, and Mitsubishi). 
 338. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800–06. 
 339. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800–06. 
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for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.340  As in SanDisk, the Federal 
Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissals because the parties’ 
conduct and adverse positions demonstrated the presence of an “ac-
tual controversy,” which was ripe for judicial determination.341 
In so holding, the Federal Circuit found no affirmative evidence to 
support Guardian’s allegations that the declaratory judgment plain-
tiffs had filed their complaints as an “intimidation tactic to gain lev-
erage in the licensing negotiations.”342  Even if the lawsuits did place 
the plaintiffs in a more favorable negotiating position, “that effect is 
not a sufficient reason to decline to hear the suit,” the court wrote.343  
Nonetheless, the court instructed the district court to reconsider on 
remand whether to exercise its discretion to dismiss or stay the 
claims, particularly in light of the fact that the patents were undergo-
ing reexamination.344 
SanDisk was also followed by Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novar-
tis Pharmaceuticals Corp.,345 in which the Federal Circuit examined de-
claratory judgment jurisdiction in the context of Abbreviated New 
Drug Applications (“ANDAs”) and 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).346  In 2004, 
Teva filed an ANDA for generic famciclovir tablets, in which it certi-
fied that the five Novartis Famvir Orange Book patents were either 
invalid or not infringed by Teva’s proposed drug.347  When Novartis 
sued for infringement of one of its five patents under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1), Teva brought a declaratory judgment suit on the four 
remaining patents under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) and 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(C), which entitles an ANDA applicant to bring a declara-
tory judgment action “to obtain patent certainty” on any patent iden-
tified in the paragraph IV certification but not included in an in-
fringement suit.348  On Novartis’s motion, the district court dismissed 
Teva’s declaratory judgment complaint because Teva had no reason-
able apprehension of being sued on the four patents Novartis had 
not asserted in its complaint.349  Teva appealed.350 
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The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Teva’s 
declaratory judgment action.351  As in SanDisk, the Federal Circuit re-
counted in detail the Supreme Court’s analysis of the “actual contro-
versy” requirements of the Declaratory Judgment Act and 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(5).352  With that framework in mind, the court proceeded to 
find that Teva had an “injury-in-fact” and thus a justiciable contro-
versy under Article III.353 
The court explained that Novartis had created a present and actual 
controversy by suing Teva under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) for filing 
an ANDA.354  Since an ANDA is a “single act of infringement,”355 re-
gardless of the number of patents it identified, it did not matter that 
Novartis had elected to sue on only one of the five patents, or that 
Teva had filed a separate declaratory judgment action on the other 
four patents.356  Those complaints all arose from the same “contro-
versy” created when Novartis listed its Famvir patents in the Orange 
Book.357 
The Federal Circuit then found that other actions by the parties 
collectively established a “justiciable controversy,” which could be re-
solved by allowing Teva to bring a declaratory judgment action 
against Novartis.358  For example, Novartis’s listing of its Famvir pat-
ents in the Orange Book meant that it could reasonably assert a claim 
of infringement against an unlicensed party making, using, or selling 
its claimed inventions.359  Second, Teva’s submission of an ANDA gave 
rise to Novartis’s infringement suit as well as Teva’s “justiciable de-
claratory judgment controversy.”360  Third, the statutory “civil action 
to obtain patent certainty,”361 the ANDA declaratory judgment provi-
sion,362 and the Hatch-Waxman Act363 combine to prevent patentees 
like Novartis from “gaming” the system by bringing suit on only one 
of the five patents Teva named in its ANDA in order to invoke the 
statute’s thirty-month stay on Teva’s ANDA while shielding the other 
                                                          
 351. Id. at 1334, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226. 
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patents from a validity challenge.364  Fourth, Novartis’s infringement 
suit against Teva on one patent was sufficient to create “an actual de-
claratory judgment controversy as to all the paragraph IV certified 
patents.”365  Finally, there was a “present and real harm” that Novartis 
could bring a future litigation against Teva on its other four Famvir 
patents if Teva was not allowed to bring a declaratory judgment ac-
tion against Novartis on those patents.366 
The Federal Circuit concluded that these factors demonstrated 
that “Teva has an injury-in-fact and a justiciable controversy that can 
be fully resolved by a declaratory judgment.”367  Since “Teva’s injuries 
are traceable to Novartis’ conduct and those injuries can be redressed 
by a favorable judicial decision[,]” the Federal Circuit concluded that 
“Teva has established standing and an actual controversy . . . to con-
fer jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act.”368 
In Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc.,369 OrthoArm argued that the dis-
trict court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case.370  Ac-
cording to OrthoArm, “the court itself stated that it lacked adequate 
information to decide the jurisdictional issue, but then proceeded to 
deny OrthoArm’s motion, thereby improperly assuming jurisdic-
tion.”371  OrthoArm further argued that “the court lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to decide the case” because the “reasonable appre-
hension of an imminent infringement suit” was absent.372  In 
particular, according to OrthoArm, a letter threatening Adenta, stat-
ing that Orthoarm would “pursue its available legal remedies” in the 
event of a breach of the License Agreement, did not create in Adenta 
the reasonable apprehension that it would be sued.373 
The Federal Circuit quoted its earlier holding in SanDisk, stating 
that “where a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain 
identified ongoing or planned activity of another party,” and where 
that party asserts its “right to engage in the accused activity without a 
license under the patent,” a case or controversy will arise and the 
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party does not have to risk an infringement suit “by engaging in the 
identified activity before seeking a declaration of its legal rights.”374 
While SanDisk, Sony, Teva, and Adenta all examined when pre-
litigation activities may create declaratory judgment jurisdiction, at the 
other end of the spectrum is Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.,375 
which examined when post-litigation conduct may remove declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction.376 
In pertinent part, Benitec’s original infringement case was ren-
dered moot by the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the safe 
harbor provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) in its Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Life Sciences377 decision.378  After Benitec voluntarily dismissed its 
claims, the district court dismissed Nucleonics’s counterclaims of pat-
ent invalidity for lack of declaratory judgment jurisdiction.379  Benitec, 
however, covenanted not to sue Nucleonics only with respect to Nu-
cleonics’s prior activities but not with respect to its ongoing and fu-
ture research activities.380  Nucleonics argued that these potential 
claims for infringement were sufficient to support jurisdiction for a 
declaratory judgment.381  The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, 
finding that Nucleonics had failed to show that it was “engaged in any 
present activity that could subject it to a claim of infringement by 
Benitec” and had further failed to show a claim of “‘sufficient imme-
diacy and reality’ to support declaratory judgment jurisdiction.”382 
Judge Dyk dissented, citing the Supreme Court’s holding in Cardi-
nal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc.383 that once declaratory ju-
risdiction has been established, jurisdiction continues unless the 
party seeking to divest the court of jurisdiction can prove that there is 
no longer a current case or controversy.384  Thus, even if the pat-
entee’s infringement claim becomes moot, “a counterclaim for inva-
lidity should not be dismissed unless the patentee demonstrates that 
there is no possibility of a future controversy with respect to invalid-
ity.”385  Cardinal Chemical reversed the Federal Circuit’s initial holding 
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“that a finding of non-infringement moots a declaratory counterclaim 
for invalidity,” according to Judge Dyk.386 
E. Motion to Dismiss 
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted is a purely procedural question not pertaining to pat-
ent law.  Thus, on review the Federal Circuit applies the law of the 
regional circuit.387 
In McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,388 the Federal Circuit reversed the 
district court’s dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s complaint for failure to 
adequately state a claim for patent and trademark infringement.389  
The court, relying on the law of the regional circuit, noted that the 
bar for pro se litigants may be lower than that for litigants repre-
sented by an attorney.390  McZeal met this low bar, according to the 
majority, by pleading that he owned the patent and trademark in 
question and that they were infringed by the defendants’ Motorola 
i930 and related cell phone products.391  It was not necessary for 
McZeal to know how the accused devices worked for the purpose of 
satisfying Rule 12(b)(6).392  Nor was it proper for the district court at 
the pleading stage to determine that McZeal’s trademark is invalid as 
generic, which is a question of fact.393 
Judge Dyk dissented with respect to the majority’s vacatur of the 
dismissal of the patent infringement claim.394  Since the claim was 
predicated on the doctrine of equivalents, Judge Dyk argued that 
even a pro se plaintiff was required to plead with more specificity re-
garding which limitations were infringed literally or by equivalents 
and how the accused product was insubstantially different from the 
claims.395 
In RFR Industries, Inc. v. Century Steps, Inc.,396 the Federal Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 
41(a)(1)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes 
a plaintiff to dismiss the action without a court order by filing a no-
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tice before the defendant serves its answer.397  In this case, Century 
claimed Rule 41(a)(1)(i) did not apply because it had faxed its an-
swer to the complaint before RFR voluntarily dismissed the action.398  
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding there was no “exceptional 
good cause” exception to Rule 5(b)(2)’s requirement that service by 
fax be consented to in writing.399  The court further noted that, ac-
cording to the advisory committee notes for Rule 5, consent to service 
by fax “must be express, and cannot be implied from conduct.”400 
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s order granting 
the plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal in Walter Kidde Portable 
Equipment, Inc. v. Universal Security Instruments, Inc.,401 despite certain 
harmless legal errors.  In what the court described as a “tortuous pro-
cedural history,” Kidde filed a complaint (“Kidde I”), which Defen-
dant Universal Security Instruments (“USI”) moved to dismiss for 
improper venue and lack of standing because Kidde allegedly did not 
own the patent at the time it filed suit.402  The district court denied 
the motion without addressing the standing issue, and the parties 
proceeded to litigate Kidde I.403  However, Kidde eventually moved to 
dismiss the action after the court granted USI’s motion to exclude 
Kidde’s expert reports as untimely and began to examine Kidde’s 
standing more closely.404  On the same day, Kidde filed a new action 
(“Kidde II”) in which it sought to resolve the standing issue by point-
ing to a corrected assignment of the patent at issue.405  The district 
court dismissed Kidde I without prejudice or conditions, and USI ap-
pealed.406 
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had acted 
within its discretion in dismissing Kidde I without prejudice or condi-
tions.407  USI had not shown any severe prejudice, the court found, 
because USI could rely on the same factual and legal resources in 
Kidde II that it had developed in Kidde I.408  Furthermore, the in 
limine ruling excluding Kidde’s expert reports was due to the timing 
of trial, and thus did not convey any rights to USI that were improp-
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erly taken away when Kidde I was dismissed.409  However, the Federal 
Circuit found the district court had erred in dismissing USI’s coun-
terclaims and failing to resolve the standing issue when it dismissed 
Kidde I.410  Nonetheless, these were harmless errors, which did not 
warrant a remand, because USI could reassert its counterclaims in 
Kidde II, and Kidde resolved the standing question before filing Kidde 
II.411 
In General Mills, Inc. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc.412 (General Mills II), the 
Federal Circuit initially affirmed the district court’s decision that 
Kraft did not have a counterclaim pending at the time judgment was 
entered.413  Although Kraft responded to General Mills’ original com-
plaint with a counterclaim, Kraft later secured the dismissal of Gen-
eral Mills’ subsequently filed amended complaint.414  The Federal 
Circuit held that Kraft did not “toll its deadline to answer the 
amended complaint and reassert its counterclaim” by filing its mo-
tion to dismiss.415  “Accordingly, [the Federal Circuit] concluded that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit 
Kraft to reassert the counterclaim after the motion to dismiss was 
granted.”416  Kraft subsequently petitioned for rehearing, arguing that 
the Federal Circuit “misapprehended Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.”417 
The Federal Circuit did not agree, stating “[o]ur holding is nar-
rower than Kraft’s petition suggests.  We did not and do not hold that 
the tolling provision of Rule 12(a)(4)(A) never applies to responses 
to amended pleadings.”418  According to the court, 
Rule 15(a), which sets the deadline for answering an amended 
pleading, has two prongs:  “A party shall plead in response to an 
amended pleading [(1)] within the time remaining for response to 
the original pleading or [(2)] within 10 days after service of the 
amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer.”  Ordi-
narily, the time remaining for response to the original pleading” 
will be defined by one of the periods of time enumerated in Rule 
12(a) and tolled by Rule 12(a)(4)(A).  Thus, when there is time 
remaining for response to the original pleading—for example, 
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when a plaintiff amends her complaint as a matter of right before 
serving the defendant or before the defendant answers—the first 
prong of Rule 15(a) (which refers to a deadline that is tolled by 
Rule 12(a)(4)(A)) becomes the longer of the two prongs, and the 
extended deadline of Rule 12(a)(4) controls.419 
Kraft then argued in its petition that the Federal Circuit decision 
“undermines the ‘clearly expressed intent’ of Rule 12—to permit cer-
tain defenses, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted, to be raised by motion instead of in a responsive plead-
ing.”420  The Federal Circuit again disagreed, stating “where the mean-
ing of Rule 12 is unambiguous, we decline to ignore the text of the 
rule in service of a purported purpose.”421  The court further stated 
that “[t]he language of the rule is unambiguous:  Rule 12(a)(4) does 
not extend the time for filing an answer to an amended complaint 
when ‘the time remaining for response to the original pleading’ has 
elapsed.”422 
F. Standing 
“The doctrine of standing limits federal judicial power and has 
both constitutional and prudential components.”423  Constitutional 
standing requires only that a plaintiff have suffered an injury in fact, 
that there be a causal connection between the injury and a defen-
dant’s conduct, and that the injury be redressable by a favorable 
court decision.424 
The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of standing in MyMail, Ltd. 
v. America Online, Inc.425  MyMail acquired the pending patent applica-
tion that became the patent at issue (“the ‘290 patent”) through an 
assignment from an individual, who had obtained it “through a state 
court foreclosure action on a promissory note secured by the applica-
tion.”426  Defendants asserted that the promissory note was fraudulent, 
which meant MyMail’s chain of title was insufficient to establish own-
ership of the ‘290 patent or to create standing to bring an infringe-
ment action.427 
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The Federal Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court’s 
finding that the state court judgment through which the individual 
had acquired the application was not subject to collateral attack in 
the federal case.428  In so holding, the court rejected the defendants’ 
reliance on cases involving inequitable conduct in their attempt to 
show that, “as a matter of law, anyone can assert fraud at any time.”429  
The Federal Circuit explained that “[f]raud in the procurement 
bears on the enforceability of the patent and thus implicates the pub-
lic’s interest in ensuring that the grant of patent rights is legiti-
mate.”430  MyMail, on the other hand, dealt with patent ownership, a 
property matter dealt with by state law.431 
In PODS, Inc. v. Porta Stor, Inc.,432 the Federal Circuit determined 
that Porta Stor “lack[ed] standing to appeal the jury’s finding of a 
violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.”433  
There had been no award of damages, no injunction, and no award 
of attorney’s fees, and PODS had not sought a declaratory judg-
ment.434  Thus, Porta Stor was seeking no more than a “review of un-
favorable findings,” which was insufficient to create standing.435  Pur-
suant to Penda Corp. v. United States,436 “the law is well-settled that a 
party lacks standing to appeal from a judgment by which it is not ag-
grieved.”437 
The Federal Circuit also examined standing in the context of fed-
eral research grants in Central Admixture Pharmacy Services, Inc. v. Ad-
vanced Cardiac Solutions, P.C.438  In that case, co-plaintiff Dr. Buckberg 
had performed research under a grant from the National Institutes of 
Health (“NIH”), which led to the ‘515 patent at issue.439  The grant 
entitled the federal government to certain rights in the patent under 
the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.440  Defendant Advanced 
Cardiac Solutions argued that Central Admixture Pharmacy Services 
(“CAPS”) lacked standing because Dr. Buckberg had failed to exe-
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 437. Pods, 484 F.3d at 1366, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557 (quoting Penda Corp., 44 
F.3d at 971, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203). 
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cute a license, as required by the NIH.441  The Federal Circuit rejected 
this argument, finding that the Bayh-Dole Act gives the government 
only discretionary authority to take title but does not mandate such a 
transfer.442  Because NIH had made no effort to take title to Dr. Buck-
berg’s invention, the patent remained with Dr. Buckberg, which 
meant his exclusive license to CAPS was valid, and CAPS had suffi-
cient standing to sue for infringement.443  In so holding, the court dis-
tinguished Campbell Plastics Engineering & Manufacturing, Inc. v. 
Brownlee,444 in which title to a patent had been forfeited to the federal 
government after it had demanded those rights from a contractor, 
who had failed to disclose the invention.445 
In Propat International Corp. v. RPost, Inc.,446 the plaintiff Propat had 
been granted responsibility by patentee Authentix to license its pat-
ent, enforce license agreements, and sue infringers.447  The district 
court found that Propat did not have standing to sue without joining 
Authentix because Propat was not the owner of the patent but only a 
bare licensee, lacking any proprietary or substantial rights in the pat-
ent.448  Accordingly, the district court dismissed the case without 
prejudice and without ruling on Propat’s motion to join Authentix.449 
The Federal Circuit affirmed.450  Propat had not been assigned any 
right to make, use, and sell the patented invention but had received 
only a share of licensing royalties and any judgment or settlement re-
sulting from litigation.451  Authentix, on the other hand, retained “an 
economic interest in the patent and a substantial measure of control 
over decisions affecting the patent rights.”452  Moreover, Propat was 
obligated to notify Authentix of targets for licensing or suit and ob-
tain Authentix’s consent before proceeding.453  Authentix thus re-
tained the “right to veto any transfer of Propat’s rights under the 
agreement,” even if it did so “arbitrarily,” as well as the right to ter-
minate the contract if Propat failed to meet certain conditions.454  
The Federal Circuit concluded that Authentix “retains sufficient 
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rights in the patent that it cannot be said to have assigned ‘all sub-
stantial rights’ in the patent to Propat.”455 
In Israeli Bio-Engineering Project v. Amgen Inc.,456 the Federal Circuit 
found that Israeli Bio-Engineering Project (“IBEP”) lacked standing 
to sue in its own name because it did not have full ownership of the 
patent in dispute and could not voluntarily join the co-owner of the 
patent.457  In particular, it was argued that certain inventors of claims 
two and three of the patent at issue had an ownership interest in 
those claims because work on the project that resulted in the inven-
tion described in those claims had not begun until after the contract 
assigning all patents to IBEP had expired.458  The Federal Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s summary judgment that IBEP lacked stand-
ing to sue for infringement.459 
Non-party standing was the issue in Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys-
tems, Inc.,460 in which the parties settled their infringement dispute af-
ter the district court had found the patent unenforceable due to in-
equitable conduct.461  An attorney involved in prosecution of the 
unenforceable patent moved to intervene to amend and reconsider 
the judgment.462  The district court denied the motions.463 
The Federal Circuit affirmed.464  Ordinarily, non-parties do not 
have standing to appeal from judgments of a district court, even 
when the non-party alleges that the judgment has an adverse impact 
on him.465  Although there are rare exceptions when an attorney is 
sanctioned by the court in the course of litigation, those cases re-
quired some change in the legal rights of the non-party as a result of 
the court’s action.466  Critical remarks in the record about a non-party 
are not sufficient to confer standing upon that non-party.467  The Fed-
eral Circuit further pointed out that allowing attorneys (or members 
of other professions) to appeal mere criticisms would stretch the 
concept of collateral proceedings into an unrecognizable form.468  
The court thus affirmed the district court’s denial of the attorney’s 
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motion to intervene, although it noted that “[t]o the extent that an 
individual is harmed by the mere existence of a statement in an opin-
ion, that individual ‘is free to petition for a writ of mandamus, . . . 
and request that offending commentary be expunged from the pub-
lic record.’”469 
In Hydril Co. LP v. Grant Prideco LP,470 the question was whether Hy-
dril could state a Walker Process471 fraud claim based on Grant 
Prideco’s threat to bring infringement suits against Hydril’s custom-
ers.472  The district court dismissed Hydril’s antitrust claim “[b]ecause 
Hydril ha[d] failed to allege enforcement activity by Grant Prideco 
which would create an objectively reasonable apprehension that 
Grant Prideco intended to enforce the ‘631 Patent against Hydril.”473  
The district court also dismissed the patent claim on the ground that 
the parties had waived their right to sue for patent infringement in 
their merger agreement, which left breach of contract as the only 
available remedy for such claims.474  Having dismissed Hydril’s federal 
claims, “the district court declined to exercise ‘supplemental jurisdic-
tion’ over the ‘state law breach of contract claim.’”475 
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the 
Walker Process fraud claim and its determination that the merger 
agreement barred a claim for patent infringement.476  The court 
noted that if Hydril could prove allegations that Grant Prideco had 
withheld material prior art, it could state a claim for a violation of § 2 
of the Sherman Act.477  The court also found that “a valid Walker Proc-
ess claim may be based upon enforcement activity directed against the 
plaintiff’s customers” because threatening to bring patent infringe-
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ment suits against customers to cause them to stop dealing with their 
suppliers “is the kind of economic coercion that the antitrust laws are 
intended to prevent.”478 
As for the alleged waiver of the right to sue for patent infringe-
ment, the court determined that 
[i]n view of the length and detail relating to all aspects of the 
merger set forth in the Merger Agreement, the text of which occu-
pies [forty-seven] pages of the joint appendix, one would think that 
if the parties intended to preclude the patent infringement suits, 
they would have explicitly so provided.479 
Further, “[a]lthough in other contexts patent infringement some-
times has been referred to as a tort, the term ‘tort’ . . . cannot prop-
erly be read to cover a claim for patent infringement.”480 
Judge Mayer dissented with respect to the antitrust claim.481  Hydril 
had only alleged competing with Grant Prideco outside the United 
States, which ruled out standing to bring a Walker Process claim, he 
wrote.482  Judge Mayer also would have affirmed the district court’s 
determination that the parties had waived any patent infringement 
claims, finding that such claims were covered by the term “tort” in the 
parties’ merger agreement.483 
In Biotechnology Industry Organization v. District of Columbia,484 the 
Federal Circuit concluded that Biotechnology Industry Organization 
and another industry group had standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the District of Columbia’s Excessive Pricing Act.485  The 
Act made it “unlawful for any drug manufacturer or licensee . . . to 
sell or supply for sale or impose minimum resale requirements for a 
patented prescription drug that results in the prescription drug being 
sold in the District for an excessive price.”486  The plaintiffs alleged 
that the Act violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution by 
seeking to control prices outside the District and was preempted by 
federal patent law.487  The district court agreed with the industry 
groups and issued a permanent injunction preventing the enforce-
ment of the act.488  The District of Columbia appealed the lower 
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court’s decision and challenged the standing of the industry organi-
zations to bring the suit.489  The Federal Circuit affirmed that the 
plaintiffs had standing because at least one member of the group had 
“some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal 
action.”490 
In IpVenture, Inc. v. Prostar Computer, Inc.,491 the court considered 
whether an organization can have standing if the inventor failed to 
assign his invention to his previous employer, as directed by his em-
ployment agreement with that employer.492  In particular, IpVenture 
owned and licensed the patent at issue and others on inventions re-
lating to the management of personal computer systems.493  The co-
inventors of the ‘235 patent included a part owner of IpVenture, who 
had been working as a patent attorney for Hewlett-Packard Company 
(“HP”) at the time of the invention.494 
IpVenture sued two computer manufacturers, ProStar Computer 
and Midern Computer, for infringing its ‘235 patent.495  The defen-
dants moved to dismiss on the ground that IpVenture lacked stand-
ing to sue because one of the inventors had been obligated under his 
employment contract to assign his ‘235 patent to HP.496  The district 
court agreed and dismissed the suit without prejudice.497  IpVenture 
subsequently appealed the dismissal, and the ProStar cross-appealed 
for attorney fees.498  The Federal Circuit found the dismissal was in er-
ror and vacated the lower court’s decision.499  The inventor’s em-
ployment agreement with HP used the language “agree to assign,”500 
which the Federal Circuit stated was not equivalent to a “does hereby 
grant” provision, as the district court had concluded.501  In the ab-
sence of any actual written assignment to HP, the Federal Circuit con-
cluded that HP had no immediate ownership interest in the patent, 
which meant IpVenture held the rights by virtue of an assignment 
from the inventor.502 
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Furthermore, HP had expressly disclaimed any interest in the pat-
ent in a 2005 agreement with IpVenture.503  Even though HP had 
executed this agreement after IpVenture had filed the present law-
suit, the Federal Circuit found it was error to disregard it, as it re-
moved any doubt that HP had no rights to the patent and had essen-
tially acknowledged that it could not sue ProStar for infringement.504  
Consequently, the court concluded that IpVenture had standing to 
assert the ‘254 patent on its own and without joining HP.505 
Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc.506 was a case of first im-
pression in which the Federal Circuit considered whether an exclu-
sive licensee, Schwarz Pharma, had standing to appeal, when the pat-
ent owner, Warner-Lambert, which had participated in the original 
suit, declined to join the appeal.507  Paddock Labs argued that 
Schwarz Pharma lacked standing without Warner-Lambert.508  
Schwarz Pharma responded that joinder of the patent owner by an 
exclusive licensee is merely prudential and not constitutional.509  The 
Federal Circuit concluded, “Warner-Lambert need not have joined in 
the appeal and Schwarz has standing to appeal on its own” because 
Warner-Lambert had already had an opportunity to protect its inter-
ests as a plaintiff in the original lawsuit.510  Thus, this case satisfied the 
Supreme Court’s directives in Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Ra-
dio Corp. of America,511 in which the Court held that a patent owner 
should be joined so that “a patent should not be placed at risk of in-
validation by the licensee without the participation of the pat-
entee.”512  Warner-Lambert’s presence in the original action also “en-
able[d] the alleged infringer to respond in one action to all claims of 
infringement for his act, and thus either to defeat all claims in the 
one action, or by satisfying one adverse decree to bar all subsequent 
actions.”513  Thus, the Federal Circuit found no need to join Warner-
Lambert in the appeal. 
The Federal Circuit also addressed a question of first impression in 
Morrow v. Microsoft Corporation,514 in which it considered “how bank-
ruptcy or trust law relationships affect the standing analysis in a pat-
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ent infringement case.”515  After internet service provider At Home 
Corporation (“AHC”) went bankrupt, the liquidation agreement cre-
ated three separate trusts—the At Home Liquidating Trust 
(“AHLT”), the General Unsecured Creditors’ Liquidating Trust 
(“GUCLT”), and the Bondholders Liquidating Trust (“BHLT”).516  In 
pertinent part, AHLT was given ownership and liquidation rights in 
AHC’s intellectual property, including the ‘647 patent at issue, but 
not the right to bring suit.517  GUCLT, on the other hand, received 
the rights to all causes of action, including patent infringement, but 
did not receive any ownership or liquidation rights under the ‘647 or 
other patents.518 
GUCLT’s trustee subsequently sued Microsoft for infringement of 
the ACH’s ‘647 patent.519  The district court denied Microsoft’s mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of standing, citing GUCLT’s status as trust 
beneficiary and other bankruptcy principles, but granted Microsoft’s 
motion for summary judgment of non-infringement.520  The trustees 
for GUCLT and AHLT appealed the non-infringement ruling, while 
Microsoft cross-appealed the ruling on standing.521 
The Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling on standing 
and vacated the non-infringement ruling as moot.522  Although the 
parties’ rights were granted through bankruptcy law, their standing 
must be determined according to the patent laws, which “govern the 
creation and protection of patent rights, how rights can be trans-
ferred, and the parties entitled to assert those rights[,]”523 including 
“when patent rights have been transferred as a result of bankruptcy 
or proceedings in equity” or “[w]here parties have contractually di-
vided patent rights.”524  Of particular importance was the principle 
that the party holding the exclusionary rights to the patent is the one 
that suffers legal injury when another party infringes the patent.525 
Plaintiffs in patent infringement suits can be divided into three 
general categories for standing purposes.526  The first category con-
sists of those who can sue in their own name alone because they hold 
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or have been assigned all rights or all substantial rights to the pat-
ent.527  The second category consists of those who do not hold all the 
substantial rights to the patent but hold sufficient exclusionary rights 
and interests that they suffer injury by the infringing acts of an-
other.528  Accordingly, this category of plaintiffs, which includes exclu-
sive licensees, can sue as long as the patent owner is joined in the 
suit.529  The third and final category of patent plaintiffs consists of 
those who do not hold all substantial rights or sufficient exclusionary 
rights to meet the injury requirement for standing and thus cannot 
participate as a party to the infringement suit even if joined with an-
other.530 
In this case, 
[t]he question is whether GUCLT’s interests in the patent include 
sufficient exclusionary rights such that GUCLT suffers an injury in 
fact from infringing activities.  If GUCLT holds all substantial 
rights, it can sue in its name alone.  If GUCLT holds less than all 
substantial rights but sufficient exclusionary rights that it suffers in-
jury in fact, it can sue as a co-party with legal title holder AHLT.  If 
it lacks injury in fact, GUCLT lacks standing to be a party to this 
case.531 
According to the majority, “[t]he problem for GUCLT and AHLT 
is that the exclusionary rights have been separated from the right to 
sue for infringement.”532  Although GUCLT had the right to sue for 
patent infringement, that right was not unlimited, for GUCLT could 
not sue controlling shareholders or settle a lawsuit without AHLT’s 
approval.533  Thus, GUCLT lacked sufficient exclusionary rights to suf-
fer legal injury from infringement.534  Those exclusionary rights be-
longed instead to AHLT, which held the title to the patent as well as 
the rights to sell, grant, transfer, or license any rights under the pat-
ent to another party.535  Even though AHLT required the consent of 
GUCLT and BHLT to transfer its patent rights, the majority found 
this was not a substantial restriction and did not transfer any exclu-
sionary rights to GUCLT.536  Moreover, there was no restriction on the 
parties to whom AHLT could transfer its exclusionary rights or to 
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whom it could confer an exclusive license.537  As a result, the majority 
concluded that GUCLT did not have standing to bring suit, even as a 
co-plaintiff with AHLT.538 
Judge Prost dissented, arguing that GUCLT held “a sufficient bun-
dle of rights to support co-plaintiff standing” with AHLT because nei-
ther party could enforce the patent on its own.539  GUCLT, he further 
argued, had suffered an injury in fact by virtue of its equitable title to 
the patent as beneficiary to AHLT, as well as its explicit right to sue as 
part of the bankruptcy agreement.540 
The lack of exclusionary rights was also the basis for finding that 
exclusive distributor Mitutoyo America Corporation (“MAC”) lacked 
standing in Mitutoyo Corp. v. Central Purchasing, LLC.541  MAC had 
joined the patentee Mitutoyo in a suit against Central Purchasing 
(“Central”) for infringement and breach of a 1994 settlement agree-
ment.542  The Federal Circuit concluded: 
In order for a licensee to have co-plaintiff standing, it must hold at 
least some of the proprietary rights under the patent.  Conse-
quently, the pertinent question is whether MAC has the exclusive 
right to sell products made according to the ‘902 patent in the 
United States; the exclusive right to sell only Mitutoyo’s products 
made according to the ‘902 patent, however, is not a sufficient basis 
for standing.543 
In another question of first impression, the Federal Circuit found 
that the holder of an “exclusive enterprise license” lacked sufficient 
exclusionary rights to sue in its own name in International Gamco, Inc. 
v. Multimedia Games, Inc.544  An “exclusive enterprise license,” the 
court explained, is “an amalgam of an exclusive territorial license and 
an exclusive field of use license.”545  Specifically, plaintiff Gamco as-
signed the patent at issue to International Game Technology (“IGT”) 
as part of an asset purchase agreement but reserved to itself the ex-
clusive right to sue for infringement within a particular territory, 
which was defined as “the lawful operation of lottery games author-
ized by the New York State Lottery in the state of New York.”546  Since 
Gamco’s license contained a field of use restriction (“lottery games”), 
                                                          
 537. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 538. Id. at 1343–44, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385–86. 
 539. Id. at 1344, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
 540. Id. at 1344–48, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386–89. 
 541. 499 F.3d 1284, 1291, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 542. Id. at 1287, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003. 
 543. Id. at 1291, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (citation omitted). 
 544. 504 F.3d 1273, 1280, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2017, 2022 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 545. Id. at 1274, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2018. 
 546. Id. at 1275, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2018–19. 
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the Federal Circuit found that it created the risk that an accused in-
fringer could be subjected to a multiplicity of lawsuits by different 
persons holding different game-specific rights to the patent.547  “The 
problem of a multiplicity of lawsuits arising from an exclusive field of 
use license is not cured by adding a geographic restriction[,]” the 
court stated.548  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
Gamco lacked substantial rights in the licensed patent within the li-
censed territory to sue in its own name, without joining IGT.549  Judge 
Friedman, in an opinion dubitante, doubted there was a serious dan-
ger of a multiplicity of lawsuits in this case and thus remained uncon-
vinced that Gamco could not sue in its own name.550 
G. Collateral Estoppel 
The Federal Circuit has held that issue preclusion (or collateral es-
toppel) has four prerequisites:  (1) an identity of issues between the 
prior and present proceedings, (2) the issue in question was actually 
litigated in the prior proceeding, (3) the determination of the issue 
in the prior proceeding was necessary to the resulting judgment, and 
(4) the party defending against preclusion had a full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.551 
The absence of the last prerequisite led the court to conclude that 
the PTO did not have to give preclusive effect to a district court’s 
Markman opinion in In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp.552  At Trans 
Texas’s request, the PTO reexamined two of Trans Texas’s patents on 
business methods for insulating deposit and loan accounts from infla-
tion and providing stability to financial institutions.553  The PTO, 
however, refused to give preclusive effect to a claim construction 
opinion by a district court in an earlier infringement proceeding and 
eventually rejected all of the claims as obvious.554 
The Federal Circuit affirmed that the PTO was not bound by the 
district court’s Markman order, emphasizing that it had “never ap-
plied issue preclusion against a non-party to the first action.”555  Since 
the PTO was not a party to the earlier litigation, it did not have a “full 
and fair opportunity to litigate” the claim construction issue, as re-
                                                          
 547. Id. at 1279, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2022. 
 548. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2022. 
 549. Id. at 1280, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2022. 
 550. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2023 (Friedman, J., dubitante). 
 551. In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1297, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1835, 
1840 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 552. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840. 
 553. Id. at 1294, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1838. 
 554. Id. at 1295–96, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1839. 
 555. Id. at 1297, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840. 
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quired for estoppel to apply.556  The Federal Circuit also rejected 
Trans Texas’s argument that it had “somehow represented the PTO’s 
interests in the district court action” by arguing against the construc-
tion that was ultimately adopted by the district court.557  The pre-
sumption that a non-party can be bound by a judgment in an earlier 
proceeding can be rebutted only in limited circumstances, e.g., 
“when the non-party [is] in privity with the party, has interests that 
are derivative from a party, or ‘participated in an active and control-
ling way in the earlier litigation.’”558  Since none of those exceptions 
applied here, and the PTO was not a party, the Federal Circuit found 
that the PTO had properly declined to give preclusive effect to the 
district court’s claim construction.559 
In Abbott Laboratories v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,560 Andrx asserted 
on appeal that Abbott was “collaterally estopped from seeking a pre-
liminary injunction based on holdings in the preliminary injunction 
proceedings . . . that all of the asserted claims are invalid or unen-
forceable.”561 
The Federal Circuit concluded: 
[T]he determinations made in proceedings against defendants 
Teva and Ranbaxy were not full litigation and decision on the mer-
its for purposes of issue preclusion.  Andrx argues that there has 
been a final resolution on the limited issue of whether there is a 
substantial question of invalidity of Abbott’s patents, but Seventh 
Circuit law does not support this view.562 
However, the Federal Circuit stated that “[a] determination that 
there is merely a likelihood of proving invalidity is a determination 
made solely in terms of probabilities, not certainties and is therefore 
not full litigation and decision on the merits for purposes of issue 
preclusion.”563  The Federal Circuit determined that “[i]n both the 
Teva and Ranbaxy cases, the district court judge did not intend to 
firmly and finally resolve the issue for which preclusion [was] as-
serted, the validity or enforceability of the Abbott patents, in its pre-
liminary injunction proceedings.”564 
                                                          
 556. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 557. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840. 
 558. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840 (quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4449 (2d ed. 
2002)). 
 559. Id. at 1297–98, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840. 
 560. 473 F.3d 1196, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 561. Id. at 1200, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290. 
 562. Id. at 1206, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 563. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 564. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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In Transclean Corp. v. Jiffy Lube International, Inc. (Transclean II),565 
“the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Jiffy Lube 
and . . . other defendants . . ., holding that under the doctrine of 
claim preclusion, a judgment against Bridgewood [in a prior litiga-
tion barred] Transclean from bringing a separate infringement ac-
tion against Bridgewood’s customers” (i.e., the defendants in the in-
stant litigation).566  In particular, the Federal Circuit in Transclean I 567 
affirmed the judgment against Bridgewood that Bridgewood in-
fringed claims one, two, three, four, and twelve of a patent to which 
Transclean was the exclusive licensee.568  Transclean then filed the in-
stant patent infringement suit against the defendants who had pur-
chased the accused devices from Bridgewood.569 
“[T]he trial court granted Jiffy Lube’s motion for summary judg-
ment that Transclean was precluded from bringing infringement 
claims against Jiffy Lube[,]” concluding that Jiffy Lube had satisfied 
the elements of claim preclusion.570 
First, there was no dispute that the Bridgewood litigation ended in 
a final judgment on the merits or that the court properly exercised 
jurisdiction in that matter.  Nor did Transclean dispute that Jiffy 
Lube was in privity with Bridgewood, the defendant in the prior 
litigation.  Finally, Transclean did not dispute that during the first 
litigation it was aware of Jiffy Lube’s use of T-Tech machines and 
could have brought claims against Jiffy Lube.571 
Transclean argued that its claim should not be precluded because 
“the law generally allows a patentee to sue manufacturers or sellers 
and users of an infringing device as joint tortfeasors, and that the law 
permits multiple suits, just not multiple (i.e., double) recoveries.”572 
According to the Federal Circuit, “the real question [was] whether 
the relationship between the defendants and Bridgewood was so close 
that they were in privity for claim preclusion purposes.”573  “[A] 
manufacturer or seller of a product who is sued for patent infringe-
ment typically is not in privity with a party, otherwise unrelated, who 
does no more than purchase and use the product.”574  Defendants ar-
gued that Transclean’s admission that Bridgewood and its customers 
                                                          
 565. 474 F.3d 1298, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 566. Id. at 1301, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401. 
 567. Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc. (Transclean I), 290 F.3d 1364, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 568. Transclean Corp., 474 F.3d at 1301, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401. 
 569. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401. 
 570. Id. at 1302, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402. 
 571. Id. at 1302–03, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402. 
 572. Id. at 1303, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403. 
 573. Id. at 1305, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404. 
 574. Id. at 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405. 
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were in privity was “binding because privity is a question of fact that 
can be admitted.”575  Transclean contended that “privity cannot be 
admitted because it is a question of law and [the Federal Circuit is] 
free to determine that Bridgewood and the Participating Defendants 
were not in privity if that conclusion is supported by the actual 
facts.”576 
The Federal Circuit concluded that “even if Transclean is correct 
that the issue should be characterized as a legal conclusion, . . . 
Transclean should be bound by its concession under the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel.”577  Thus, the court held that judicial estoppel 
bound Transclean to its repeated, prior concessions that competitor’s 
customers were in privity with competitor, for claim preclusion pur-
poses, and patentee’s infringement claims against defaulting defen-
dants were barred by claim preclusion.578 
Interestingly, “[t]he district court previously had entered default 
judgment in favor of Transclean against several other defendants 
(‘Defaulting Defendants’), none of whom had answered the com-
plaint.”579  According to the Federal Circuit, however, preclusion is-
sues may be raised by a court sua sponte even though the Defaulting 
Defendants had not pleaded claim preclusion as an affirmative de-
fense.580  “Although the general rule is that claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion must be pleaded, an exception exists where all relevant 
data and legal records are before the court and the demands of com-
ity, continuity in the law, and essential justice mandate invocation of 
preclusion principles.”581  As such, the court “believe[d] that as a mat-
ter of law and fairness, claim preclusion should bar Transclean’s in-
fringement claims against the Defaulting Defendants.”582  The Federal 
Circuit therefore reversed the judgment against the Defaulting De-
fendants.583 
                                                          
 575. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405. 
 576. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405. 
 577. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405. 
 578. Id. at 1307, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406. 
 579. Id. at 1301, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401. 
 580. Id. at 1308, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406. 
 581. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 582. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406–07. 
 583. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407. 
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H. Trial Procedures 
1. Right to a jury trial 
The right to a jury trial was a central issue in Shum v. Intel Corp.,584 
which stemmed from an unsuccessful venture between Plaintiff Frank 
Shum and co-defendant Jean-Marc Verdiell.585  After the partners had 
dissolved their joint corporation Radiance Design (“Radiance”), 
Shum sued Verdiell, his corporation LightLogic, and its purchaser 
Intel for fraud, unjust enrichment, and other state law claims and as-
serted a claim for improper inventorship of Verdiell’s patents.586  In 
particular, Shum accused Verdill of forming LightLogic to file patent 
applications in Verdiell’s name based on technology developed at 
Radiance, misrepresenting to the PTO and third parties that Verdiell 
was the sole inventor of a patent application by Shum, improperly 
causing the PTO to abandon Shum’s application, transferring Radi-
ance’s funds to Verdiell’s exclusive control, excluding Shum from 
meetings with Radiance investors, removing Shum as a “principal in-
vestigator” from government contracts, and engaging in other ques-
tionable activity.587 
In pertinent part, the district court dismissed Shum’s unjust en-
richment claim and granted defendants’ motion to bifurcate the trial, 
with Shum’s inventorship claim to be tried before the court and the 
state law claims to be tried before the jury.588  The district court held a 
bench trial and concluded Shum had not met his burden of proving 
that he was the inventor of any of the patents at issue.589  Based on 
that result, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment on Shum’s remaining state law claims and entered judgment in 
their favor.590  Shum appealed.591 
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court violated 
Shum’s constitutional right to a jury by holding a bench trial on his 
inventorship claim before holding a jury trial.592  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that “only under the most imperative circum-
stances . . . can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through 
                                                          
 584. 499 F.3d 1272, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 585. Id. at 1274–75, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934–35. 
 586. Id. at 1275, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935. 
 587. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935. 
 588. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935. 
 589. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935. 
 590. Id. at 1275–76, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935. 
 591. Id. at 1276, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935. 
 592. Id. at 1279, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938. 
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prior determination of equitable claims.”593  Although Shum’s claim 
for correction of inventorship was an equitable claim with no right to 
a jury trial, it had common factual issues with his state law claims, in-
cluding proofs that Shum conceived the invention, the degree of his 
inventive contribution, and the time and place of conception.594  Both 
the district court and the appellees implicitly recognized these facts 
were common to both sets of claims when they stated that Shum’s 
state law claims would fail if he was not the inventor.595  The Federal 
Circuit thus vacated the district court’s determination on inventor-
ship and its summary judgment on the state law claims, and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.596 
The Federal Circuit also reversed the district court’s dismissal of 
Shum’s unjust enrichment claim because it rested on different ele-
ments and was not “merely duplicative and dependent” upon Shum’s 
fraudulent concealment claim, as the lower court had found.597  
Moreover, under California law, unjust enrichment can exist as a 
separate cause of action where, as here, it is grounded in equitable 
principles of restitution.598 
Judge Friedman dissented on the Seventh Amendment issue, argu-
ing that Shum had no common-law right to a jury trial on his im-
proper inventorship claim, which was sufficiently different from his 
state law claims as to justify bifurcation.599  Judge Friedman also found 
a “striking parallel” between this case and Markman v. Westview In-
struments, Inc.,600 where the Supreme Court found that claim construc-
tion was a legal issue exclusively within the province of the court, 
even though it may be dispositive of the remaining issues to be tried 
before the jury.601 
In Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.,602 the Federal Circuit found that 
a patentee does not necessarily have a Seventh Amendment right to a 
trial by jury on the question of the reasonable royalty a court may im-
pose on an infringer.603  Although the court agreed with Paice that 
                                                          
 593. Id. at 1276, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1936 (quoting Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. 
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959)). 
 594. Id. at 1277, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937–38. 
 595. Id. at 1278, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937. 
 596. Id. at 1280, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 597. Id. at 1279–88, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938–39. 
 598. Id. at 1279, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938. 
 599. Id. at 1280, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939 (Friedman, J., dissenting). 
 600. 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996). 
 601. Shum, 499 F.3d at 1284, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942 (Friedman, J., dissent-
ing). 
 602. 504 F.3d 1293, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 603. Id. at 1316, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
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the determination of damages is generally a legal question that in-
vokes the Seventh Amendment, it noted that “not all monetary relief 
is properly characterized as ‘damages.’”604  The Federal Circuit con-
cluded that “the fact that monetary relief is at issue in this case does 
not, standing alone, warrant a jury trial[,]” and rejected Paice’s Sev-
enth Amendment argument.605 
2. District court’s interpretation of remand 
In E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp.606 (E-Pass II), E-Pass argued 
that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the previous 
Federal Circuit opinion,607 in which the Federal Circuit had vacated 
and remanded the case to the district court to address the issue of in-
fringement under the proper construction of the term “card.”608  E-
pass’s argument relied in substantial part on the Federal Circuit’s 
statement in E-Pass I that “issues of material fact remain in dispute as 
to both literal and doctrine of equivalents infringement under the 
proper construction” of the term “card.”609  However, the Federal Cir-
cuit stated that the district court’s grant of summary judgment in E-
Pass I was vacated and remanded for further proceedings, and by va-
cating the Federal Circuit signaled that, “although the district court’s 
prior decision rested upon erroneous grounds, a proper claim con-
struction might support a judgment (summary or otherwise) in favor 
of either party, depending on the evidence and argument submitted 
to the district court on remand and considered by the district court 
in the first instance.”610 
In E-Pass I, the Federal Circuit discussed in detail the claim con-
struction of the term “card” and the district court’s error in constru-
ing “card” to mean a card with the precise dimensions of a standard 
credit card.611  At the conclusion of the discussion, the Federal Circuit 
emphasized that “under the correct construction of ‘card’ in this con-
text . . . it may be or may not be that the accused Palm Pilot devices 
                                                          
 604. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
 605. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
 606. 473 F.3d 1213, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 607. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp. (E-Pass I), 343 F.3d 1364, 1365, 67 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1947, 1948–49 (BNA) (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 608. E-Pass II, 473 F.3d at 1218, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 609. E-Pass I, 343 F.3d at 1365, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947. 
 610. E-Pass II, 473 F.3d at 1218, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388; see id., 81 
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1388 (“[W]hen the Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari, vacates, 
and remands, it ‘does not indicate, nor even suggest, that the lower court’s decision 
was erroneous.’” (quoting Communities for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 
459 F.3d 676, 680 (6th Cir. 2006))). 
 611. E-Pass I, 343 F.3d at 1367–71, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948–52. 
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literally infringe.”612  Indeed, in E-Pass II the Federal Circuit stated 
that it “could not have intended to foreclose a summary judgment of 
noninfringement because the record did not yet contain the evidence 
that the parties would put forward in support of their infringement 
and noninfringement contentions under the proper construction.”613  
“Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that it had the 
authority to entertain the defendants’ motions for summary judg-
ment on remand.”614 
3. Summary judgment 
The Federal Circuit reviews a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo, “reapplying the standard applicable at the district 
court.”615  Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the 
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”616  In deciding such a mo-
tion, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justi-
fiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”617 
In In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation,618 the Federal Circuit noted that 
the district court had previously granted a motion for summary 
judgment of noninfringement based on Warner Lambert’s failure to 
meet its burden of proof.619  The district court “determined that War-
ner Lambert failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish that the 
accused products meet the limitation that the anions of a mineral 
acid do not exceed 20 ppm (‘the 20 ppm limitation’).”620 
The Federal Circuit reversed.621  The court explained that to prove 
infringement, Warner Lambert was required to demonstrate that the 
infringing party’s samples contained less than 20 ppm of anions of a 
mineral acid, as recited in the claims.622  Warner Lambert submitted 
pH tests performed by its analytical expert.623  The Federal Circuit 
found that the “pH testing can indicate whether a sample contains 
                                                          
 612. Id. at 1371, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951–52. 
 613. E-Pass II, 473 F.3d at 1218, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 614. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388–89. 
 615. Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1301, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1429, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 616. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 617. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v. 
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)). 
 618. 503 F.3d 1254, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1651 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 619. Id. at 1258, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 620. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 621. Id. at 1262, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 622. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 623. Id. at 1260, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. 
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less than 20 ppm of acidic chloride by measuring the pH, or acidity, 
of the solution and comparing it against a sample with a known 
amount of acid.”624  The court concluded that the district court erred 
in granting summary judgment of noninfringement based on Warner 
Lambert’s purported failure to meet its burden of proof.625  The re-
cord showed that “Warner Lambert proffered sufficient evidence to 
create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the accused 
products met the 20 ppm claim limitation of the . . . patent.”626 
I. United States Patent and Trademark Office Procedures 
1. Reissue and recapture 
The recapture rule limits the ability of patentees to broaden their 
patents after issuance.627  Inventors may seek reissuance of their pat-
ent under 35 U.S.C. § 251.628  If the reissue application is filed within 
two years of the patent’s initial issuance and the patentee “through 
error without any deceptive intention . . . claim[ed] . . . less than he 
had a right to[,]” the reissue patent’s claims may be broader than the 
original patent’s claims.629  Section 251 is “remedial in nature, based 
on fundamental principles of equity and fairness, and should be con-
strued liberally.”630  However, the remedial function of the statute is 
limited.  Material that was surrendered in order to obtain issuance 
cannot be reclaimed via § 251, for “deliberate withdrawal or amend-
ment . . . cannot be said to involve the inadvertence or mistake con-
templated by 35 U.S.C. § 251.”631  The Federal Circuit has mandated 
that “[i]t is critical to avoid allowing surrendered matter to creep 
back into the issued patent, since competitors and the public are on 
notice of the surrender and may have come to rely on the consequent 
                                                          
 624. Id. at 1262, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 625. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 626. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 627. See Pannu v. Storz Instruments, Inc., 258 F.3d 1366, 1370–71, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1597, 1600 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The recapture rule ‘prevents a patentee from 
regaining through reissue the subject matter that he surrendered in an effort to ob-
tain allowance of the original claims.’” (quoting In re Clement, 131 F.3d 1464, 1468, 
45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997))). 
 628. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
 629. Id.; see In re Handel, 312 F.2d 943, 948, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 460, 464 (Fed. 
Cir. 1963) (“[T]he whole purpose of the statute, so far as [reissue] claims are con-
cerned, is to permit limitations . . . to be taken from claims that are too narrow.”). 
 630. In re Weiler, 790 F.2d 1576, 1579, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 675 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (citing In re Bennett, 766 F.2d 524, 528, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 413, 416 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (en banc)). 
 631. Clement, 131 F.3d at 1468, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Haliczer v. United States, 356 F.2d 541, 545, 148 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 565, 
569 (1966)). 
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limitations on claim scope.”632  The recapture rule thus serves the 
same policy as the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel—both 
operate, albeit in different ways, to prevent a patentee from reclaim-
ing territory that he had previously committed to the public.633 
In operation, the recapture rule excludes earlier deliberate with-
drawals and amendments from the allowable scope of a reissue pat-
ent.  “Under [the recapture] rule, claims that are ‘broader than the 
original patent claims in a manner directly pertinent to the subject 
matter surrendered during prosecution’ are impermissible.”634  The 
Federal Circuit described the required analysis in a recapture case in 
depth in In re Clement.635  First, the original and reissued claims are 
construed to ascertain “whether and in what ‘aspect’ the reissue 
claims are broader than the patent claims.”636  If the reissue claims are 
broader in some way, the court must determine “whether the broader 
aspects of the reissue claims relate to surrendered subject matter.”637  
This is accomplished by reviewing the prosecution history to deter-
mine what has been surrendered and determining whether the addi-
tional coverage of the reissue claim reads on the surrendered mat-
ter.638  If it does, the recapture rule bars the claim.639 
In MBO Laboratories, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,640 the Federal 
Circuit determined that MBO clearly sought in reissue to broaden 
the scope of its patent coverage by rewriting its claims directed to 
“providing a body slidably receiving the needle” to cover all relative 
movement, not just retraction.641  MBO, in fact, had explicitly stated 
that such broadening was the purpose behind the reissue applica-
tion.642  In light of these “clear statements” in the prosecution history 
                                                          
 632. MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1331, 81 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1661, 1667 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see id. at 1331–32, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1667 (“[T]he recapture rule . . . ensur[es] the ability of the public to rely 
on a patent’s public record.” (quoting Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 
1379, 1384, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1998))). 
 633. See Hester Indus., Inc. v. Stein, Inc., 142 F.3d 1472, 1481, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1641, 1649 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The recapture rule is based on principles of 
equity and therefore embodies the notion of estoppel . . . which prevents the applica-
tion of the doctrine of equivalents in a manner contrary to the patent’s prosecution 
history.”). 
 634. Id. at 1480, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648 (citing Clement, 131 F.3d at 1468, 45 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164). 
 635. 131 F.3d at 1468–70, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164–65. 
 636. Id. at 1468, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 637. Id. at 1468–69, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 638. Id. at 1469, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 639. Id. at 1469–70, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164–65. 
 640. 474 F.3d 1323, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1661 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 641. Id. at 1333, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668. 
 642. See id. at 1332, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (noting MBO’s statement in its 
Application for Reissue of its patent that the original claims “claim less than we had a 
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of the reissue patent, the court was “compelled to give effect to 
MBO’s stated intent to broaden the coverage of its claims.”643  “The 
district court [thus] erred in the first instance by applying the recap-
ture rule to rewrite the claims, essentially unmaking the change that 
the PTO had permitted.”644  While determining that the recapture 
rule should not be used to rewrite claim language, claim construction 
should not, of course, be blind to validity issues:  “claims should be so 
construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity.”645  “A claim that is 
interpreted too broadly will run into validity issues, providing motiva-
tion for the construing court to choose a narrower interpretation if 
possible.”646  However, according to the court, “validity construction 
should be used as a last resort, not a first principle.”647  The court ex-
plained that it has “limited the maxim [that claims are to be con-
strued to preserve validity] to cases in which the court concludes, af-
ter applying all the available tools of claim construction, that the 
claim is still ambiguous.”648  The court stated, “[w]hether those 
broadened claims are invalidated by the recapture rule is an issue 
separate from construction.”649 
In In Re Serenkin,650 the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences that the error upon which 
Serenkin based his reissue application was not a correctable error 
under 35 U.S.C. § 251.651  On January 29, 1997, Serenkin filed a U.S. 
provisional patent application in the PTO.652  On January 28, 1998, 
one day less than a year after the filing of the provisional application, 
Serenkin “submitted an application to the PTO in its capacity as the 
United States Receiving Office (‘USRO’) under the Patent Coopera-
tion Treaty (‘the PCT application’).”653  The PCT application claimed 
priority from the provisional application.654  Although Serenkin’s re-
quest form noted that the application contained eight pages of draw-
                                                                                                                                      
right to claim in that they fail to claim clearly that any relative movement . . . will 
achieve the desired result of preventing needlestick hazard, whether or not the nee-
dle moves toward the body and connected safety device”). 
 643. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667. 
 644. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667. 
 645. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 646. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667. 
 647. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667. 
 648. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (alteration in original) (quoting Phillips v. 
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)). 
 649. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667. 
 650. 479 F.3d 1359, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2011 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 651. Id. at 1360, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2011. 
 652. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2011–12. 
 653. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012. 
 654. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012. 
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ings, and the PCT application referenced the eight figures, no draw-
ings were actually included with the application.655  Serenkin later re-
ceived a postcard from the USRO notifying him of the receipt of the 
application and the missing drawings.656 
On March 24, 1998, the USRO issued a Petition Decision stating 
that “pursuant to PCT Rule 20.2(a) and PCT Administrative Instruc-
tions, sections 309(b) and 310, ‘the filing date of an international ap-
plication is the date when all the papers completing the international 
application are received.’”657  As such, Serenkin’s drawings could not 
be treated as having been submitted on the original filing date.658  
Again, the USRO informed Serenkin that he must decide within fif-
teen days “whether he preferred to retain the original filing date of 
January 28, 1998, with the application as filed without drawings, or 
incorporate the drawings as part of the application and accept a new 
filing date of February 17, 1998.”659  If Serenkin chose to incorporate 
his drawings, the USRO specifically stated that the priority date of 
January 29, 1997, would be lost.660  On March 31, 1998, Serenkin’s at-
torney filed a petition to the USRO accepting the later filing date of 
February 17, 1998.661  A patent issued on August 29, 2000.662 
On April 30, 2002, through a new attorney, Serenkin sought reissue 
of the patent in order to obtain the benefit of the January 29, 1997, 
filing date for the provisional application.663  “While admitting that 
the relief he [sought] is not available under PCT procedures, Seren-
kin argue[d] that such a procedural mistake is remediable under 
§ 251, particularly in light of [Federal Circuit] case law authorizing 
the use of reissue to correct prosecution mistakes.”664  The Federal 
Circuit affirmed the PTO’s conclusion that it was not “permissible for 
Serenkin to claim the benefit of the earlier filing date through the re-
issue process.”665 
The Federal Circuit reasoned that while § 251 is “‘based on funda-
mental principles of equity and fairness, and should be construed 
                                                          
655.Id 
., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012. 
 656. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012. 
 657. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012. 
 658. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012. 
 659. Id. at 1360–61, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012. 
 660. Id. at 1361, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012. 
 661. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012. 
 662. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012. 
 663. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012. 
 664. Id. at 1362, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013. 
 665. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013. 
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liberally’ . . . the remedial function is not without limits.666  It went on 
to say, “[i]deed, ‘the reissue statute was not enacted as a panacea for 
all patent prosecution problems, nor as a grant to the patentee of a 
second opportunity to prosecute de novo his original application.’”667  
As such, “not every event or circumstance that might be labeled ‘er-
ror’ is correctable by reissue.”668 
The court further pointed out that the reissue could be used to 
perfect a claim for priority but not in cases in which an applicant 
made a deliberate decision to accept a later priority date in exchange 
for including newly submitted material in the application.669  The 
Federal Circuit thus affirmed the PTO’s determination that Seren-
kin’s reissue was an improper attempt to change an error in judg-
ment by the applicant during prosecution of the patent, which is not 
correctable by reissue under 35 U.S.C. § 251.670 
In Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Ivax Pharmaceuticals,671 the question be-
fore the court was whether a change effected in the reissue applica-
tion improperly broadened the scope of claim 11 of Forest’s patent 
or merely clarified or corrected the original claim.672  Defendants Ivax 
and Cipla argued that claim 11 was invalid because it had been im-
properly broadened during reissue two years after the original patent 
had issued.673  In particular, they argued that the change in the opti-
cal rotation sign of the diol intermediate in claim 11 during reissue 
broadened the claim because it now covered a process beginning 
with a different enantiomer.674  Even if the change had been intended 
merely to correct a typographical error, the plaintiffs argued it may 
still be an improper broadening and that a “typographical error must 
be evident to the general public in order to serve the public notice 
function of patents.”675 
The Federal Circuit agreed with Forest that the change in the opti-
cal rotation sign for the diol intermediate in claim 11 did not 
broaden the scope of the claim.676  The Federal Circuit relied on the 
                                                          
 666. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013 (quoting In re Weiler, 790 F.2d 1576, 1579, 
229 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 673, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 667. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 
Weiler, 790 F.2d at 1582, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 677). 
 668. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013–14 (quoting Weiler, 790 F.2d at 1579, 229 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 675). 
 669. Id. at 1364, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2014–15. 
 670. Id. at 1365, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2015. 
 671. 501 F.3d 1263, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 672. Id. at 1270, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105. 
 673. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104. 
 674. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105. 
 675. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105. 
 676. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105. 
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plain reading of the patent specification, which “supports, even com-
pels, this conclusion.”677  The court therefore agreed that “the change 
in the optical sign during reissue does not represent a change of 
claim scope but merely a correction of the claim to be consistent with 
the disclosure of the specification.”678 
2. Certificate of correction 
A typographical error was also at issue in Central Admixture Pharmacy 
Services, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions,679 in which Advanced Car-
diac Solutions and Charles Wall (collectively, “ACS”) appealed from 
several summary judgment orders that found ACS liable to plaintiffs 
CAPS and Dr. Gerald Buckberg for willful infringement of U.S. Pat-
ent No. 4,988,515 (“the ‘515 patent”).680 
The Federal Circuit found that the certificate of correction CAPS 
obtained from the PTO to alter the asserted claims of the patent was 
invalid.681  The court noted: 
[T]he asserted patent claims initially required the solution to have 
an “osmolarity . . . of between about 400-500 mOsmol,” but after the 
certificate issued, the claims required an “osmolality . . . of between 
about 400-500 mOsmol.”  For the solutions at issue here, the nu-
merical figure for osmolarity will be less than the figure for osmo-
lality by about one or two percent.682 
Accordingly, the court vacated the finding of infringement and 
remanded for a “redetermination of infringement under the patent’s 
original, uncorrected claims.”683 
The court explained that a patentee who has made “a mistake of a 
clerical or typographical nature, or of minor character” may apply to 
the PTO for a “certificate of correction, if the correction does not in-
volve such changes in the patent as would constitute new matter or 
would require re-examination.”684 
“Invalidating a certificate of correction for impermissible broaden-
ing therefore requires proof of two elements:  (1) the corrected 
claims are broader than the original claims; and (2) the presence of 
the clerical or typographical error, or how to correct that error, is not 
                                                          
 677. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105. 
 678. Id. at 1271, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
 679. 482 F.3d 1347, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 680. Id. at 1349, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294. 
 681. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294. 
 682. Id. at 1350, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295 (alterations in original). 
 683. Id. at 1349, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294. 
 684. Id. at 1353, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 255 (2000)). 
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clearly evident to one of skill in the art.”685  Citing Superior Fireplace Co. 
v. Majestic Products Co.,686 the Federal Circuit stated that there are 
three categories into which an error might fall.687  The first category 
involves mistakes that are obvious, thus leaving no doubt as to what 
the mistake is.688  “In contrast, [the] second category includes those 
typographical mistakes not apparent to the reader at all; for example, 
a mistake resulting in another word that is spelled correctly and that 
reads logically in the context of the sentence.”689  The third category 
includes those “where it is apparent that a mistake has been made, 
but it is unclear what the mistake is.”690 
Since it is not evident to the reader of the public record how to ap-
propriately correct mistakes of the second and third categories, those 
categories of error cannot be repaired by a certificate of correction if 
the effect would be to broaden the claim.691  The Federal Circuit con-
cluded that “since the error corrected . . . was not clearly evident to 
one of skill in the art and the result of its correction was to broaden 
the claims, ACS should be granted summary judgment that the cer-
tificate of correction is not valid.”692  Thus, the patent should con-
tinue to read as it did before the issuance of the certificate.693 
3. Interference 
In Henkel Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,694 the Federal Circuit held 
that “as a matter of law, we do not require that a junior party in an in-
terference demonstrate that it recognized the exact language of the 
ultimate count—only the subject matter of the invention.”695  In this 
case, the invention involved dishwashing detergent tablets, which 
were divided into a “compressed” region and a “solidified solution or 
melt” region, wherein the compressed region dissolves “at a faster 
rate” than the solidified region.696  The Board found that Henkel, the 
                                                          
 685. Id. at 1353, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297. 
 686. 270 F.3d 1358, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1668 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 687. Cent. Admixture Pharmacy Servs., 482 F.3d at 1354, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1298. 
 688. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298. 
 689. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298 (quoting Superior Fireplace, 270 F.3d at 1370, 
60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677). 
 690. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298 (quoting Superior Fireplace, 270 F.3d at 1370, 
60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677). 
 691. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298. 
 692. Id. at 1355, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298. 
 693. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298. 
 694. 485 F.3d 1370, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1784 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 695. Id. at 1375, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788 (citing Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. 
Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1336, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)). 
 696. Id. at 1371, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785. 
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designated junior party, had failed to prove that it had conceived of 
the invention and reduced it to practice before Procter & Gamble’s 
constructive reduction to practice (filing) date, as Henkel’s inventors 
had not “contemporaneously appreciated an embodiment that met 
all the limitations of the interference count.”697 
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded that decision, finding 
that the Board had legally erred by requiring Henkel to show that its 
inventors and technicians had tested or calculated specific dissolution 
rates.698  This “explicit calculation or measurement of quantitative dis-
solution rates is unnecessary,” the court explained, as the interfer-
ence count merely required “a showing of an appreciation by the in-
ventors . . . that the dissolution of rate of the compressed region is 
greater than the dissolution rate of the other region” but not an “ap-
preciation of specific dissolution rates.”699  The court stated that this 
was not a case where there was “a significant danger that the inven-
tors unwittingly and accidentally created something new; rather, they 
set out to design detergent tablets with a particular structure and did 
so, and the only question is whether they appreciated that the tablets 
met one limitation of the interference count.”700  Once the count was 
properly construed, the court found ample evidence in the record of 
Henkel’s appreciation of the different dissolution rates and objective 
corroboration of the inventors’ testimony.701 
In In re Garner,702 the applicant Garner appealed the decision of the 
PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, awarding judg-
ment against Garner for failure to make a prima facie showing of pri-
ority in an interference.703  Specifically, Garner appealed the Board’s 
ruling on sufficiency and the Board’s definition of “new evidence.”704 
Garner attempted to establish priority by showing that he actually 
reduced to practice an invention within the proposed count before 
the senior party patent’s effective filing date.705  “To this end, Garner 
submitted a declaration he executed on November 28, 2001 in the 
parent application.”706  “The declaration had originally been submit-
ted under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 in an attempt to overcome a prior art re-
                                                          
 697. Id. at 1373–74, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786–87. 
 698. Id. at 1374, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787. 
 699. Id. at 1375, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787. 
 700. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788. 
 701. Id. at 1375–76, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788. 
 702. 508 F.3d 1376, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 703. Id. at 1377, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 704. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 705. Id. at 1377–78, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 706. Id. at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
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jection in the parent application.”707  After receiving a letter sent by 
the examiner that his 2001 declaration was “insufficient” to provoke 
an interference under 37 C.F.R. § 41.202(d) (Rule 202(d)), Garner 
retitled his 2001 Rule 131 declaration to be a “Rule 202(d) declara-
tion” without making any substantive changes, re-executed, and filed 
it.708  “The examiner forwarded Garner’s request to provoke an inter-
ference to the Board.”709 
The Board found Garner’s filing insufficient to establish a prima 
facie showing of priority.710  In accordance with Rule 202(d), the 
Board declared an interference and issued an Order to Show Cause 
why judgment should not be entered against him.711  In responding to 
the Order, Garner relied on three items that he did not submit in his 
original Rule 202(d) filing to show priority:  “(i) a 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 
declaration filed on September 2, 2003 in an attempt to overcome a 
prior art rejection (‘2003 Garner declaration’); (ii) the specification 
of his provisional application; and (iii) the specification of his utility 
application.”712 
The Board found that these three items were “new evidence” that 
was not permitted under Rule 202(d) without a showing of good 
cause and that Garner had not attempted to show good cause for his 
belated reliance.713  Therefore, the Board issued judgment against 
Garner, who then appealed the Board’s ruling on sufficiency and the 
Board’s definition of “new evidence.”714 
The Federal Circuit concluded that “the Board’s interpretation of 
‘new evidence’ is inconsistent with the regulation, as the Board inter-
preted Rule 202 in a way that requires it to consider the specification 
under [202](a), but not under [202](d), unless the applicant resub-
mits the specification.”715  “Since the specifications were already be-
fore the Board in the interference proceeding pursuant to Rule 
202(a), they cannot be new evidence under Rule 202(d).”716  There-
fore, the Federal Circuit concluded the Board erred when it found 
that the specifications constitute “new evidence” under Rule 
202(d).717  However, the Federal Circuit found that even with the pat-
                                                          
 707. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 708. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 709. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 710. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 711. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 712. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 713. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 714. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 715. Id. at 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313. 
 716. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313. 
 717. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313. 
 2008] 2007 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 895 
 
ent specifications in evidence, Garner failed to establish a prima facie 
showing of priority.718  “In order to establish an actual reduction to 
practice, the inventor must prove that:  (1) he constructed an em-
bodiment or performed a process that met all the limitations of the 
interference count; and (2) he determined that the invention would 
work for its intended purpose.”719 
While “the law does not impose an impossible standard of ‘inde-
pendence’ on corroborative evidence by requiring that every point 
of a reduction to practice be corroborated by evidence having a 
source totally independent of the inventor[,]” corroboration of the 
existence of the device is not sufficient in this case to establish cor-
roboration of reduction to practice.720 
The court added that “[i]t is also necessary to corroborate that the 
device worked for its intended purpose.”721 
In an interference proceeding, a party may assert that the patentee 
did not invent the patented invention by showing derivation.722  The 
person challenging the senior party’s priority date bears the burden 
of proof on derivation and must make two showings.723  First, he must 
“establish prior conception of the claimed subject matter.”724  Second, 
he must prove “communication of that conception to the patentee 
that is ‘sufficient to enable [him] to construct and successfully oper-
ate the invention.’”725 
This was the issue that arose in Brand v. Miller.726  The Federal Cir-
cuit reversed a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences in an interference proceeding related to an invention concern-
ing methods of cutting veneer from logs of wood.727  Robert Brand, 
the senior party in the interference and the inventor of the applica-
tion at issue, was the chief engineer for Capital Machine Co. (“Capi-
                                                          
 718. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313. 
 719. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Taskett v. Dentlinger, 344 F.3d 1337, 1340, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1472, 1474 
(Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 720. Id. at 1381, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314 (alterations in original) (quoting 
Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1330, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896, 1904 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)). 
 721. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314 (citing Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1032, 
13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 722. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031, 1033 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993). 
 723. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031. 
 724. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031. 
 725. Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1376, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1209, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 
110 F.3d 1573, 1577, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 726. 487 F.3d 862, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 727. Id. at 871, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
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tal”), which makes machines for cutting veneer.728  Thomas Miller, the 
junior party in the interference and inventor of the patent at issue, 
was the production manager of Miller Veneers, a customer of Capi-
tal.729  The two companies had a close relationship during the relevant 
period, often sharing information related to veneer cutting technol-
ogy.730  Brand filed for its patent first, but Miller argued that he was 
entitled to priority because Brand derived the invention from Mil-
ler.731  The Board, without citing evidence from the record, ruled that 
Miller had established derivation based on certain communications 
from Miller to Brand’s then company, Capital.732  Brand and Capital 
appealed the Board’s ruling.733 
This case turned on the communication of the conception between 
Miller and Brand, and, more specifically, on whether Miller’s com-
munications to Capital were sufficiently enabling.734  The Federal Cir-
cuit, citing § 706 of the Administrative Procedures Act, noted that 
findings of fact by the Board must in all cases be supported by sub-
stantial evidence in the record.735  The Federal Circuit held that “in 
the context of a contested case, it is impermissible for the Board to 
base its factual findings on its expertise, rather than on evidence in 
the record.”736  Turning to the facts of the case, the Federal Circuit 
found that Miller’s communications were sufficiently enabling, and 
the Board improperly substituted its own opinion for evidence of the 
knowledge of one or ordinary skill in the art.737  The court thus re-
versed the Board’s award to Miller.738 
4. Disciplinary action 
Bender v. Dudas739 involved a disciplinary action to exclude an attor-
ney from practicing before the PTO, a case the Federal Circuit de-
scribed as one that “reads like a novel but represents the true story of 
hopes dashed, fees wasted, and dreams lost by hundreds of individual 
inventors caught up in the world of self-interested promoters who 
promise the world and deliver very little.”740  In a larger sense, this 
                                                          
 728. Id. at 865, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706. 
 729. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706. 
 730. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706. 
 731. Id. at 866, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 732. Id. at 867, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 733. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 734. Id. at 870, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 735. Id. at 869, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 736. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 737. Id. at 870, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 738. Id. at 871, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 739. 490 F.3d 1361, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 740. Id. at 1362, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
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case expressed the Federal Circuit’s concern for “[i]ndividual inven-
tors . . . [who] are often unfamiliar with even the most basic princi-
ples of patent law, do not know where to turn for help, and are vul-
nerable to those who seek to take advantage of their experience.”741  
The real target of the court’s ire were 
so-called “invention promoters” who exploit unsophisticated inven-
tors, heap every invention with praise regardless of the merits or 
the real prospects of legal protection, and entice inventors into en-
gagement agreements filled with hollow guarantees of patent pro-
tection and promises of royalty-bearing licenses that seldom yield 
anything of any significant value.742 
The prosecuting attorney in this case had worked under contract 
with American Inventors Corporation (“AIC”), an invention pro-
moter that solicited inventors for their ideas, offered to pay all legal 
fees to procure a patent, and promised to promote the invention to 
manufacturers and other potential parties in exchange for a flat fee 
or fee plus royalty arrangement.743  The Federal Circuit found that 
substantial evidence supported the PTO’s finding that the attorney 
had neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by failing to advise his 
clients on how best to protect their inventions.744  Even though the at-
torney knew that many of his clients wanted a utility patent or did not 
understand the difference between design and utility patents, Bender 
continued to prosecute their applications as design patents.745  His 
form letter to his clients describing those differences was “an entirely 
hollow and formalistic gesture[,]” according to the court, “because it 
did not provide any of the . . . applicants with advice that directly re-
lated to the particular inventions at issue, the type of patent best 
suited to protect these particular inventions and the inventor’s inter-
ests therein, or the consequences of pursuing a design patent instead 
of a utility patent.”746 
The Federal Circuit found that the PTO had carefully weighed the 
public interest, the seriousness of Bender’s violations, the need for 
deterrence, the integrity of the legal profession, and other extenuat-
ing circumstances in deciding to exclude Bender from practicing be-
fore the PTO.747  In particular, Bender “refused to recognize the im-
propriety of his conduct or to express any remorse for his actions[,]” 
                                                          
 741. Id. at 1362–63, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 742. Id. at 1363, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 743. Id. at 1363–64, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067–68. 
 744. Id. at 1366, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
 745. Id. at 1364, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068. 
 746. Id. at 1366, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
 747. Id. at 1370, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
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which “created a likelihood that he would continue to violate the 
same disciplinary rules again.”748  Even the best of intentions, the 
court added, “cannot absolve Bender’s complicity with AIC in a 
scheme fraught with deception and adversely affecting a large num-
ber of unsuspecting inventors.”749 
J. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection 
The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, who alone may 
waive it.750  “The widely applied standard for determining the scope of 
a waiver . . . is that the waiver applies to all other communications re-
lating to the same subject matter.”751  This broad scope is grounded in 
principles of fairness and serves to prevent a party from simultane-
ously using the privilege as both a sword and a shield; that is, it pre-
vents the inequitable result of a party disclosing favorable communi-
cations while asserting the privilege as to less favorable ones.752  
Ultimately, however, “[t]here is no bright line test for determining 
what constitutes the subject matter of a waiver, rather courts weigh 
the circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of the legal advice 
sought and the prejudice to the parties of permitting or prohibiting 
further disclosures.”753 
The work product doctrine is “designed to balance the needs of 
the adversary system:  promotion of an attorney’s preparation in rep-
resenting a client versus society’s general interest in revealing all true 
and material facts to the resolution of a dispute.”754  Unlike the attor-
ney-client privilege, which provides absolute protection from disclo-
sure, work product protection is qualified and may be overcome by 
need and undue hardship.755  However, the level of need and hard-
ship required for discovery depends on whether the work product is 
                                                          
 748. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 749. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 750. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 
F.3d 1337, 1345, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560, 1565–66 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that, 
to protect the interests of the client, most courts have declined to impose adverse in-
ferences when a party invokes the attorney-client privilege and holding to apply that 
rule to the patent realm as well); Am. Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745, 
3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1817, 1824 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that the privilege belongs to 
the client, not the attorney). 
 751. Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1257, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 752. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264. 
 753. Id. at 1349–50, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264. 
 754. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 755. See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(3) (“Ordinarily, a party may not discover docu-
ments and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial 
by or for another party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, 
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)[,]” but subject to Rule 26(b)(4) 
those materials may be discoverable in certain specified circumstances). 
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factual or the result of mental processes such as plans, strategies, tac-
tics, and impressions, whether memorialized in writing or not.756  
Whereas factual work product can be discovered solely upon a show-
ing of substantial need and undue hardship, mental process work 
product is afforded even greater, nearly absolute, protection.757 
In Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.,758 the 
Federal Circuit addressed an outgrowth of its willfulness doctrine.  
Over the years, the court had held that an accused infringer’s failure 
to produce advice from counsel “would warrant the conclusion that it 
either obtained no advice of counsel or did so and was advised that its 
[activities] . . . would be an infringement of valid U.S. patents.”759  
Recognizing that this inference can distort the attorney-client rela-
tionship, the Federal Circuit held that invoking the attorney-client 
privilege or work product protection does not give rise to an adverse 
inference.760  The court further held that an accused infringer’s fail-
ure to obtain legal advice does not give rise to an adverse inference 
with respect to willfulness.761 
More recently, in In re EchoStar Communications Corp.,762 the Federal 
Circuit addressed the scope of waiver resulting from the advice of 
counsel defense.763  First, the court concluded that relying on in-
house counsel’s advice to refute a charge of willfulness triggers waiver 
of the attorney-client privilege.764  Second, the court held that assert-
ing the advice of counsel defense waives work product protection and 
the attorney-client privilege for all communications on the same sub-
ject matter, as well as any documents memorializing attorney-client 
communications.765  However, the court held that waiver did not ex-
tend to work product that was not communicated to an accused in-
fringer.766 
The Federal Circuit, meeting en banc, returned to the issues of 
willfulness and its functional relationship to attorney-client privilege 
                                                          
 756. Id. 
 757. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981) (discussing 
courts’ use of Rule 26 to safeguard against the disclosure of lawyers’ mental impres-
sions and legal theories). 
 758. 383 F.3d 1337, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 759. Id. at 1343, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564 (quoting Kloster Speedsteel AB v. 
Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580, 23 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 91 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 760. Id. at 1344–45, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565. 
 761. Id. at 1345–46, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 762. 448 F.3d 1294, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 763. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 764. Id. at 1299, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 765. Id. at 1299, 1302–03, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679, 1681–82. 
 766. Id. at 1303–04, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
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and the work-product doctrine in In re Seagate Technology, LLC.767  
With respect to attorney-client privilege, the court concluded “that 
asserting the advice of counsel defense and disclosing opinions of 
opinion counsel do not constitute waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege for communications with trial counsel.”768  The court explained 
that the rule is not absolute, however, and trial courts have discretion 
in extending waiver to trial counsel, such as when the party or coun-
sel engages in chicanery.769 
With respect to the work product doctrine, the Federal Circuit 
similarly held that relying on opinion counsel’s work product does 
not always waive trial counsel’s work product immunity.770  The court 
stated that it was possible, however, that situations may arise in which 
waiver may be extended to trial counsel, again such as when the party 
or counsel engages in chicanery.771  The court also noted that its rul-
ing did not affect the general principles of work product protec-
tion.772  As such, a party may still obtain discovery of work product ab-
sent waiver as long as it shows sufficient need and hardship, although 
a higher burden must still be met to obtain that pertaining to mental 
processes.773 
The court also continued to hold that work product protection 
remains available for “nontangible” work product.774  Otherwise, at-
torneys’ files would be protected from discovery, but attorneys them-
selves would have no work product objection to depositions.775 
K. Constitutional Issues 
1. Sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment 
The Federal Circuit found that a state university had waived its sov-
ereign immunity as a matter of contract in Baum Research and Devel-
opment Co. v. University of Massachusetts at Lowell.776  The University had 
entered into a license with the patent’s inventor, which stated “all 
parties agree to proper venue and hereby submit to the jurisdiction 
in the appropriate State or Federal Courts of Record sitting in the 
State of Michigan[,]” the laws of which would further govern the con-
                                                          
 767. 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 768. Id. at 1374, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873. 
 769. Id. at 1374–75, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873. 
 770. Id. at 1376, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 771. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 772. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 773. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 774. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 775. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 776. 503 F.3d 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1762 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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struction and application of the license in question.777  The Federal 
Circuit found this language “unequivocally expressed” the Univer-
sity’s waiver of sovereign immunity,778 pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s holding in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board.779  The court further found that the plaintiff 
did not need to prove that the Massachusetts legislature had dele-
gated the waiver of immunity to the University because there was no 
dispute that the University had the authority to enter into contracts 
of this nature and that the contracts frequently included the provi-
sion at issue.780 
In Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of University of Missouri,781 the Federal 
Circuit found that a state university may also waive its sovereign im-
munity for purposes of judicial review by bringing an interference 
proceeding.782  In this case, the University of Missouri had requested 
and prevailed in an interference proceeding against Vas-Cath.783  
When Vas-Cath appealed the PTO’s decision, the district court dis-
missed the appeal on Eleventh Amendment grounds.784 
The Federal Circuit reversed the decision, finding that the Elev-
enth Amendment did not shield the University from Vas-Cath’s ap-
peal.785  Ordinarily, “a state does not waive its sovereign immunity 
simply by engaging in activities normally conducted by private indi-
viduals or corporations[,]” such as participating in a routine ex parte 
patent examination.786  In this case, however, the University itself had 
requested that the PTO conduct a litigation-type activity, participated 
in the interference proceeding, and ultimately obtained a favorable 
ruling in a matter for which the statute authorizes judicial review.787  
“It has long been recognized that a state’s voluntary entry into federal 
court serves to waive state immunity from federal adjudication of that 
claim.”788  Thus, the University had waived its constitutional immunity 
not only in that proceeding but also in the appeal taken by the losing 
                                                          
 777. Id. at 1368–69, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764. 
 778. Id. at 1370, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764. 
 779. 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999). 
 780. Baum, 503 F.3d at 1370, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764. 
 781. 473 F.3d 1376, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 782. Id. at 1378, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525. 
 783. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525. 
 784. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525. 
 785. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525. 
 786. Id. at 1383, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528. 
 787. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528. 
 788. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528; see Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 
(1883) (noting that a state’s immunity is a privilege and can be waived at its pleas-
ure). 
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party.789  Principles of fairness and consistency also prohibit the Uni-
versity from selectively asserting immunity, after having won the first 
round, in order to avoid an appeal by the loser.790 
Vas-Cath was distinguished in Biomedical Patent Management Corp. v. 
California,791 in which the Federal Circuit determined that a state may 
be entitled to assert its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity 
even after having waived such immunity in an earlier lawsuit on the 
same issues.792  In pertinent part, the California Department of Health 
Services (“DHS”) intervened in a lawsuit brought by its subcontractor 
for declaratory judgment that two patents owned by Biomedical Pat-
ent Management Corporation (“BPMC”) were invalid and not in-
fringed by DHS laboratory screening methods.793  BPMC filed com-
pulsory counterclaims for infringement, but DHS successfully moved 
to dismiss the action for improper venue.794  Shortly thereafter, BPMC 
filed a new infringement action against DHS, which asserted a de-
fense of sovereign immunity.795  The second action was also dismissed 
without prejudice after the Supreme Court granted certiorari of a 
case that was expected to impact, and ultimately did impact, the sov-
ereign immunity of states in patent infringement actions.796  In par-
ticular, the Supreme Court concluded in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank797 that states retain their 
sovereign immunity in patent infringement suits and that Congress’s 
attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity in such cases was inva-
lid.798 
In February 2006, BPMC filed the present lawsuit against DHS, 
which again asserted a defense of sovereign immunity.799  The district 
court granted DHS’s motion to dismiss the action, and BPMC ap-
pealed.800  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.801 
There was no dispute that DHS, as an arm of the State of Califor-
nia, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, except in cases 
where Congress has validly authorized a lawsuit in exercise of its 
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment or where the state has 
                                                          
 789. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528. 
 790. Id. at 1384, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529. 
 791. 505 F.3d 1328, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1074 (BNA) (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 792. Id. at 1330, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 793. Id. at 1331, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 794. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 795. Id. at 1332, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1076. 
 796. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 797. 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999). 
 798. Id. 
 799. Biomedical Patent Mgmt., 505 F.3d at 1332, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 800. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 801. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
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waived its sovereign immunity by consenting to the lawsuit.802  It was 
further agreed that DHS had waived its sovereign immunity in the 
first declaratory judgment action by moving to intervene and assert-
ing claims against BPMC, thereby voluntarily invoking the district 
court’s jurisdiction.803 
The Federal Circuit, however, rejected BPMC’s argument that 
DHS’s waiver in the first lawsuit extended to the present lawsuit, even 
though both suits involved the same parties and subject matter.804  A 
waiver of sovereign immunity in an earlier action that was dismissed 
does not “carry over” to a new lawsuit, even if the lawsuits involve the 
same patents.805  In so holding, the court distinguished Vas-Cath and 
other cases cited by BPMC in which the state’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity was applied to “one continuous action” or proceeding.806  
In Vas-Cath, for example, the “continuing proceeding” was an inter-
ference action followed by judicial review.807 
According to the Federal Circuit, the problems of “unfairness” or 
“inconsistency” that had prevented states from invoking sovereign 
immunity in Vas-Cath and other cases did not preclude DHS from as-
serting immunity in this case.808  Private parties would not be forced to 
litigate in improper venues to avoid the risk of dismissal and sover-
eign immunity, as BPMC had argued, because “it is unlikely that 
venue considerations alone would govern a State’s decision to assert 
sovereign immunity from a given lawsuit.”809  Similarly, there was little 
risk that states would gain an unfair advantage by acquiring a private 
parties’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 disclosures because “it de-
fies common sense that a State keen on retaining its sovereign im-
munity would, as BPMC posits, risk subjecting itself to liability merely 
to obtain initial disclosures, hoping that the defendant will object to 
the chosen venue, which is, of course, a waivable defense.”810  The 
Federal Circuit concluded, “[f]inally, BPMC ignores the fact that 
these concerns are not even present in this case, both because DHS 
did not choose the forum of the 1997 lawsuit—it intervened in ongo-
                                                          
 802. Id. at 1332–33, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077. 
 803. Id. at 1333, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077. 
 804. Id. at 1336, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079. 
 805. Id. at 1334, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078 (citing S. Pasadena v. Mineta, 284 
F.3d 1154, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2002)); Tegic Commc’n Corp. v. Bd. of Regents, 458 
F.3d 1335, 1342–43, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 806. Biomedical Patent Mgmt., 505 F.3d at 1337, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080. 
 807. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080. 
 808. Id. at 1340, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082. 
 809. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082. 
 810. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082. 
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ing litigation—and because the current action was initiated in that 
same venue.”811 
The Federal Circuit was careful to note, however, that “we do not 
mean to draw a bright-line rule whereby a State’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity can never extend to a re-filed or separate lawsuit.”812  
Rather, the court found that the case law cited by BPMC “does not 
support its contention that waiver of immunity in one suit should ex-
tend to a separate action simply because the action involves the same 
parties and same subject matter.”813  The Federal Circuit thus ex-
tracted from the case law “two relevant principles”:  (1) “a State’s 
waiver of immunity generally does not extend to a separate or re-file 
suit”; and (2) “even a waiver by litigation conduct must nonetheless 
be ‘clear.’  These principles, of course, are related, as a waiver that 
does not ‘clearly’ extend to a separate lawsuit generally would not 
preclude a State from asserting immunity in that separate action.”814 
The Federal Circuit also rejected BPMC’s argument that DHS 
should be judicially estopped from asserting sovereign immunity be-
cause its intervention in the first case had rested on its own assertions 
that it was subject to the district court’s jurisdiction.815  Judicial estop-
pel should not apply, the court stated, because DHS’s positions in the 
two cases were not clearly inconsistent.816  Or, as the court explained, 
“[p]erhaps it is more precise to say that, although DHS’s positions 
were inconsistent, the inconsistency is excused by an intervening 
change in the law” wrought by Florida Prepaid.817  Even though Florida 
Prepaid did not change the well-established principle that interven-
tion in a lawsuit constitutes waiver of sovereign immunity, it did as-
sure DHS that it could successfully assert a defense of sovereign im-
munity.818  Since DHS had had no such expectation of success prior to 
Florida Prepaid, it had had nothing to lose, and potentially much to 
gain, by intervening in the original declaratory judgment action.819  
“Accordingly, we reject BPMC’s argument that Florida Prepaid did not 
effect a change in the law relevant to this case,” the court con-
cluded.820 
                                                          
 811. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082. 
 812. Id. at 1339, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082. 
 813. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082. 
 814. Id. at 1339–40, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082. 
 815. Id. at 1342, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083. 
 816. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083. 
 817. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083. 
 818. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083–84. 
 819. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. 
 820. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. 
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As for BPMC’s argument that the State of California had generally 
waived sovereign immunity for all California State defendants by par-
ticipating in the patent system and patent suits, the Federal Circuit 
found this argument “merits little discussion” and “must be re-
jected.”821  “The Supreme Court in [College Savings] Bank expressly 
overruled prior case law supporting the notion BPMC urges—i.e., 
that a state can constructively waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity 
by its participation in a regulatory scheme.”822 
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected BPMC’s argument that the Su-
preme Court had implicitly overruled Florida Prepaid823 in its more re-
cent decision in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz.824  “The 
holding in Katz was so closely tied to the history of the Bankruptcy 
Clause and the unique aspects of bankruptcy jurisdiction that it can-
not be read to extend to actions for patent infringement” and thus 
“cannot be read to overrule Florida Prepaid, either expressly or implic-
itly.”825  For all these reasons, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of BPMC’s complaint because DHS had a viable de-
fense of sovereign immunity.826 
2. Contracts with the government 
In Sevenson Environmental Services, Inc. v. Shaw Environmental, Inc.,827 
the Federal Circuit found that a government contractor was entitled 
to immunity from a patent infringement suit.828  Defendant Shaw En-
vironmental, Inc. (“Shaw”), a hazardous waste remediation firm, con-
tracted with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 2002 to provide cer-
tain clean-up and remediation services.829  Sevenson Environmental 
Services, Inc. (“Sevenson”) sued Shaw for allegedly infringing certain 
U.S. patents on methods for treating hazardous waste with phospho-
ric acid.830  The district court entered summary judgment that Seven-
son’s suit against Shaw was barred by government contractor immu-
nity under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.831  The Federal Circuit affirmed.832 
                                                          
 821. Id. at 1343, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. 
 822. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. 
 823. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. 
 824. 546 U.S. 356 (2006). 
 825. Biomedical Patent Mgt. Co., 505 F.3d at 1343, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. 
 826. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. 
 827. 477 F.3d 1361, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1906 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 828. Id. at 1363, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
 829. Id. at 1362, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
 830. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908. 
 831. Id. at 1363, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
 832. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
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Shaw’s relationship with the government was defined by two sepa-
rate contracts—the “Total Environmental Restoration Contract” 
(“TERC”), and the “Pre-placed Remedial Action Contract” (“PRAC”), 
which replaced the TERC due to funding issues.833  Both the TERC 
and PRAC required Shaw to provide hazardous waste remediation 
services at a number of government-owned waste sites.834  Both con-
tracts contained the same authorization and consent clause: 
in performing this contract or any subcontract at any tier, of any 
invention described in and covered by a United States patent . . . 
used in machinery, tools, or methods whose use necessarily results 
from compliance by the Contractor or subcontractor with (i) speci-
fications or written provisions forming a part of this contract or (ii) 
specific written instructions given by the Contracting Officer direct-
ing the manner of performance.835 
As a result of the government’s authorization and consent to 
Shaw’s alleged use of the patented remediation methods, Shaw’s al-
leged infringement “shall be construed as use or manufacture for the 
United States[,]” for which the only recourse would be an action 
against the United States in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.836  Ac-
cordingly, the Federal Circuit found that Shaw was entitled to immu-
nity from suit under § 1498(a) as a government contractor.837 
3. Supremacy Clause 
In Biotechnology Industry Organization v. District of Columbia,838 two in-
dustry organizations challenged the constitutionality of a statute by 
the District of Columbia to regulate the prices of prescription 
drugs.839  The Federal Circuit concluded that the D.C. statute was 
preempted by the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution.840  
Even though the District is technically not a state, Federal supremacy 
principles still applied.841  Congress, the court explained, has deter-
mined the extent of rewards to be conferred upon inventors, includ-
ing setting patent terms and allowing drug manufacturers to obtain 
extensions of patent terms under certain circumstances.842  The Dis-
trict of Columbia was thus improperly trying to rebalance “the statu-
                                                          
 833. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908. 
 834. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908. 
 835. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908. 
 836. Id. at 1365, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909 (citing language from 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1498(a) (2000)). 
 837. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 838. 496 F.3d 1362, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 839. Id. at 1366, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642. 
 840. Id. at 1374, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 
 841. Id. at 1371–72, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646. 
 842. Id. at 1373, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
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tory framework of rewards and incentives insofar as it relates to inven-
tive new drugs[,]” the court concluded.843 
L. Statutory Interpretation 
In Merck & Co. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co.,844 a generic drug manufac-
turer was accused of infringing a patent that was subject to both a 
terminal disclaimer and a patent term extension under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 156.845  During prosecution of the U.S. Patent No. 4,797,413 (“the 
‘413 patent”), assignee Merck filed a terminal disclaimer under 35 
U.S.C. § 253 to overcome an obvious-type double patenting rejection 
over the claims of U.S. Patent No. 4,677,115 (“the ‘115 patent”), also 
assigned to Merck.846  The patent terms of both the ‘413 and ‘115 pat-
ents, which coincided as a result of the terminal disclaimer, were ex-
tended by over five months as a result of the 1994 Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (“URAA”).847  The URAA changed the terms of pat-
ents then in force to the greater of seventeen years from the date of 
issue or twenty years from the earliest effective filing date.848  In re-
sponse to a request by Merck pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 156, the PTO 
extended the term of the ‘413 patent approximately three and a half 
years based on the period of FDA review of the patented drug.849 
Defendant High-Tech moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), on 
the basis that Merck had disclaimed any extension of the patent term 
beyond the term of the ‘115 patent when it filed the terminal dis-
claimer.850  Merck responded that 35 U.S.C. § 156 is unambiguous in 
that it states that the patent term “shall be extended” upon the satis-
faction of the enumerated conditions and does not prohibit the ex-
tension of patent terms subject to terminal disclaimers.851 
The Federal Circuit agreed with Merck that the language of 35 
U.S.C. § 156 is unambiguous and not in conflict with the provisions 
of 35 U.S.C. § 253.852  The Federal Circuit agreed with Merck that 
both the language and legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
                                                          
 843. Id. at 1374, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 
 844. 482 F.3d 1317, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 845. Id. at 1318–19, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204–05. 
 846. Id. at 1319, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
 847. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
 848. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
 849. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.  35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000) is a portion of the 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“Hatch-Waxman Act”). 
 850. Merck, 482 F.3d at 1320, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
 851. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206. 
 852. Id. at 1323, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206–07. 
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are “unambiguous” in allowing the extension and do not conflict with 
laws regarding disclaimers.853 
The computation of a Hatch-Waxman patent term extension is 
from the expiration date resulting from the terminal disclaimer 
and not from the date the patent would have expired in the ab-
sence of the terminal disclaimer.  Any waiver of the term is thus not 
ignored or nullified because the terminal disclaimer provides the 
date from which the patent term extension begins.854 
In Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc.,855 the Fed-
eral Circuit concluded that 35 U.S.C. § 119(a) does not permit an 
applicant for a U.S. patent to benefit from the priority of a foreign 
application previously filed by an entity that was not acting on behalf 
of the U.S. applicant at the time of the filing.856 
Andrew Cragg and Michael Dake (collectively, “Cragg”) filed their 
subject U.S. patent application on June 5, 1995, and assigned their 
rights to Boston Scientific, which later merged with Scimed.857  Tho-
mas Fogarty, Timothy Ryan, and Kirsten Freislinger (collectively, “Fo-
garty”) filed their U.S. patent application on the same date and as-
signed their rights to the company that later became Medtronic.858  
The PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences initially desig-
nated Cragg as the senior party in the interference, based on a Feb-
ruary 9, 1994, filing date of two related European patent applications, 
which had been filed by MinTec SARL (“MinTec”), a French com-
pany.859  Fogarty successfully attacked this designation on the basis 
that neither Cragg nor Dake had assigned his rights to MinTec until 
after it had filed the European applications.860  The Board reversed 
itself, denied Scimed (Cragg) the benefit of the European filing date, 
and designated Fogarty the senior party based on the June 8, 1994, 
filing date of a related U.S. patent application.861  Scimed sued in the 
district court, which affirmed the Board’s ruling, and then appealed 
to the Federal Circuit.862 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court and 
the Board, for the following reasons: 
                                                          
 853. Id. at 1322, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207. 
 854. Id. at 1322–23, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207. 
 855. 497 F.3d 1293, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 856. Id. at 1296–97, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671. 
 857. Id. at 1295, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 858. Id. at 1296, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 859. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 860. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 861. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 862. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
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[W]hile the foreign application must obviously be for the same in-
vention and may be filed by someone other than the inventor, sec-
tion 119(a) also requires that a nexus exist between the inventor 
and the foreign applicant at the time the foreign application was 
filed.  Indeed, as a matter of pure logic, an entity could not have 
filed a foreign application “on behalf of” an inventor without the 
inventor’s knowledge or consent; that the foreign application may 
have been filed in accordance with the laws of the country in which 
it was filed has no bearing here.  Therefore . . . we now explicitly 
hold that that a foreign application may only form the basis for pri-
ority under section 119(a) if that application was filed by either the 
U.S. applicant himself, or by someone acting on his behalf at the 
time the foreign application was filed.863 
In the instant case, Scimed could not claim priority to the Euro-
pean applications because at the time they were filed, MinTec had no 
legal relationship to Cragg and was not acting on their behalf.864  The 
Federal Circuit also found that the district court had not erred in 
precluding Scimed from presenting new evidence because, although 
a party may ordinarily present new evidence in an appeal to a district 
court from a Board decision, in this case the submission was im-
proper because Scimed had intended to use it to support new legal 
theories that it had not previously raised before the Board.865 
In Somerset Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Dudas,866 the Federal Circuit de-
nied as moot Somerset’s appeal to compel the PTO to issue his re-
quest for an interim extension of its reissue patent.867  Specifically, 
Somerset applied for patent term extension under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 156(d)(1) on April 27, 2006, followed on February 21, 2007, by a 
request for interim extension under 35 U.S.C. § 156(e)(2).868  In May 
2007, Somerset filed an action to compel the Director of the PTO to 
act on its interim request and moved for a preliminary injunction.869  
The district court denied that motion on June 29, 2007, and Somer-
set appealed.870  Not long afterwards, on July 12, 2007, the PTO de-
nied both Somerset’s request for an interim extension and its appli-
cation for an extension on the merits.871  Accordingly, Somerset 
withdrew that portion of its appeal that sought to compel the Direc-
                                                          
 863. Id. at 1297–98, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671–72. 
 864. Id. at 1296, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 865. Id. at 1298, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672. 
 866. 500 F.3d 1344, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2023 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 867. Id. at 1345, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024. 
 868. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2023–24. 
 869. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024. 
 870. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024. 
 871. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024. 
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tor to act on its request for interim relief but continued its appeal re-
garding the denial of injunctive relief to compel the Director to grant 
that request.872 
The Federal Circuit noted that the Director may grant an interim 
patent extension only if the patent would expire before a certificate 
of extension could be granted.873  Since the Director had already de-
nied Somerset’s application for an interim extension, the “Director 
has no statutory authority to issue the interim extension Somerset 
seeks[,]” and Somerset could not exhibit the reasonable likelihood of 
success needed for a preliminary injunction.874 
III. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY 
All patents are presumed valid, and each claim is “presumed valid 
independently of the validity of other claims.”875  This presumption 
arises because it is assumed that the PTO examiner located the most 
relevant prior art and determined that all the requirements for pat-
entability, including non-obviousness, were met before allowing the 
patent to issue.876  A court, however, is not bound by an examiner’s 
findings.877  The presumption of validity may be overcome by clear 
and convincing evidence of invalidity.878 
However, the ease with which the clear and convincing standard is 
met is influenced by whether the examiner considered the same evi-
dence or arguments presented in court.  In particular, it may be eas-
ier to meet the clear and convincing standard if a challenging party 
can locate evidence more relevant than that before the examiner.879  
For example, 
                                                          
 872. Id. at 1346, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024. 
 873. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 156(e)(2) (2000)). 
 874. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024. 
 875. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); see Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 
995, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1227, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“To prevail on anticipation at 
trial, the refiners had to prove their case by clear and convincing evidence.  The law 
imposes this high burden because Unocal’s patent, like any issued patent, enjoys a 
presumption of validity.”) (citation omitted). 
 876. Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1356, 51 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1415, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 877. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1329, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1481, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 878. Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1367, 53 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 879. Cf. Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1329, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1448 (noting that “the 
correct legal principles [are] that the amended claims define the invention, that the 
support for the invention must be found in the specification as filed, and that the 
amended claims could not be used to provide that support”); Ultra-Tex Surfaces, 204 
F.3d at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1898 (explaining that “when a party alleges that a 
claim is invalid based on the very same references that were before the examiner 
when the claim was allowed, that party assumes . . . the added burden of overcoming 
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[w]hen no prior art other than that which was considered by the 
PTO examiner is relied on by the attacker, [the attacker] has the 
added burden of overcoming the deference that is due to a quali-
fied government agency presumed to have properly done its job, 
which includes one or more examiners who are assumed to have 
some expertise in interpreting the references . . . .880 
A. Patentable Subject Matter 
One of the fundamental requirements for patentability of an in-
vention is that the invention comprises patentable subject matter.  
The statutory provision governing patentable subject matter is 35 
U.S.C. § 101, which provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”881 
Thus, the validity of a patent may be attacked if the claimed subject 
matter is not patentable under the patent law.  However, a defense 
based upon non-patentable subject matter is seldom employed and 
rarely successful.  In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress 
chose very expansive language in drafting § 101 such that “anything 
under the sun that is made by man” is patentable subject matter.882  
Nonetheless, § 101 does have some limits.  For example, laws of na-
ture, physical phenomena, abstract ideas, and mathematical algo-
rithms are not patentable.883  The Federal Circuit decided two impor-
tant cases in 2007 which further defined the boundaries on 
patentable subject matter. 
In In re Comiskey,884 the Federal Circuit revisited the patentability of 
business methods.  Comiskey had applied for a patent directed to 
methods and systems for mandatory arbitration of legal documents, 
such as wills or contracts.885  The claims fell into two general catego-
                                                                                                                                      
the deference that is due to a qualified government agency presumed to have prop-
erly done its job”). 
 880. Ultra-Tex Surfaces, 204 F.3d at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898 (citing Am. 
Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
763, 770 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984)). 
 881. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 882. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 
(1980) (citation omitted).  In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court held that an oil-
consuming bacteria, classified as a life form, was patentable.  Id. at 318, 206 U.S.P.Q 
(BNA) at 201. 
 883. Id., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 197. 
 884. 499 F.3d 1365, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 885. Id. at 1368, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671. 
 912 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:821 
ries:  (1) those that did not require the use of a computer or me-
chanical device (e.g., independent claims 1 and 32), and (2) those 
that did require such a device (e.g., claims 17 and 46).886  The PTO 
rejected the claims as obvious, and Comiskey appealed.887 
After oral argument, the Federal Circuit requested additional brief-
ing on the patentability of the subject matter in Comiskey’s applica-
tion under 35 U.S.C. § 101.888  Comiskey protested, stating that the 
Federal Circuit lacked the power to consider § 101 because it was not 
a ground for rejection relied upon by the PTO.889  The PTO, on the 
other hand, urged the court to consider § 101 to provide “needed 
guidance” in this area.890 
The Federal Circuit sided with the PTO and held that it could con-
sider “a new legal ground for affirmance” that had not been consid-
ered by the PTO.891  Under Supreme Court precedent, “a reviewing 
court can (and should) affirm an agency decision on a legal ground 
not relied on by the agency if there is no issue of fact, policy, or 
agency expertise.”892  Since the patentability of subject matter under 
§ 101 is a question of law, the Federal Circuit was not required to 
make factual or policy determinations that had not been made by the 
PTO.893  Moreover, the court should consider a new legal ground for 
affirmance “where, as here, ‘[i]t would be wasteful to send’ the case 
back to the agency for a determination as to patentable subject mat-
ter.”894 
After establishing its authority to consider § 101, the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed the rejection of the claims that did not require the use 
of a computer or machine.895  Business methods, the court explained, 
are “subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as ap-
plied to any other process or method.”896  In particular, “abstract 
ideas” and “fundamental truths” are not patentable if they have no 
claimed practical application, whereas a claim reciting an algorithm 
or abstract concept is patentable “only if, as employed in the process, 
                                                          
 886. Id. at 1369–70, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672. 
 887. Id. at 1370–71, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672–73. 
 888. Id. at 1371, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673. 
 889. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673. 
 890. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673. 
 891. Id. at 1373, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675. 
 892. Id. at 1372, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 
U.S. 80, 88 (1943)). 
 893. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675. 
 894. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675 (alteration in original)  (quoting Chenery 
Corp., 318 U.S. at 88). 
 895. Id. at 1380–81, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680–81. 
 896. Id. at 1374, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (quoting State St. Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1602 
(Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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it is embodied in, operates on, transforms, or otherwise involves an-
other class of statutory subject matter, i.e., a machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter.”897  The court continued: 
Thus, a claim that involves both a mental process and one of the 
other categories of statutory subject matter (i.e., a machine, manu-
facture, or composition) may be patentable under § 101.  For ex-
ample, we have found processes involving mathematical algorithms 
used in computer technology patentable because they claimed 
practical applications and were tied to specific machines. 
 
However, mental processes—or processes of human thinking—
standing alone are not patentable even if they have practical appli-
cation. 
 
. . . . 
 
Following the lead of the Supreme Court, this court and our 
predecessor court have refused to find processes patentable when 
they merely claimed a mental process standing alone and untied to 
another category of statutory subject matter even when a practical 
application was claimed.898 
The Federal Circuit concluded that Comiskey’s first set of claims 
was not patentable because they constituted “particular business sys-
tems . . . that depend entirely on the use of mental processes.”899  The 
court explained: 
[T]he patent statute does not allow patents on particular systems 
that depend for their operation on human intelligence alone, a 
field of endeavor that both the framers and Congress intended to 
be beyond the reach of patentable subject matter.  Thus, it is estab-
lished that the application of human intelligence to the solution of 
practical problems is not in and of itself patentable.900 
Comiskey’s second set of claims, in contrast, combined an “unpat-
entable mental process . . . with a machine [a computer]” and thus 
claimed patentable subject matter under § 101.901  Nonetheless, 
“[t]he routine addition of modern electronics to an otherwise unpat-
entable invention typically creates a prima facie case of obvious-
ness.”902  The Federal Circuit declined to decide the question of obvi-
                                                          
 897. Id. at 1376, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678. 
 898. Id. at 1377–78, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678. 
 899. Id. at 1378, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 900. Id. at 1378–79, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 901. Id. at 1379–80, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680. 
 902. Id. at 1380, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680. 
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ousness but remanded those claims to the PTO to determine 
“whether the addition of general purpose computers or modern 
communication devices to Comiskey’s otherwise unpatentable mental 
process would have been non-obvious to a person of ordinary skill in 
the art.”903 
In In re Nuijten,904 the issue before the court was whether an elec-
tromagnetic signal is patentable subject matter.905  Nuijten filed a pat-
ent application directed to improved methods for encoding water-
marks in audio or video signals in order to lower distortion levels.906  
In the context of signal processing, a “watermark” is data embedded 
into audio, video, or image signals, or data files to identify a source or 
copyright status of the signals or data files.907  The claims sought to 
patent any “signal” that has been encoded in a particular manner.908 
The PTO rejected a claim directed to a storage medium and claims 
directed to signals under § 101 on the basis that they were directed to 
non-statutory subject matter.909  On appeal, the Board of Patent Ap-
peals and Interferences upheld the rejection of the signal claims be-
cause they did not fall within any of the four categories of patentable 
subject matter in § 101, i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter.910 
Thus, “[t]he essence of the dispute between the parties [was] 
whether a transitory signal is covered by any statutory category[,]” the 
Federal Circuit explained.911  The only § 101 category worth serious 
consideration was that of a manufacture.912  “Manufacture,” however, 
refers to articles resulting from the process of manufacturing and 
thus must be “tangible articles or commodities.”913  The court rea-
soned that electromagnetic signals do not qualify as “tangible articles 
or commodities” because they are only “fleeting” energies “devoid of 
any semblance of permanence during transmission.”914  Accordingly, 
the Federal Circuit found that electromagnetic signals are not pat-
entable subject matter under § 101. 
                                                          
 903. Id. at 1380–81, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681. 
 904. 500 F.3d 1346, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 905. Id. at 1348, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496. 
 906. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496. 
 907. Id. at 1348–49, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497. 
 908. Id. at 1351, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498. 
 909. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498. 
 910. Id. at 1352, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498–99. 
 911. Id. at 1354, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. 
 912. Id. at 1356–57, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502. 
 913. Id. at 1356, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502. 
 914. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502. 
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Judge Linn dissented in part, arguing that the definition of “manu-
facture” should not be limited to “non-transitory, tangible things.”915  
Instead, Judge Linn advocated a more expansive view of the term 
“manufacture” given the “wide scope” of § 101, as noted by the Su-
preme Court in Chakrabarty.916  Judge Linn concluded that the signal 
claims should have been eligible for patenting under § 101.917 
B. Anticipation 
Under the doctrine of anticipation, a patent claim is invalid if the 
claimed invention lacks novelty.918  Anticipation, a question of fact, 
compares the “prior art” to a claim of the patent.919  “[A] claim is an-
ticipated if each and every limitation is found either expressly or in-
herently in a single prior art reference.”920  This test is often referred 
to as the “four corners” doctrine.921  Anticipation also requires that 
the prior art be enabling to one of ordinary skill in the art.922  Antici-
pation thus prevents a patentee from obtaining claims that do not 
contribute to the store of knowledge of those in the field.923  Addi-
tionally, anticipation “encourages prompt filing of patent applica-
tions after inventions have been completed and publicly used, and 
sets an outer limit to the term of exclusivity.”924 
The Federal Circuit confronted the question of inherent anticipa-
tion in In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation,925 a multiphase litigation in-
volving three patents related to Omeprazole, which is sold under the 
brand name Prilosec.926  Omeprazole functions by inhibiting the pro-
duction of gastric acid when administered within an enteric coating 
and an additional separating layer.927  AstraZeneca’s U.S. Patent No. 
                                                          
 915. Id. at 1358, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503. 
 916. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503. 
 917. Id. at 1369, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511. 
 918. Karsten Mfg. Co. v. Cleveland Golf, 242 F.3d 1376, 1383, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1286, 
1291 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 919. Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecomm., Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1327–28, 58 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Celeritas Tech., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 
150 F.3d 1354, 1361, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 920. Celeritas Tech., 150 F.3d at 1361, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
 921. Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282, 54 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1673, 1679 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 904 (2001). 
 922. See generally Bristol Meyers-Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 
1368, 58 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing enablement of an antici-
patory reference). 
 923. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370, 47 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 924. Allied Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1574, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1840, 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 925. 483 F.3d 1364, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 926. Id. at 1367, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645. 
 927. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645–46. 
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6,013,281 (“the ‘281 patent”) was directed to a process for forming 
the coated pill, specifically, the formation in situ of a water-soluble 
separating layer between the acid-sensitive omeprazole core and the 
enteric coating due to a reaction between the alkaline reacting com-
pound (“ARC”) in the core and the enteric coating.928  Claim 1, for 
example, required forming in situ a separating layer as a water soluble 
salt product between a core and a polymer coating layer.929  In a two-
one decision, the Federal Circuit found that the ‘281 patent was inva-
lid as inherently anticipated.930 
According to the Federal Circuit, “the ‘281 process produces an 
omeprazole formulation with three distinct layers, but starts with only 
two of the three layers.”931  Claim 1 recited a minimum ARC concen-
tration in the core required to form the separating layer, and de-
pendent claims recited specific ARC compounds.932  The Federal Cir-
cuit found it noteworthy that the ‘281 patent specification contained 
process parameters, such as temperature, that were not recited in the 
claims.933 
A prior Korean patent application to Chong Dam Corporation 
(“CKD”) recited all of the claim limitations of the asserted ‘281 pat-
ent, with the exception of the in situ formation of the separating 
layer.934  The trial court found that the in situ separation necessarily 
formed when practicing the prior art.935  AstraZeneca’s own testing in 
connection with a lawsuit in Korea with CKD supported the conclu-
sion that the CKD formulation created an in situ separating layer.936 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding no clear error in the factual 
findings of the district court.937  Notwithstanding the absence of a dis-
closure of the process used by CKD to make its formulation, the ma-
jority of the panel found that the presence of a separating layer in the 
CKD formulation was inherent from the combination of the ingredi-
ents specified in CKD’s Korean patent application.938 
Judge Newman dissented, however, finding no basis in the CKD 
reference from which to conclude that the missing descriptive matter 
was necessarily present.939  Judge Newman insisted that the “inherent 
                                                          
 928. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646. 
 929. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
 930. Id. at 1376, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 931. Id. at 1367, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646. 
 932. Id. at 1367–68, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646. 
 933. Id. at 1368, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646. 
 934. Id. at 1371, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649. 
 935. Id. at 1373, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650. 
 936. Id. at 1372, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650. 
 937. Id. at 1373, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650. 
 938. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650. 
 939. Id. at 1377, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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information” must “be known to be present in the subject matter of 
the reference, when viewed by persons experienced in the field of the 
invention.”940  The mere possibility that the CKD reference could be 
used by one of skill in the art to arrive at the claimed process was not 
enough, she wrote.941  Judge Newman also emphasized that the CKD 
reference did not enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice 
the claimed invention and thus could not anticipate the claims at is-
sue.942 
In In re Buszard,943 the Federal Circuit reversed the Board of Patent 
Appeals’s § 102(b) rejection of claims, focusing particularly on the 
PTO’s practice of giving claims their broadest reasonable interpreta-
tion.944 
The claims at issue were directed to a flame retardant composition 
that produces a “flexible polyurethane foam reaction mixture,” which 
the Board broadly interpreted to mean “any reaction mixture which 
produces, at least ultimately, a flexible polyurethane foam.”945  The 
PTO maintained that when the Buszard claims were given their 
broadest interpretation, they were anticipated by a patent to Eling.946  
Buszard, on the other hand, argued that Eling shows only a rigid 
polyurethane foam that loses its rigidity when crushed.947 
At oral argument before the Federal Circuit, the PTO solicitor con-
tended, apparently for the first time, that when a rigid foam is 
crushed, the chemical bonds are broken, producing a flexible foam 
reaction mixture.948  The court found this contention was not suffi-
ciently credible to warrant further consideration because the theory 
was proposed without support or citation, and Buszard had no 
chance to refute it.949  The Federal Circuit concluded that Eling de-
scribed only a rigid foam product that produces a rigid product.950  As 
Judge Newman noted, “[n]o matter how broadly ‘flexible foam’ . . . is 
construed, it is not a rigid foam . . . .  [I]t is not a reasonable claim in-
terpretation to equate ‘flexible’ with ‘rigid,’ or to equate a crushed 
rigid polyurethane foam with a flexible polyurethane foam.”951 
                                                          
 940. Id. at 1378, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 941. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 942. Id. at 1380, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
 943. 504 F.3d 1364, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 944. Id. at 1366–67, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750–51. 
 945. Id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 946. Id. at 1366, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750. 
 947. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750. 
 948. Id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 949. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 950. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 951. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
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In dissent, Judge Prost argued that the majority did not “apply the 
rule that the Board is entitled to give claim language its broadest rea-
sonable interpretation.”952  He also asserted that Buszard did not ade-
quately define the term “flexible polyurethane foam reaction mix-
ture” in the specification as to prevent anticipation by Eling.953 
In Zenon Environmental, Inc. v. United States Filter Corp.,954 the Federal 
Circuit reversed a finding of no anticipation on the basis that the 
grandchild patent (“the ‘319 patent”) was not entitled to the priority 
date of the grandparent application (“the ‘373 patent”), due to a lack 
of continuity of disclosure between the grandparent and parent pat-
ent (“the ‘250 patent”).955  Although anticipation is a question of fact, 
continuity of disclosure is a question of law subject to de novo re-
view.956 
The ‘250 patent incorporated a description of a “vertical skein” 
from its grandparent ‘373 patent using the following language:  “Fur-
ther details relating to the construction and deployment of a most 
preferred skein are found in the parent U.S. Pat. No. 5,639,373, and 
in Ser. No. 08/690,045, the relevant disclosures of each of which are 
included by reference thereto as if fully set forth herein.”957  The Fed-
eral Circuit found that the “plain language indicates that the subject 
matter that is being incorporated by reference pertains to the details 
relating to the construction and deployment of a vertical skein.”958  
The vertical skein, according to the ‘373 patent, “consisted of fibers, a 
pair of headers, and a permeate collection means, . . . [but] by defini-
tion, a skein does not include a gas distribution system.”959  Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that the ‘250 patent did not incorporate 
the gas distribution system of the grandparent ‘373 patent.960  As a re-
sult, the chain of continuity was broken between the ‘373 patent and 
the grandchild ‘319 patent, which claimed a filtering apparatus com-
prising inter alia a gas distribution system.961  The panel majority con-
cluded that the grandparent ‘373 patent anticipated the ‘319 pat-
ent.962 
                                                          
 952. Id. at 1368, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751 (Prost, J., dissenting). 
 953. Id. at 1369–70, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752–53. 
 954. 506 F.3d 1370, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 955. Id. at 1377–78, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123. 
 956. Id. at 1379, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124. 
 957. Id. at 1376, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122. 
 958. Id. at 1379, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124. 
 959. Id. at 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125. 
 960. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125. 
 961. Id. at 1380–81, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124–25. 
 962. Id. at 1382, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126. 
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Judge Newman dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that 
“[t]he question of what material would be understood as incorpo-
rated is a question of fact,” but the findings by the patent examiner 
and district court had not been shown to have been clearly errone-
ous.963  Judge Newman further wrote that the panel’s decision “casts 
doubt on the reliable use of this expedient [of using incorporation by 
reference]” and “raise[s] new risks of patent drafting” without adding 
anything to public knowledge, the patent’s disclosure requirements, 
or compliance with § 120.964  The majority found the dissent “alarm-
ing[],” for “[t]he draftsman here made clear what was being incorpo-
rated by reference and, by difference, what was not.  No doubt or risk 
arises from carefully drafted language that is interpreted to mean 
what it says.”965 
1. On-sale and public use bar 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), once an invention is offered for sale or 
used in public, the inventor has one year in which to file a patent ap-
plication.966  If the invention was in public use or on sale more than 
one year prior to the filing date of the patent application, § 102(b) 
bars the ability to patent the invention.967  An on-sale bar under 
§ 102(b) requires that two conditions be satisfied:  (1) the claimed 
invention must have been the subject of a commercial sale or offer 
for sale more than one year before the application was filed, and 
(2) the invention must have been ready for patenting.968  An inven-
tion can be found to be “ready for patenting” in at least the following 
ways:  (1) by proof that it was reduced to practice, or (2) by proof that 
the inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the in-
vention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the 
art to practice the invention.969 
In the following Federal Circuit decisions, invalidation frequently 
turned on the meaning of “public use” and “on sale.”  The Federal 
Circuit has described “public use” as including “any use of [the 
                                                          
 963. Id. at 1384, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 964. Id. at 1385, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129. 
 965. Id. at 1382 n.3, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126 n.3. 
 966. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 967. Id. 
 968. Sparton Corp. v. United States, 399 F.3d 1321, 1323, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1919, 1921 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 969. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1921. 
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claimed] invention by a person other than the inventor who is under 
no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the inventor.”970 
In Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd.,971 Cargill accused Canbra of in-
fringing four of its patents related to non-hydrogenated canola oil.972  
The district court found that two of the patents were invalid under 
the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because Cargill had sold 400 
pounds of the claimed composition prior to the critical date.973  The 
Federal Circuit, in a unanimous decision, affirmed the judgment of 
the district court that the two patents were invalid under § 102(b)’s 
on-sale bar rule.974 
In so holding, the Federal Circuit rejected Cargill’s argument that 
the oil, which was the subject of the sale was not ready for patenting, 
and thus did not trigger the on-sale bar rule, because “an invention is 
only reduced to practice when it is shown to work for its intended 
purpose.”975  The Federal Circuit responded that Cargill was aware of 
the utility of the claimed invention before its offer to sell the oil and 
that awareness of a general utility is sufficient for reduction to prac-
tice.976  It is not necessary “to be aware of the specific characteristics 
that made the oil useful.”977  The court also found “powerful evidence 
of a sales transaction” in a letter, including an amount to be deliv-
ered, a unit price and contract language allocating risks and respon-
sibility between Cargill and the buyer.978  The Federal Circuit further 
rejected Cargill’s argument that the sale was for “experimental pur-
poses” by explaining that “even if [Cargill’s predecessor in interest] 
offered to sell the oil to [Proctor & Gamble] for the purpose of con-
tinued testing, it does not prevent a finding that the oil had already 
been reduced to practice.”979 
In Honeywell International, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Systems Corp.,980 
the Federal Circuit upheld the denial of defendant’s remaining coun-
terclaims of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).981  Honeywell sued 
                                                          
 970. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (citing Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881)). 
 971. 476 F.3d 1359, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 972. Id. at 1361, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706–07. 
 973. Id. at 1363, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707. 
 974. Id. at 1372, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 975. Id. at 1370, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 976. See id. at 1371 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318, 
51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999), in which the court held that “[t]he fact 
that the claimed material was sold under circumstances in which no question existed 
that it was useful means that it was reduced to practice”). 
 977. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 978. Id. at 1369, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 979. Id. at 1371, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 980. 488 F.3d 982, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 981. Id. at 987, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890. 
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Universal Avionics Systems (“UAS”) for infringing its patents on ad-
vanced terrain warning systems, which help prevent pilots from flying 
into mountains or hillsides.982  Instead of relying on radio signals, as 
in the prior art, the patented invention used a virtual “look ahead” 
terrain warning system, which compared the aircraft’s position to on-
board digitized maps of the earth’s terrain and man-made obsta-
cles.983  Two of the five asserted patents were at issue in this appeal—
the ‘080 patent, which covered certain input and output signals in 
the look-ahead system, and the ‘009 patent, which covered systems for 
displaying the contours of the terrain.984 
In this case, UAS argued that Honeywell’s claims were invalid un-
der § 102(b) because Honeywell had negotiated with Gulfstream and 
Canadair prior to the critical date to develop its invention for use in 
their luxury airplanes.985  The Federal Circuit rejected this argument 
because Honeywell had to test the system’s in-cockpit results to “de-
termine that the invention worked for its intended purpose” and to 
demonstrate “the workability or utility of the claimed invention.”986  
Accordingly, Honeywell’s negotiations did not trigger the on-sale bar 
because the invention was not “ready for patenting” at that time.987 
The Federal Circuit also rejected UAS’s argument that Honeywell’s 
flight demonstrations had a commercial purpose or constituted an 
invalidating “public use” under § 102(b).988  In particular, a reporter 
was on board one of those flights and later published an article indi-
cating the system was still under development.989  The court con-
cluded that this was not a “public use” because it did not disclose “a 
completed invention in public, without confidentiality restrictions, 
and without permitted experimentation.”990 
In contrast, in Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp.,991 the Fed-
eral Circuit, in a unanimous decision, reversed the district court’s 
summary judgment of invalidity based on public use.992  The two pat-
ents in question were directed to an ergonomic keyboard that re-
quired only slight finger gestures to actuate the keys.993  In pertinent 
                                                          
 982. Id. at 987–88, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890–91. 
 983. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890–91. 
 984. Id. at 989, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891–92. 
 985. Id. at 996, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897. 
 986. Id. at 997, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898. 
 987. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898. 
 988. Id. at 998, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899. 
 989. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899. 
 990. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898. 
 991. 486 F.3d 1376, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 992. Id. at 1378, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802. 
 993. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802. 
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part, the inventor developed the Cherry Model 5 and other proto-
types of his invention, which he demonstrated to numerous potential 
investors, a friend, a business partner, and a typing tester.994  None of 
those disclosures, save the one to the typing tester, involved connect-
ing the Cherry Model 5 to a computer or using it to transmit data.995  
Instead, the disclosures were limited to a visual view of the new key-
board design without disclosing its ability to translate finger move-
ments into the keys to transmit data.996 
The Federal Circuit concluded that since the claims were directed 
to a device for transmitting data, the disclosures to the investors, 
friend, and business partner were inadequate to constitute an invali-
dating “public use” under § 102(b).997  As for the disclosure to the typ-
ing tester, who had used the prototype to transmit data to a com-
puter, her use had occurred less than a year before the filing date of 
the application for the ‘477 patent, and she had signed a non-
disclosure agreement (“NDA”) when she took the test.998  For these 
reasons, her use did not qualify as a “public use” under § 102(b).999 
In Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm Inc.,1000 the Federal Circuit, in another 
unanimous decision, held that the claims for an orthodontic bracket 
were invalid due to its public use or sale at a trade show more than 
one year prior to filing the application.1001  The action was brought by 
patent licensee Adenta, which sought a declaratory judgment that the 
patent was invalid and unenforceable.1002  OrthoArm argued that 
Adenta had failed to meet its burden of proof at trial because 
Adenta’s witnesses all had an interest in declaring the patent invalid, 
and their testimony was not corroborated by the documentary evi-
dence.1003  The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that corroboration 
was not at issue because this was not a case in which the witnesses 
were claiming to be the inventors.1004  Rather, the question was the 
sufficiency of the evidence.1005  The court found there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury’s verdict of invalidity because the differ-
ent witnesses all corroborated each other, and their testimony was 
further supported by the documents in evidence, which included a 
                                                          
 994. Id. at 1385, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 995. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 996. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 997. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 998. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 999. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 1000. 501 F.3d 1364, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1428 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1001. Id. at 1366–67, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429–30. 
 1002. Id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430. 
 1003. Id. at 1367–68, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431. 
 1004. Id. at 1371–72, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433–34. 
 1005. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434. 
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letter from Adenta’s German patent attorney informing its American 
patent attorney that the bracket had been on display and instructing 
him to file a patent application within a year.1006  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s denial of OrthoArm’s motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law to overturn the jury’s verdict of invalidity.1007 
C. Obviousness 
One cannot discuss the Federal Circuit’s 2007 decisions on obvi-
ousness without first mentioning the Supreme Court’s landmark de-
cision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.1008  As explained in Part 
D.3, KSR reversed the Federal Circuit’s mandatory application of the 
TSM test and seemingly broadened the grounds for finding obvious-
ness.  Although not as radically transformative as many had pre-
dicted, KSR still represents a fundamental change in the concept of 
obviousness, a change reflected in the Federal Circuit’s subsequent 
obviousness decisions.  This section begins with a basic primer on ob-
viousness, including a brief discussion of the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in KSR, followed by a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s applica-
tions of KSR and its 2007 decisions either decided before KSR or 
involving aspects of obviousness uninfluenced by the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement in KSR. 
A patent claim is invalid for obviousness if the differences between 
the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the claimed 
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time of the 
invention to a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art.1009  Obvi-
ousness is a question of law that is based on underlying factual con-
siderations: 
1. the scope and content of the prior art; 
2. the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; 
3. the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and 
4. objective evidence of non-obviousness (i.e., secondary considera-
tions).1010 
It is against this factual background that the ultimate determina-
tion of obviousness is made.  The inquiry into obviousness is an “ex-
pansive and flexible approach” rather than a “formalistic concep-
                                                          
 1006. Id. at 1372–73, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434. 
 1007. Id. at 1373, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435. 
 1008. 127 S. Ct. 1727, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007). 
 1009. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). 
 1010. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
459, 467 (1966); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Phillip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 
1120, 1124, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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tion.”1011  A combination of familiar elements according to their estab-
lished functions is probably obvious if the combination does no more 
than yield predictable results.1012  If the combination is more than a 
predictable use of prior art, then the court must determine whether 
there was an “apparent reason to combine the known elements,” by 
looking, e.g., at “interrelated teachings of multiple patents,; to the ef-
fects of demands known to the design community or present in the 
marketplace; and to the background knowledge possessed by a per-
son having ordinary skill in the art.”1013  The court need not seek out 
precise teachings, but can consider the common sense “inferences 
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would em-
ploy.”1014 
The fourth factual inquiry, referred to as objective evidence of non-
obviousness or secondary considerations, must be resolved before 
coming to an obviousness conclusion.1015  These considerations are 
important because they may provide circumstantial evidence of non-
obviousness.1016  Secondary considerations may include: 
1. the commercial success of the claimed invention; 
2. long-standing problems in the art solved by the invention; 
3. widespread recognition and copying of the invention in the     
industry; 
4. disbelief by experts that the invention would work; 
5. failure of others; 
6. unexpected results; and 
7. praise and industry acceptance of the invention.1017 
                                                          
 1011. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739, 1741, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1385, 1395–96 (2007). 
 1012. Id. at 1739, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. 
 1013. Id. at 1740–41, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
 1014. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
 1015. Tex. Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1178, 26 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson 
& Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1573, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1333 
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1566–67, 224 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 195, 198–99 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Standard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United 
States, 25 Cl. Ct. 1, 52 n.40 (1991). 
 1016. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467 
(1966). 
 1017. See Tex. Instruments, 988 F.2d at 1178, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028 ( stating 
that obviousness is based on several factual determinations, including a considera-
tion of “other objective evidence”); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 976 F.2d at 1573, 24 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (examining commercial success, failure of others, long-
felt need, and unexpected results when inquiring into secondary considerations); 
Vandenberg, 740 F.2d at 1566-67, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 199 (noting that the appel-
lants’ device obtained widespread recognition and that evidence existed showing the 
device was copied in the industry); see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) at 467 (“Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but 
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In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,1018 a unanimous Supreme 
Court reasserted the primacy of Graham v. John Deere1019 in making an 
obviousness determination and warned that a rigid application of the 
teaching/suggestion/motivation test in an obviousness inquiry is in-
consistent with the Graham framework.1020  In effect, the Court repri-
manded the Federal Circuit for its strict adherence to the TSM ap-
proach over the years.  The Supreme Court did not reject the TSM 
test outright, however, but stripped it of its prominence as the deter-
minative factor in an obviousness inquiry.1021  The Court noted, 
“[t]here is no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying 
the TSM test and the Graham analysis.  But when a court transforms 
the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness in-
quiry, as the court of appeals did here, it errs.”1022 
The Supreme Court also weighed in on the combination of famil-
iar elements in an invention, noting that “[t]he combination of famil-
iar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious 
when it does no more than yield predictable results.”1023  “If a person 
of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely 
bars its patentability.”1024  The Federal Circuit also erred when it con-
cluded that “a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by 
showing that the combination of elements was ‘obvious to try.’”1025  
According to the Supreme Court, in some circumstances “the fact 
that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious 
under § 103.”1026 
                                                                                                                                      
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circum-
stances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.”); Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1129, 56 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (listing secondary considerations that 
other courts have considered, including commercial success, long-felt but unfulfilled 
needs, failure of others, skepticism about the invention, copying, praise and accep-
tance, and unexpected results); Standard Mfg., 25 Cl. Ct. at 51, 52 (tracing the evolu-
tion of secondary considerations and suggesting that they now “comprise a fourth 
factual inquiry . . . which now must be resolved before coming to a conclusion con-
cerning obviousness”); 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.05 (1996) (dis-
cussing three views on the role of secondary considerations). 
 1018. KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385. 
 1019. Graham, 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459. 
 1020. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396–97. 
 1021. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396–97. 
 1022. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396–97. 
 1023. See id. at 1739–40, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395–96 (discussing the applica-
tion of this doctrine in United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 479 
(1966), the companion case to Graham; in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 189 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 449 (1976); and in Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 
396 U.S. 57, 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1969)). 
 1024. Id. at 1740, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396. 
 1025. Id. at 1742, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397. 
 1026. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397. 
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Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.1027 was one of the Federal 
Circuit’s first obviousness cases after the Supreme Court’s KSR ruling.  
Leapfrog, a manufacturer of children’s educational products, sued 
Fisher-Price for infringing a patent on an interactive learning toy that 
makes a sound or says a phoneme when a child properly enters the 
letters.1028  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding 
that the claims were obvious.1029  The prior art in question included:  
(1) an electro-mechanical learning toy (“Bevan”) in which a motor 
and internal record would say a phoneme when a particular letter was 
pressed; (2) an electronic reading toy (“SSR”) by Texas Instruments; 
and (3) knowledge in the art about electronic “readers.”1030  The Fed-
eral Circuit concluded it would have been obvious to use SSR as a 
“roadmap” to update the Bevan device with modern electronic com-
ponents, and then add a “reader” of the type well-known in the art.1031  
In the words of KSR, the patent was thus an obvious “combination of 
familiar elements . . . [and] known methods” that “yield[ed] predict-
able results.”1032  The court, in fact, found the prima facie showing of 
obviousness to be so strong that it overcame the secondary considera-
tions of commercial success, praise, and long-felt-need.1033 
Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd.1034 was the 
Federal Circuit’s first obviousness case in the chemical arts after 
KSR.1035  Takeda owned a patent directed to compounds that can be 
used as antidiabetic agents.1036  Seeking approval to market its generic 
version of the same compounds, Alphapharm filed a Paragraph IV 
certification with its Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”), 
asserting that the patent at issue was invalid as obvious.1037  Takeda 
filed suit against Alphapharm and three other generic drug manufac-
turers, alleging infringement of certain claims in Takeda’s patent.1038 
The critical portion of the claimed compounds was an ethyl substi-
tuted pyridyl ring, which had four possible positions on which an al-
                                                          
 1027. 485 F.3d 1157, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1687 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1028. Id. at 1158, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688–89. 
 1029. Id. at 1163, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692. 
 1030. Id. at 1158–59, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689. 
 1031. Id. at 1162, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691–92. 
 1032. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1385, 1395 (2007). 
 1033. Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1162, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692. 
 1034. 492 F.3d 1350, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1035. See id. at 1355-56, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173–74 (noting that obviousness 
had only recently been addressed by the Supreme Court and the opinion given by 
the district court was rendered before the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR). 
 1036. Id. at 1352, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172–73. 
 1037. Id. at 1354, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172. 
 1038. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172. 
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kyl group could be located.1039  The claimed compounds had an ethyl 
group attached to the 5-position.1040  Alpharm cited prior art that in-
cluded a similar compound (“compound b”), which had a methyl 
group attached to the 6-position.1041  “Relying on KSR, Alphapharm 
argue[d] that the claimed compounds would have been obvious be-
cause the prior art compound fell within ‘the objective reach of the 
claim,’ and the evidence demonstrated that using the techniques of 
homologation and ring-walking would have been ‘obvious to try.’”1042  
The district court found “there was no motivation in the prior art to 
select compound b as the lead compound for antidiabetic research.”  
In fact, “the prior art [actually] taught away from” compound b.1043  
The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that Alphapharm “failed to 
show that there existed a reason, based on what was known at the 
time of the invention, to perform the chemical modifications neces-
sary to achieve the claimed compounds.”1044 
The Federal Circuit stated that the test for prima facie obviousness 
in an invention concerning chemical compounds “is consistent with 
the legal principles enunciated in KSR[,]” and thus, “in cases involv-
ing new chemical compounds, it remains necessary to identify some 
reason that would have led a chemist to modify a known compound 
in a particular manner to establish prima facie obviousness of a new 
claimed compound.”1045  The Federal Circuit also found that, in con-
trast with KSR, “the prior art disclosed a broad selection of com-
pounds any one of which could have been selected as a lead com-
pound for further investigation[,]” as opposed to identifying 
predictable solutions.1046 
In Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd.,1047 the Federal 
Circuit reversed a pre-KSR district court decision in which patent 
claims to a certain pharmaceutical compound were found to be non-
obvious over the prior art.1048  The patent at issue was directed to a 
compound for blood pressure medication that was “substantially free 
of other isomers.”1049  The patent owner had argued that there was no 
explicit teaching to purify a stereoisomer from the mixture in which 
                                                          
 1039. Id. at 1353, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172. 
 1040. Id. at 1354, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172. 
 1041. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172. 
 1042. Id. at 1359, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176. 
 1043. Id. at 1354, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172–73. 
 1044. Id. at 1363, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179. 
 1045. Id. at 1356–57, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174. 
 1046. Id. at 1359, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176. 
 1047. 499 F.3d 1293, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1048. Id. at 1299, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202. 
 1049. Id. at 1296, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200. 
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it was the active ingredient, and that the purified isomer exhibited 
the unexpected result of increased potency.1050 
The Federal Circuit, in a unanimous decision, reversed the district 
court, holding that the claimed composition was obvious because the 
inventors had merely isolated and purified the active ingredient in a 
mixture that existed in the prior art.1051  The district court had erred 
in relying on a lack of clear and convincing evidence of any motiva-
tion in the art to separate active stereoisomer.1052  The Federal Circuit 
stated that “[r]equiring an explicit teaching to purify the . . . [active] 
stereoisomer from a mixture in which it is the active ingredient is 
precisely the sort of rigid application of the TSM test that was criti-
cized in KSR.”1053 
[I]f it is known that some desirable property of a mixture derives in 
whole or in part from a particular one of its components, or if the 
prior art would provide a person of ordinary skill in the art with 
reason to believe that this is so, the purified compound is prima fa-
cie obvious over the mixture even without an explicit teaching that 
the ingredient should be concentrated or purified.1054 
In In re Translogic Technology, Inc.,1055 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the PTO’s finding on reexamination that the claims of Translogic’s 
‘666 patent were invalid as obvious.1056  Accused infringer Hitachi had 
petitioned the PTO to reexamine Translogic’s ‘666 patent during the 
course of an infringement suit.1057  While the appeal from the PTO 
was pending, the jury in Translogic’s district court case found the 
patent valid and infringed, and awarded Translogic $86.5 million in 
damages.1058  The district court also entered a permanent injunction, 
which it stayed pending appeal.1059  The Federal Circuit consolidated 
Translogic’s appeals from the PTO and the district court, although 
the present decision addressed only the appeal from the reexamina-
tion.1060 
In affirming the PTO’s obviousness determination, the Federal 
Circuit rejected Translogic’s argument that the PTO had erred in 
construing the term “coupled to receive” to include terminals that 
                                                          
 1050. Id. at 1302, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
 1051. Id. at 1303, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
 1052. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
 1053. Id. at 1301, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
 1054. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204 (citing In re May, 574 F.2d 1082, 1090–94, 
197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 601, 607–610 (C.C.P.A. 1978)). 
 1055. 504 F.3d 1249, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1056. Id. at 1262, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 1057. Id. at 1251, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930. 
 1058. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930. 
 1059. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930. 
 1060. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930. 
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were merely capable of receiving signals.1061  The Federal Circuit 
found the PTO’s construction to be correct because the claims and 
specification did not specify any particular structural connection, and 
the input variables (signals) were not part of the claimed inven-
tion.1062 
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the PTO’s finding that the Gorai 
reference was relevant prior art to the technical field of the ‘666 pat-
ent.1063  Translogic, in contrast, was “making the same error corrected 
by the Supreme Court in KSR,” namely, that variants of the circuit 
disclosed in the prior art reference were not relevant prior art be-
cause they did not address the same problem as the ‘666 patent.1064  
“However, this argument overlooks the fundamental proposition that 
the series circuits in Gorai are prior art within the public domain and 
the common knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art.”1065  
The Federal Circuit further rejected Translogic’s argument that, 
from the viewpoint of a skilled artisan, the Gorai reference disclosed 
only an algorithm to perform certain logic functions but not an ac-
tual multiplexer.1066 
Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO’s finding that the 
‘666 patent claims were obvious over a combination of the Gorai and 
Weste references.1067  Translogic’s arguments to the contrary were 
based on the absence of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to 
combine the references—a test that is no longer mandatory after the 
Supreme Court’s KSR decision.1068  Instead, the court found that the 
PTO had properly taken into account “‘the inferences and creative 
steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ,’” pursu-
ant to KSR.1069 
In In re Icon Health and Fitness, Inc.,1070 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the Board of Patent Appeals decision holding the patentee’s claims to 
a treadmill with a folding base unpatentable as obvious.1071  Icon was 
the patent holder of the ‘624 patent, which requires that the folding 
base have a gas spring “to assist in stably retaining” the treadmill base in 
                                                          
 1061. Id. at 1258, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935. 
 1062. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935–36. 
 1063. Id. at 1261, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938. 
 1064. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938. 
 1065. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938. 
 1066. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938. 
 1067. Id. at 1262, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938–39. 
 1068. Id. at 1261–62, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938–39. 
 1069. Id. at 1262, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1396 (2007)). 
 1070. 496 F.3d 1374, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1071. Id. at 1382, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752. 
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the upright position.1072  “On reexamination, the examiner rejected 
Icon’s claims as obvious . . . based on the combination of an adver-
tisement [for a folding treadmill] by Damark International, Inc. 
(‘Damark’) and U.S. Patent No. 4,370,766 to Teague, Jr. (“Teague”),” 
which teaches the use of gas springs in a bed that folds up into a 
cabinet.1073  The Board affirmed the examiner’s determination of ob-
viousness over the combination of Damark and Teague, noting the 
breadth of Icon’s claim limitation with respect to the gas spring and 
the pertinence of Teague.1074 
On appeal, Icon focused on two major arguments.  First, Icon ar-
gued that Teague, describing a folding bed, falls outside of the 
“treadmill art” and addresses a different problem than the ‘624 pat-
ent, thus removing it from the relevant prior art.1075  Second, Icon ar-
gued that Teague, which references use of a dual-action spring, 
teaches away from Icon’s invention.1076  The Federal Circuit rejected 
both arguments, noting that Teague indeed addresses the same prob-
lem as Icon’s.1077  Citing In re Clay,1078 the Federal Circuit noted that 
“[a] reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a 
different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, 
because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have com-
mended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his prob-
lem.”1079  Further, the Federal Circuit, citing KSR, noted that “‘familiar 
items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.’”1080  The 
Federal Circuit stated that there was “[n]othing about Icon’s folding 
mechanism [that] requires any particular focus on treadmills; it gen-
erally addresses [the] problems of supporting the weight of such a 
mechanism and providing a stable resting position.”1081  Moreover, the 
Federal Circuit found that a variety of sources may have led one 
skilled in the art to combine the teachings of Damark and Teague to 
produce a device meeting all of the limitations of the ‘624 patent 
claims.1082 
                                                          
 1072. Id. at 1377, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748. 
 1073. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748. 
 1074. Id. at 1378, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749. 
 1075. Id. at 1379, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750. 
 1076. Id. at 1381, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 1077. Id. at 1379–80, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 1078. 966 F.2d 656, 659, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1058, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 1079. Icon Health & Fitness, 496 F.3d at 1379–80, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 
(quoting Clay, 966 F.2d at 659, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061). 
 1080. Id. at 1380, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1397 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 1081. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750. 
 1082. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750. 
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Regarding Icon’s second argument that Teague teaches away from 
Icon’s invention, the Federal Circuit noted that Teague disclosed two 
types of gas spring mechanisms, neither of which was undesirable for 
Icon’s purpose.1083  The Federal Circuit further noted that Icon’s 
broad claims encompassing anything that assists in stably retaining 
the tread base undermined their argument.1084  Accordingly, the Fed-
eral Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision that the claims were obvi-
ous.1085 
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the PTO’s finding of obviousness 
in In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp.1086  Trans Texas held two related 
patents on methods for insulating deposit and loan accounts from in-
flation and providing stability to financial institutions by matching in-
flation-adjusted payments to depositors with increased inflation-
adjusted interest payments from borrowers.1087  At Trans Texas’s re-
quest, the PTO reexamined each of the patents in question, but re-
jected Trans Texas’s argument that the Office was bound by a district 
court’s claim construction in an earlier infringement proceeding on 
the same patents.1088  The PTO eventually rejected all the claims as 
obvious, and Trans Texas appealed.1089  The Federal Circuit found the 
claims were obvious either because the limitation in question was dis-
closed in the prior art or because a combination of the prior art with 
a “well-known practice” in the field yielded predictable results.1090  Ac-
cordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO’s rejection of all of 
the reexamined claims as obvious.1091 
In In re Sullivan,1092 the patent applicants appealed a decision of the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirming the Examiner’s 
rejection of the invention as obvious.1093  The applicants claimed an 
antivenom for treating rattlesnake bites, wherein the composition was 
characterized by the use of a fragment of an antibody, rather than an 
intact antibody, even though such fragments are not generally used 
for antivenoms.1094  The Board found that the applicants’ composition 
                                                          
 1083. Id. at 1381–82, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752. 
 1084. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 1085. Id. at 1382, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752. 
 1086. 498 F.3d 1290, 1292, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835, 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1087. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836. 
 1088. Id. at 1294, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838. 
 1089. Id. at 1295, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838. 
 1090. Id. at 1299–1301, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841–43 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1394 (2007)). 
 1091. Id. at 1301, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843. 
 1092. 498 F.3d 1345, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1093. Id. at 1347, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035. 
 1094. Id. at 1348, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036. 
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was obvious in view of a combination of one of the inventor’s own 
references that taught the use of an intact antibody in a rattlesnake 
antivenom and another reference that taught the use of an antibody 
fragment to detect rattlesnake venom.1095  The Board found that the 
applicant’s intended use of the composition to neutralize, rather 
than detect, rattlesnake venom did not render the composition non-
obvious.1096 
The Federal Circuit held that the Board erroneously failed to con-
sider the applicants’ rebuttal evidence, which included declarations 
from the inventors and their experts.1097  The Board was mistaken in 
finding that the declarations related only to the use of the claimed 
composition.1098  Rather, the declarations also showed “an unexpected 
result from the use of the claimed composition,” namely, the “unex-
pected property of neutralizing the lethality of rattlesnake venom 
while reducing the occurrence of adverse immune reactions in hu-
mans.”1099  In addition, the declarations explained that the prior art 
taught away from the composition and that there was a long-felt need 
for this new antivenom.1100 
Conversely, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judg-
ment of non-obviousness in Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc.1101  The 
patent in question was directed to a method for treating bacterial ear 
infections using antibiotic ofloxacin, which is a gyrase inhibitor.1102  
Daiichi sued Apotex for infringement after Apotex filed an Abbrevi-
ated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) for generic ear drops.1103  At 
trial, Apotex argued that the patent was invalid as obvious in view of 
the Ganz reference, which taught the use of ear drops containing a 
certain gyrase inhibitor to treat middle ear infections.1104  In pertinent 
part, Ganz stated that “gyrase inhibitors ‘should be used only in diffi-
cult cases and exclusively by the otologist.’”1105  The district court, how-
ever, concluded that the person of ordinary skill in the art would 
have been “a pediatrician or general practitioner.”1106  Accordingly, the 
district court rejected Apotex’s argument that it would have been ob-
                                                          
 1095. Id. at 1348–49, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036–37. 
 1096. Id. at 1349, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036–37. 
 1097. Id. at 1352–53, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039–40. 
 1098. Id. at 1353, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040. 
 1099. Id. at 1352, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039–40. 
 1100. Id. at 1353, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040. 
 1101. 501 F.3d 1254, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1102. Id. at 1258, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288. 
 1103. Id. at 1256, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286. 
 1104. Id. at 1258, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287–88. 
 1105. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288 (emphasis added). 
 1106. Id. at 1256, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286 (emphasis added). 
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vious to use ofloxacin, a gyrase inhibitor, to topically treat bacterial 
ear infections.1107 
The Federal Circuit, in a rather unusual step, found that the dis-
trict court had clearly erred in determining that a person skilled in 
the art would have been a general practitioner and not a specialist.1108  
The court noted that the inventors of the patent were specialists in 
drug treatments for ear infections, and not pediatricians or general 
practitioners, who generally would have lacked the training or knowl-
edge to have developed the claimed compound.1109  The Federal Cir-
cuit concluded that the patent would have been obvious to persons 
having that higher skill level, as Apotex had argued.1110 
In Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey,1111 a case decided prior to KSR, the 
Federal Circuit examined the experimental use exception in the con-
text of obviousness.1112  When Dippin’ Dots sued Mosey for infringing 
its patented process for making a novelty ice cream product, the jury 
found that the claims were invalid in view of sales made more than a 
year before the application date.1113  Dippin’ Dots argued on appeal 
that those sales were experimental and did not trigger the on-sale 
bar.1114  The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that the inventor him-
self had testified that the sales were made to determine the market-
ability of the product, not to improve its technical aspects.1115  A per-
son skilled in the art would have been motivated to combine the 
process used to make those products with other relevant prior art, the 
court found.1116  In particular, a skilled artisan would have sought the 
appropriate temperature ranges to prepare and serve the product 
and thus would have found it obvious to use the higher temperatures 
set forth in the claims.1117  The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the dis-
trict court’s determination that the claims were obvious, even under 
the higher pre-KSR standard.1118 
In PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc.,1119 PharmaStem sued 
six defendants for infringement of two patents on compositions and 
                                                          
 1107. Id. at 1258, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288. 
 1108. Id. at 1257, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287. 
 1109. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287. 
 1110. Id. at 1258–59, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288. 
 1111. 476 F.3d 1337, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1112. Id. at 1343–44, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638. 
 1113. Id. at 1345, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639. 
 1114. Id. at 1344, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638. 
 1115. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638. 
 1116. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638. 
 1117. Id. at 1345, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639. 
 1118. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639. 
 1119. 491 F.3d 1342, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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methods for using cryopreserved umbilical cord stem cells for re-
building a person’s compromised blood and immune systems.1120  The 
jury returned verdicts for PharmaStem that the patents were in-
fringed and valid, and the court denied defendants’ motion for 
JMOL that the claims were invalid.1121  The Federal Circuit reversed 
the JMOL and held the patents were invalid as obvious.1122 
The obviousness issue largely turned on whether the prior art gave 
a reasonable expectation of success in using cord blood in transplants 
for hematopoietic reconstitution.1123  The Federal Circuit found that 
the inventors had demonstrated only the presence of stem cells in 
cord blood, which was also inferred by prior art.1124  Judge Bryson, 
writing for the majority, explained: 
While the inventors may have proved conclusively what was strongly 
suspected before—that umbilical cord blood is capable of hemato-
poietic reconstitution—and while their work may have significantly 
advanced the state of the science of hematopoietic transplantations 
by eliminating any doubt as to the presence of stem cells in cord 
blood, the mouse experiments and the conclusions drawn from 
them were not inventive in nature.  Instead, the inventors merely 
used routine research methods to prove what was already believed 
to be the case.  Scientific confirmation of what was already believed 
to be true may be a valuable contribution, but it does not give rise 
to a patentable invention.1125 
Judge Newman strongly dissented, noting that after a three-week 
trial the jury sustained the validity of the patents, the district court 
upheld their validity, and their validity was confirmed in several reex-
aminations by the PTO.1126  Judge Newman wrote, “[t]he undisputed 
evidence at trial was that these long-sought life-saving inventions were 
achieved amid general scientific skepticism, despite the extensive re-
search that was being conducted by many scientists in this field,” and 
that her colleagues on the panel “reconstruct[ed] these inventions by 
selection and inference, with perfect hindsight of the discoveries.”1127  
                                                          
 1120. Id. at 1346–47, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291. 
 1121. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291. 
 1122. Id. at 1347, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291. 
 1123. Id. at 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301. 
 1124. Id. at 1363, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
 1125. Id. at 1363–64, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1732, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 
Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1367–69, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 
1334–37 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 1126. Id. at 1367, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307. 
 1127. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307. 
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Judge Newman also emphasized that based on the strong secondary 
considerations, the patent claims were not obvious.1128 
In Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.,1129 one of the last appellate opinions on 
obviousness prior to KSR, the Federal Circuit reversed a district court 
ruling that Pfizer’s claims were not obvious.1130  Pfizer’s claims were 
directed to the use of a besylate salt form of one of the drug’s key in-
gredients, amlodipine.1131  The PTO’s allowance of the claims, as well 
as the district court’s ruling of validity, turned largely on a declara-
tion from one of the inventors that the amlodipine besylate salt was a 
unique compound with highly desirable yet unpredictable proper-
ties.1132  The declaration also attested to the difficulty in selecting that 
besylate salt from a number of other options.1133 
The Federal Circuit found clear motivation to combine references, 
speaking, of course, from a pre-KSR vantage point.1134  The Federal 
Circuit also found that a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable 
expectation of success in making amlodipine besylate because the 
prior art “contained a strong suggestion that any and all pharmaceu-
tically-acceptable anions would form non-toxic acid addition salts and 
would work for their intended purpose.”1135  Evidence of secondary 
considerations was not sufficient to overcome the strong showing of 
obviousness, in the court’s view.1136  The Federal Circuit concluded 
that “[a]t most, then, Pfizer engaged in routine, verification testing to 
optimize selection of one of several known and clearly suggested 
pharmaceutically-acceptable salts to ease its commercial manufactur-
ing and marketing of the tablet form of the therapeutic amlodip-
ine.”1137 
Pfizer unsuccessfully petitioned the Federal Circuit for a panel re-
hearing or rehearing en banc.1138  Judges Newman, Bryson, and Rader 
dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc because they believed 
the panel had improperly relied on an “obvious to try” standard and 
substituted its own fact-finding for that of the district court, where 
                                                          
 1128. Id. at 1375–78, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313–16. 
 1129. 480 F.3d 1348, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh’g and reh’g en 
banc denied, 488 F.3d 1377, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1130. Id. at 1352–53, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324. 
 1131. Id. at 1352, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323. 
 1132. Id. at 1355, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 1133. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 1134. Id. at 1361–62, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331. 
 1135. Id. at 1364-65, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333. 
 1136. Id. at 1372, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338. 
 1137. Id. at 1371, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338. 
 1138. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F.3d 1377, 1378, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852, 
1853 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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there was no showing of clear error.1139  The judges also expressed 
concern that the panel’s decision would adversely impact the phar-
maceutical and chemical industries because it failed to appreciate the 
importance of the unexpected benefits of compounds and the diffi-
culty in identifying and pursuing them.1140 
D. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 1 & 2 
1. Enablement 
A patent must contain “the manner and process of making and us-
ing [the invention] in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which 
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.”1141  This is 
known as the enablement requirement.1142 
The essence of this requirement is that patent protection is granted 
in return for an enabling disclosure of the invention, “not for vague 
intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable.”1143  
Enablement is a question of law, although it may contain subsidiary 
questions of law and fact.1144  Whether a disclosure is enabling is de-
termined as of the filing date of the application.1145 
Enablement requires that the specification teach those of ordinary 
skill in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed inven-
tion without “undue experimentation.”1146  Undue experimentation is 
determined according to a “standard of reasonableness, having due 
regard for the nature of the invention and the state of the art.”1147  In 
other words, “a patent specification complies with the statute even if a 
‘reasonable’ amount of routine experimentation is required in order 
to practice a claimed invention, but that such experimentation must 
                                                          
 1139. See id. at 1384, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857 (noting that the “obvious to try” 
standard has a very limited application here, as in all cases that involve the pharma-
ceutical invention field). 
 1140. Id. at 1380, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854. 
 1141. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000). 
 1142. E.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1129, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 1143. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536, 148 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689, 696 (1966)). 
 1144. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1354, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1705, 1713 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 1145. Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1371, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135; In re Brana, 51 F.3d 
1560, 1567 n.19, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1441 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 1146. Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1365, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004; In re Wands, 858 
F.2d 731, 737, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 1147. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404 (citing Ansul Co. v. Uni-
royal, Inc., 448 F.2d 872, 878–79, 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 759, 762–63 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
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not be ‘undue.’”1148  A specification need not disclose what is well 
known in the art but must supply the novel aspects of the inven-
tions.1149 
In Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc.,1150 the Federal Circuit found 
enablement was lacking based on the testimony of the inventors.1151  
One of the inventors of Ormco’s patents on computer-aided design 
and manufacture of custom orthodontic appliances testified that 
Ormco had never attempted to create a computerized system that 
automatically determined tooth positions without human decision 
making.1152  While the goal was to have the software generate final 
tooth positions without use of a manual override, in fact “the manual 
override had been used on all of the approximately forty cases 
treated using the product” because “variations in human anatomy 
had prevented the attainment of that goal.”1153  The Federal Circuit 
stated that “[i]f an inventor attempts but fails to enable his invention 
in a commercial product that purports to be an embodiment of the 
patented invention, that is strong evidence that the patent specifica-
tion lacks enablement.”1154  In this case, “[s]ubstantial doubt concern-
ing the enablement of the invention was cast by the inventors.”1155 
In Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad, Inc.,1156 the Federal Circuit, in affirm-
ing summary judgment of non-enablement, emphasized that the full 
scope of the patent claims must be enabled.1157  During prosecution, 
patentee Liebel had removed all references to a pressure jacket in 
claims directed to a “method of loading a tubular replacement sy-
ringe in a high-pressure power injector for injecting fluid into an 
animal.”1158  Medrad argued, and the district court agreed, that Liebel 
had deleted such references in order to encompass Medrad’s jacket-
less injector system.1159  The district court concluded that the claims, 
                                                          
 1148. Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1371, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135 (citing Wands, 858 F.2d 
at 736–37, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404). 
 1149. See Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1366, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005 (stating that the 
specification should facilitate the public in understanding and carrying out the in-
vention). 
 1150. 498 F.3d 1307, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1151. Id. at 1318, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 1152. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154–55. 
 1153. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
 1154. Id. at 1319, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
 1155. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
 1156. 481 F.3d 1371, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1157. Id. at 1379, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118. 
 1158. Id. at 1373, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115. 
 1159. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115. 
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while infringed, were invalid for lack of enablement and insufficient 
written description.1160 
On appeal, Liebel argued that since the claims do not require the 
absence of a pressure jacket, the district court had erroneously fo-
cused its enablement analysis on an embodiment without a pressure 
jacket and did not consider an injector with a pressure jacket.1161  The 
Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the district court had correctly 
considered whether the full scope of the construed claims had been 
enabled.1162  Since the specification teaches away from an embodi-
ment without a pressure jacket, the Federal Circuit found, “where the 
specification teaches against a purported aspect of an invention, such 
a teaching ‘is itself evidence that at least a significant amount of ex-
perimentation would have been necessary to practice the claimed in-
vention.’”1163  The court also noted that “[t]he irony of this situation is 
that Liebel successfully pressed to have its claims include a jacketless 
system, but, having won that battle, it then had to show that such a 
claim was fully enabled, a challenge it could not meet.”1164 
Liebel-Flarsheim figured prominently in the Federal Circuit’s affir-
mance of the district court’s summary judgment of non-enablement 
in Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, 
Inc.1165  Automotive Technologies International (“ATI”) was the as-
signee of a patent, which was directed to side impact sensors.1166  Al-
though the patent’s claims covered both mechanical and electronic 
sensors, the patent included a detailed description of mechanical 
sensors but very little on electronic sensors.1167  The Federal Circuit, 
citing Liebel-Flarsheim, pointed out that there “must be ‘reasonable 
enablement of the scope of the range.’”1168  In particular, there must 
be sufficient enablement of electronic sensors because they are “dis-
tinctly different” from the enabled mechanical sensors.1169  Although 
ATI maintained that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have 
been able to construct an electronic side impact sensor based on the 
disclosure provided, ATI and the patent’s inventor admitted that they 
                                                          
 1160. Id. at 1378, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118. 
 1161. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118. 
 1162. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118. 
 1163. Id. at 1379, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119 (citing AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & 
Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1280, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 1164. Id. at 1380, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 1165. 501 F.3d 1274, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1166. Id. at 1277, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1111. 
 1167. Id. at 1285, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116. 
 1168. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116  (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Li-
bel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1113, 
1120 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 1169. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116. 
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had not known of any electronic side impact sensors at the time of fil-
ing.1170  Moreover, an expert from Delphi (Counterclaimant Defen-
dant-Appellee) testified that a great deal of experimentation would 
have been required to make an electronic sensor using only the dis-
closure in the patent.1171  Based on this evidence, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that the enablement requirement was not satisfied by the 
patent’s limited disclosure of electronic sensors.1172 
In Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc.,1173 the district court held that 
certain claims of Monsanto’s patent were invalid under § 112 because 
the specification did not “enable the full scope of the broad func-
tional language in claim 1 without undue experimentation.”1174  The 
language in question was the term “in plant cells.”1175  According to the 
Federal Circuit, “[t]he district court correctly construed claim 1 . . . 
to require the claimed gene to function in any plant cell, including 
both dicots and monocots.”1176  The court stated that “those skilled in 
the art could not transform a monocot plant cell as of the filing date 
of the patent application.”1177  Further, “[t]he claim requires trans-
formation of the plant cell.”1178  The court went on to state that 
“[w]ithout the ability to transform a monocot cell, one skilled in the 
art could not determine whether the plant gene could carry out the 
claimed functions and thus fall within the scope of the claim.”1179  
Monsanto argued that “the disputed claim language merely describes 
the operation of the discrete gene components in a plant cell, but 
does not operate as a limitation.”1180  Stated differently, the court 
noted, “Monsanto argue[d] that the term ‘plant cell’ should not con-
vert chimeric gene claims into claims directed to plants or plant cells 
transformed with the claimed gene, particularly where the patent al-
ready contains separate claims directed to such plants and plant 
cells.”1181  The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court, holding 
that “Monsanto’s patent recites broad functional language in its 
                                                          
 1170. Id. at 1284, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115. 
 1171. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115. 
 1172. Id. at 1285, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115–16. 
 1173. 503 F.3d 1352, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1174. Id. at 1360, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 1175. Id. at 1360–61, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 1176. Id. at 1361, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 1177. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 1178. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 1179. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 1180. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 1181. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
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claims,” and “the evidence here does not demonstrate that as of the 
filing date of the . . . patent . . . the invention was enabled.”1182 
2. Best mode 
In addition to requiring that the specification disclose the inven-
tion in sufficient detail as to enable one skilled in the art to make and 
use the claimed invention, § 112 further requires that the specifica-
tion “set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carry-
ing out his invention.”1183  Or, as elaborated by the Federal Circuit, 
the inventor must disclose the “best mode contemplated by him, as of 
the time he executes the application, of carrying out his inven-
tion.”1184  This “best mode” requirement prevents inventors from ob-
taining patent protection while concealing from the public the pre-
ferred embodiments of their inventions.1185  “The best mode 
requirement creates a statutory bargained-for-exchange by which a 
patentee obtains the right to exclude others from practicing the 
claimed invention for a certain time period, and the public receives 
knowledge of the preferred embodiments for practicing the claimed 
invention.”1186 
The best mode analysis, a question of fact, has two components.1187  
“First, a fact-finder must determine whether at the time an applicant 
filed an application for a patent, he or she had a best mode of prac-
ticing the invention; this is a subjective determination.”1188  Second, 
the fact-finder must determine “whether the specification adequately 
disclosed what the inventor contemplated as the best mode so that 
                                                          
 1182. Id. at 1361–62, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 1183. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000). 
 1184. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1532, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1737, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772, 135 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 311, 315 (C.C.P.A. 1962)); see also Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 
F.3d 1043, 1050, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that an 
inquiry into the best mode requirement should focus on the inventor’s state of 
mind). 
 1185. Glaxo, 52 F.3d at 1050, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569. 
 1186. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1869, 1874 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Spectra-Physics, 827 F.2d at 1532, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1742). 
 1187. N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1065, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 1188. Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1548, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re Hayes Microcomputer Prod., Inc. Patent 
Litig., 982 F.2d 1527, 1536, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating 
that this inquiry focuses on whether the inventor, at the time of filing his patent ap-
plication, knew of a mode of practicing that he felt was better than any other). 
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those having ordinary skill in the art could practice it.”1189  The second 
prong is an objective determination.1190 
In Allvoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Communications, Inc.,1191 the 
Federal Circuit further explained that “[o]nly the claimed invention 
is subject to the best mode requirement.”1192  The claims at issue, 
which “cover[ed] an interface between a speech recognition engine 
and various end-user application programs on a personal com-
puter[,]” recited an “output means for outputting the recognised 
words into at least any one of the plurality of different computer-
related applications to allow processing of the recognised words as 
input text.”1193 
The Federal Circuit reversed both determinations, largely on the 
basis of the district court’s erroneous construction of the term “out-
put means” to “require[] a system outputting, alternately, to a plurality 
of different word processing or other application programs.”1194  The 
“alternately” requirement, the court found, was not suggested or re-
quired by the claims.1195  As a result, the alleged undisclosed best 
mode fell outside the scope of the claims and thus was “not a best 
mode of practicing the claimed invention.”1196  The Federal Circuit 
concluded that the patent did not violate the best mode requirement, 
regardless of the lack of disclosure of the subject matter in ques-
tion.1197 
3. Written description 
A third requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 is that “[t]he specifica-
tion shall contain a written description of the invention.”1198  The 
Federal Circuit has held that this language gives rise to a requirement 
separate and distinct from the enablement and best mode require-
                                                          
 1189. Young Dental Mfg. Co. v. Q3 Special Prods., Inc., 112 F.3d 1137, 1144, 42 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1589, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gyp-
sum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1388, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 1190. E.g., Fonar Corp., 107 F.3d at 1548, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. 
 1191. 504 F.3d 1236, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1192. Id. at 1246, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894 (citing Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus 
Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 588, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“It is 
concealment of the best mode of practicing the claimed invention that section 112 ¶ 1 
is designed to prohibit.”); DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1325, 226 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 758, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reversing a Patent Appeals Board determination 
on the basis that it extended the best mode beyond the proper scope of the claim)). 
 1193. Id. at 1238, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888. 
 1194. Id. at 1241, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890 (emphasis added) (quoting Allvoice 
Computing PLC v. Scansoft, Inc., No. H-02-4471 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2005)). 
 1195. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890. 
 1196. Id. at 1246, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893. 
 1197. Id. at 1248, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895. 
 1198. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000). 
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ments.1199  In other words, a specification may enable the practice of 
an invention and disclose its best mode but still not adequately de-
scribe the invention.1200  The Federal Circuit has stated as follows: 
Satisfaction of the description requirement insures that subject 
matter presented in the form of a claim subsequent to the filing 
date of the application was sufficiently disclosed at the time of fil-
ing so that the prima facie date of invention can fairly be held to be 
the filing date of the application.1201 
The written description requirement, an issue of fact, is satisfied if 
persons skilled in the art would recognize from the patent specifica-
tion that the inventor invented what is claimed.1202  Stated another 
way, the disclosure in the patent must reasonably convey to one of 
ordinary skill in the art that the inventor “possessed” the claimed sub-
ject matter at the time of the invention and described it “with all its 
claimed limitations.”1203 
Since satisfaction of the first paragraph of § 112 must be judged as 
of the filing date of the patent,1204 the focus of the inquiry is on the 
patent’s “original” disclosure, i.e., the disclosure contained in the 
originally filed patent application, including the originally filed 
claims.1205  Therefore, when original claims are at issue, disclosure as 
of the filing date is ensured, and the written description requirement 
is likely satisfied.1206 
In Hyatt v. Dudas,1207 the Federal Circuit examined the written de-
scription requirement in the context of an action under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 145.1208  Hyatt was prosecuting five applications that all shared the 
same specification when, at one point, it withdrew all of the claims 
and proposed over 1,100 new claims.1209  The Examiner, relying on 
                                                          
 1199. In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1172, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
 1200. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 
1115 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 1201. In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 620, 623 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 1202. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1498, 1503 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 1203. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503 (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 
107 F.3d 1565, 1572, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also 
Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829, 1833 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (explaining that a disclosure that “merely renders the later-claimed inven-
tion obvious is not sufficient to meet the written description requirement”). 
 1204. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1461, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 1205. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1128, 1130 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998); Gentry, 134 F.3d at 1479, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503; In re Benno, 768 
F.2d 1340, 1346, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 683, 686–87 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 1206. In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 620, 624 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 1207. 492 F.3d 1365, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1208. Id. at 1367–68, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
 1209. Id. at 1367, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
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the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) 
§ 2163.04(I)(B), analyzed representative claims and rejected them for 
failing the written description test.1210  Rather than responding to the 
merits of the rejection, Hyatt argued that the PTO’s prima facie test 
was improper and section 2163.04(I)(B) of the MPEP was not good 
law.1211  After failing to persuade the Examiner and the Board of Pat-
ent Appeals and Interferences, Hyatt appealed successfully to the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, which found that the ex-
aminer had improperly used “vague and unspecific language” in the 
rejection.1212  The PTO appealed to the Federal Circuit.1213 
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment that the 
PTO had failed to establish a prima facie case of inadequate written 
description when it rejected the patent claims.1214  When the specifica-
tion lacks any written description to support a claim, “the only thing 
the PTO can reasonably be expected to do is to point out its nonexis-
tence” and “specify which claim limitation is lacking adequate sup-
port in the written description.”1215 
In this case, the examiner had notified Hyatt that support for his 
amended claims was missing, which shifted the burden to Hyatt to 
show where support for those new claim limitations could be found 
in order to overcome the rejection.1216  Because Hyatt refused to do so 
at the appropriate time, the claims were properly rejected.1217 
In Frazer v. Schlegel,1218 the Federal Circuit held that in an interfer-
ence proceeding, an appellant is entitled to the benefit of a foreign 
priority document that is “disclosed in the [same] manner provided 
by the first paragraph of section 112,” for the disclosure of a species 
of the count.1219  On that basis, the court reversed the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences’ determination of priority in a patent in-
terference case.1220 
In this case, Frazer and Schlegel both claimed inventions related to 
human papillomavirus (“HPV”) vaccines comprising HPV-like parti-
                                                          
 1210. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
 1211. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
 1212. Id. at 1368, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
 1213. Id. at 1367, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
 1214. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
 1215. Id. at 1370, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376 (citing MPEP sec. 2163.04(I)). 
 1216. Id. at 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
 1217. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
 1218. 498 F.3d 1283, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1850 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1219. Id. at 1287, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1) 
(2000)). 
 1220. Id. at 1289, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851. 
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cles.1221  Schlegel, having the earlier U.S. filing date, was declared the 
senior party.1222  Frazer’s U.S. application, however, claimed priority to 
an Australian patent application, which he had filed prior to 
Schlegel’s U.S. filing date.1223  Frazer’s Australian application dis-
closed a vector “designed to coexpress the L1 and L2 late genes of 
human papillomavirus” yielded HPV-like particles, which “could pro-
vide a safe source of material for the development of a vaccine.”1224  
The interference count recited an HPV-like particle made by “con-
structing a recombinant DNA molecule that contains a sequence en-
coding a papillomavirus L1 protein; transfecting a host cell with the 
recombinant DNA molecule; [and] expressing papillomavirus virus-
like particles from the transfected host cell.”1225  In view of Schlegel’s 
priority, however, the Board determined that Frazer was not entitled 
to the benefit of the Australian application because at the time he 
filed it, “Frazer believed that both the L1 and L2 genes had to be ex-
pressed together from the same plasmid,” while Frazer’s “later work 
shows that only L1 protein was necessary.”1226  As a result, the Board 
found that Frazer’s Australian application “did not provide a de-
scribed and enabled anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) of the 
subject matter of the count.”1227 
The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision with regard to 
Schlegel’s priority.1228 
Although the Board analyzed the Australian application in terms of 
“conception,” when reliance is on a patent document already filed, 
the question is whether the document discloses the invention of 
the count by meeting the written description and enablement re-
quirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112[, paragraph 1], for a filed applica-
tion serves as a constructive reduction to practice of its content.1229 
Thus, “[i]n accordance with United States law, when the priority 
claim is based on subject matter disclosed in a foreign patent applica-
tion whose filing date is properly claimed” under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a) 
and which complies with § 112(a), “the foreign application has the 
same effect as if filed in the United States.”1230 
                                                          
 1221. Id. at 1284, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851. 
 1222. Id. at 1286, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853. 
 1223. Id. at 1283–84, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851. 
 1224. Id. at 1284, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851 (quoting Jian Zhou et al., Expression 
of Vaccinia Recombinant HPV 16 L1 and L2 ORF Proteins in Epithelial Cells is Sufficient for 
Assembly of HPV Virion-Like Particles, 185 VIROLOGY 251, 251 (1991)). 
 1225. Id. at 1286, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853. 
 1226. Id. at 1287, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854. 
 1227. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854. 
 1228. Id. at 1289, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855. 
 1229. Id. at 1287, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854. 
 1230. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853. 
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The court then found that Frazer’s “Australian application con-
tained complete details of the method that is the subject of the inter-
ference count, and depicts the papillomavirus-like particle of the 
count with full disclosure of how to produce it.”1231  Notwithstanding 
Frazer’s disclosure of the expression of both the L1 and L2 genes in 
the Australian application, “his later discovery that either the L1 pro-
tein or both the L1 and L2 proteins led to capsid formation does not 
negate or contradict his disclosure and constructive reduction to 
practice of the method of the count that produced the papillomavi-
rus-like particle of the count.”1232  Accordingly, “the description [in 
Frazer’s Australian application] of the procedures used, and the suc-
cessful production of the virus-like particles there achieved and re-
ported, disclose and enable a species within the count.”1233 
4. Claim definiteness 
The second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that a patent 
specification “conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing 
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant re-
gards as his invention.”1234  This is referred to as the “definiteness re-
quirement,” which is a question of law.1235  “[P]aragraph two of sec-
tion 112 ‘is essentially a requirement for precision and definiteness of 
claim language.’”1236  In other words, “‘the requirement is that lan-
guage of the claims must make it clear what subject matter they en-
compass.’”1237 
The definiteness requirement serves two primary purposes.  First, it 
ensures that those skilled in the art can understand and apply the 
teachings of the invention.1238  Second, it encourages enterprise and 
experimentation by requiring certainty as to the scope of the inven-
                                                          
 1231. Id. at 1288, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854. 
 1232. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854. 
 1233. Id. at 1289, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855. 
 1234. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
 1235. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369, 37 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 466, 471 (1938); Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1181, 20 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 1236. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1562, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1618, 1621 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909, 164 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 642, 646 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). 
 1237. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621 (quoting In re Hammack, 427 F.2d 1378, 
1382, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 204, 208 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). 
 1238. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 136, 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
122, 136 (2d Cir. 1958). 
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tion.1239  The Supreme Court identified the policy served by the defi-
niteness requirement in United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.:1240 
The statutory requirement of particularity and distinctness in 
claims is met only when they clearly distinguish what is claimed 
from what went before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is 
foreclosed from future enterprise.  A zone of uncertainty which en-
terprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of in-
fringement claims would discourage invention only a little less than 
unequivocal foreclosure of the field.  Moreover, the claims must be 
reasonably [clear-cut] to enable courts to determine whether nov-
elty and invention are genuine.1241 
Claim definiteness depends on whether the inventor’s claim lan-
guage conveys to those skilled in the art the scope of coverage.1242  
The specification informs the meaning of the claims.  Thus, claims 
can be held indefinitely if there is a conflict between the claimed sub-
ject matter and the specification that would render the scope uncer-
tain.1243  Additionally, “‘the amount of detail required to [meet the 
definiteness standard] . . . depends on the particular invention and 
the prior art,’”1244 for the language of the claim need only be as pre-
cise as the subject matter permits.1245 
The definiteness of the claims is judged as of the date the applica-
tion was filed.1246  It is permissible, however, to use patents and publi-
cations appearing after the filing date to construe the claim lan-
guage.1247  Moreover, it is possible for the claims to fail to adequately 
define the scope of the subject matter of the invention even if the 
                                                          
 1239. Id., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 136. 
 1240. 317 U.S. 228, 55 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 381 (1942). 
 1241. Id. at 236, 55 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 385–86. 
 1242. Credle v. Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1576, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1919 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994). 
 1243. See In re Cohn, 438 F.2d 989, 993, 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 95, 98 (C.C.P.A. 1971) 
(rejecting claims as indefinite upon a finding of an inconsistency between the 
claims). 
 1244. Polymer Indus. Prods. Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 10 F. App’x 812, 
817 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 
758 F.2d 613, 624, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634, 641 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 1245. N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1579–80, 28 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 1246. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1251, 9 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (explaining that specification lan-
guage is to be construed for what it meant to one with “ordinary skill in the art” at 
the time of filing); In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 31, 34 
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (noting that a specification should be interpreted as of the date of 
filing). 
 1247. U.S. Steel Corp., 865 F.2d at 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464. 
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disclosures in the specification are adequate to satisfy the enablement 
and written description requirements.1248 
In Young v. Lumenis, Inc.,1249 the Federal Circuit explained that 
claims are indefinite only when they are “‘not amenable to construc-
tion or are insolubly ambiguous.’”1250  The claims in that case were di-
rected to a surgical method for removing a claw from a domesticated 
cat, such claims including the step of “forming [an] incision in the 
epidermis near the edge of the ungual crest.”1251  The district court 
found the term “near” to be indefinite because it “fails to distinguish 
the invention over the prior art and does not permit one of ordinary 
skill to know what activity constitutes infringement.”1252  The Federal 
Circuit reversed.  Noting that the definiteness of claim terms depends 
on whether those terms can be given any reasonable meaning, the 
Federal Circuit found that the patent’s drawings and references to 
measurements were sufficient to permit persons skilled in the art to 
understand what was claimed and to resolve the meaning of the term 
“near.”1253 
The Federal Circuit also reversed the district court’s indefiniteness 
determination in Allvoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Communications, 
Inc.1254 due to a flawed claim construction.1255  The district court had 
held that the claims on “an interface between a speech recognition 
engine and various end-user application programs on a personal 
computer” were invalid because the means-plus-function elements in 
three claims were indefinite.1256  In particular, the district court con-
strued the claimed “output means for outputting the recognised words 
into at least any one of the plurality of different computer related ap-
plications to allow processing of the recognised words as input text” 
to require “a system outputting, alternately, to a plurality of different 
word processing or other application programs.”1257  The Federal Cir-
cuit found that the district court had improperly “added the re-
quirement that the system be able to output ‘alternately’ to different 
                                                          
 1248. In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909, 16 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 642, 645 (C.C.P.A. 
1970). 
 1249. 492 F.3d 1336, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1250. Id. at 1346, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197 (quoting Datamize, LLC v. Plum-
tree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)). 
 1251. Id. at 1340, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193. 
 1252. Id. at 1343, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194. 
 1253. Id. at 1346–47, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197. 
 1254. 504 F.3d 1236, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1255. Id. at 1248, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.  
 1256. Id. at 1238, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888. 
 1257. Id. at 1238, 1241, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888, 1890 (emphasis added). 
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programs,” even though “the claim does not suggest the requirement 
that the means do so alternately.”1258  Once this extraneous limitation 
was disregarded, “an artisan of ordinary skill would understand the 
bounds of the claim when read in light of the specification.”1259  The 
Federal Circuit concluded that the claim at issue satisfied the defi-
niteness requirement.1260 
In Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Technologies Corp.,1261 the Federal Circuit 
unanimously confirmed the district court’s determination that cer-
tain claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,602,002 (“the ‘002 patent”) were inva-
lid for indefiniteness, “[b]ecause the claim limitation ‘control means’ 
had no corresponding structure described in the specification as re-
quired by 35 U.S.C. § 112(6).”1262  The district court construed the 
term “control means” to raise the presumption that § 112(6) ap-
plied.1263  The court found that the word “control” did not identify 
structure, and thus the presumption that the claim limitation was a 
means-plus-function claim was unrebutted.1264  In reviewing the speci-
fications to determine what structure constitutes the means for per-
forming the specified function, the district court identified a box la-
beled control in Figure 6 and a statement that “the invention ‘may be 
controlled automatically by known differential pressure, valving and 
control equipment.’”1265 
The appellant, Biomedino, argued that one of ordinary skill in the 
art would identify structure from the written description provided by 
the specification.1266  Appellee argued that no specific structure was 
disclosed in the specifications to correspond to the claimed function 
of automatically operating the invention, and the proper inquiry was 
whether one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the specifi-
cation itself to disclose the structure.1267  Citing Medical Instrumentation 
& Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB,1268 the Federal Circuit stated that the 
proper inquiry is “whether one of [ordinary] skill in the art would 
understand the specification itself to disclose a structure, not simply 
                                                          
 1258. Id. at 1241, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890 (emphasis added). 
 1259. Id. at 1242, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891; see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1397 (2007) (“A person of 
ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). 
 1260. Allvoice, 504 F.3d at 1240, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890. 
 1261. 490 F.3d 946, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1262. Id. at 948, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119. 
 1263. Id. at 949, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 1264. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 1265. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 1266. Id. at 950, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 1267. Id. at 951, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121. 
 1268. 344 F.3d 1205, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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whether that person would be capable of implementing a struc-
ture.”1269 
The Federal Circuit held that “a bare statement that known tech-
niques or methods can be used does not disclose structure.”1270  On 
that basis, the Federal Circuit affirmed “the judgment of the district 
court holding claims 13–17 and 40 of the ‘502 patent as invalid for 
indefiniteness.”1271 
E. Double Patenting 
Obviousness-type double patenting is a judicially created doctrine 
designed to prevent a patentee from claiming essentially the same in-
vention in two patents to effectively extend the lifetime of patent pro-
tection.1272  The analysis has two steps—the claims of the two patents 
are first construed, and then they are compared to determine if they 
are patentably distinct.1273  If they are not, the later claims are inva-
lid.1274 
In In re Metoprolol Succinate Patent Litigation,1275 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment that the patent at is-
sue was invalid for obviousness-type double patenting.1276  Plaintiffs 
(collectively, “Astra”) sued for infringement of its patent on pharma-
ceutical compositions containing metoprolol succinate, a pharmaceu-
tical used to treat angina, hypertension, and congestive heart fail-
ure.1277  (Astra’s second patent was not at issue in this portion of the 
appeal.1278)  Construction of the ‘154 patent’s single claim was not 
disputed, so the district court proceeded to compare the ‘154 patent 
to claim 8 of Astra’s earlier ‘318 patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,780,318), 
which claimed an oral composition having a core of metoprolol suc-
cinate surrounded by two controlled-release layers.1279  The district 
court concluded that the ‘154 patent claimed a patentably indistinct 
                                                          
 1269. Biomedino, 490 F.3d at 953, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123 (citing Med. Instru-
mentation, 344 F.3d at 1212, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269). 
 1270. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123. 
 1271. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123. 
 1272. In re Metoprolol Succinate Patent Litig., 494 F.3d 1011, 1016, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1273. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. 
 1274. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. 
 1275. Metoprolol, 494 F.3d 1011, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545. 
 1276. Id. at 1016, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. 
 1277. Id. at 1013, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545. 
 1278. Id. at 1014, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546–47.  The district court also found 
both patents unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.  Id. at 1015, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1547.  Astra appealed that decision as well, which is discussed infra Part V. 
 1279. Id. at 1016, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. 
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genus of the species claimed by the earlier-issued ‘318 patent and en-
tered summary judgment of invalidity.1280  Astra appealed. 
The majority of the Federal Circuit panel, over Judge Schall’s dis-
sent, affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of obviousness-
type double patenting.1281  The court rejected as irrelevant Astra’s 
“semantic distinction” that the ‘154 and ‘318 patents were not in a 
genus/species relationship but an element/combination relation-
ship.1282  The Federal Circuit then affirmed that it would have been 
obvious to omit the outer layers in claim 8 of the ‘318 patent and 
produce the metoprolol succinate compound claimed in the ‘154 
patent because “the omission of the known elements from the com-
position . . . is ‘the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and 
common sense.’”1283  Allowing the inventors to patent the drug itself 
after having patented a combination of the drug with a carrier would 
unlawfully extend the first patent and deprive the public of the use of 
the drug beyond the allowed term of the earlier patent.1284  Accord-
ingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the 
‘154 patent was invalid for obviousness-type double patenting.1285 
In so holding, the Federal Circuit agreed with Astra that a patent 
cited in support of a double-patenting rejection cannot be used as 
“prior art” for a § 102 or § 103 rejection, but stated the “critical” focus 
of a double-patenting analysis is on “what is claimed, as opposed to 
what is disclosed to one skilled in the art.”1286  Moreover, the scope of 
double-patenting is not limited to § 101’s statutory prohibition 
against claims to the same invention.1287  That prohibition, the court 
explained, could be easily circumvented by drafting claims that varied 
only slightly from the earlier patent.1288 
Judge Schall dissented, finding that the ‘154 patent was “patentably 
distinct” because it “lack[ed] any semblance to the second two ele-
ments [(the inner and outer layers)] in the three-element composi-
tion of claim 8” of the ‘318 patent.1289  Also, since metoprolol succi-
nate was only one of the eleven possible compounds recited in claim 
                                                          
 1280. Id. at 1013, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546. 
 1281. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546. 
 1282. Id. at 1016-17, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548–49. 
 1283. Id. at 1017 n.2, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549 n.2 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1397 (2007)). 
 1284. Id. at 1017–18, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549. 
 1285. Id. at 1020, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551. 
 1286. Id. at 1018, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548 (citing Gen. Foods Corp. v. Studi-
engesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1281-82, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839, 
1846–47 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 1287. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
 1288. Id. at 1018–19, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
 1289. Id. at 1023, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553 (Shall, J., dissenting). 
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8, Judge Schall did not believe that claim 8 was equivalent to the 
claim for metoprolol succinate in the ‘154 patent or rendered that 
claim obvious.1290  The law of double patenting, he wrote, does not in-
validate a claim “simply because a later claimed element is set forth in 
an earlier claim to a combination.”1291 
IV. INFRINGEMENT 
“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any 
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the 
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent 
therefor, infringes the patent.”1292  Determining patent infringement 
“entails two steps:  (1) the claims must be construed; and (2) the 
properly construed claims must be compared to the allegedly infring-
ing device.”1293 
A. Claim Construction 
“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent 
define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to ex-
clude.’”1294  Because the claims are the language the patentee chose to 
define the invention, claim construction must begin and remain cen-
tered on the language of the claims themselves.1295  The evidentiary 
review is hierarchical, focusing first on the claims, then on the patent 
specification, next on the file history, and finally on the “extrinsic” 
evidence if appropriate.1296  In determining the proper meaning of 
claim terms, the patent specification “is always highly relevant to the 
                                                          
 1290. Id. at 1021, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552. 
 1291. Id. at 1023, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553. 
 1292. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
 1293. Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1321, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 
52 F.3d 967, 976, 34 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 
38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996)). 
 1294. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtra-
tion Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)); see also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the words of the claim 
itself are used to define the scope of the patent, and that the patentee “may choose 
to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary 
meaning”). 
 1295. Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1116, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004; see also 
Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (beginning its analysis of claim construction with 
the claim language). 
 1296. E.g., Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582–83, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576–77. 
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claim construction analysis.”1297  It is typically dispositive; “it is the sin-
gle best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”1298  The impor-
tance of the specification in claim construction “derives from its sta-
tutory role.  The close kinship between the written description and 
the claims is enforced by the statutory requirement that the specifica-
tion describe the claimed invention in ‘full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms.’”1299  It is therefore “entirely appropriate for a court, when 
conducting claim construction, to rely heavily on the written descrip-
tion for guidance as to the meaning of the claims.”1300 
While the Federal Circuit has acknowledged the maxim that claims 
should be construed to preserve their validity, the court has not ap-
plied that principle broadly and has not endorsed a regime in which 
a validity analysis is conducted as a regular component of claim con-
struction.1301  Instead, the Federal Circuit has limited the maxim to 
cases in which “‘the court concludes, after applying all the available 
tools of claim construction, that the claim is still ambiguous.’”1302 
In Saunders Group, Inc. v. Comfortrac, Inc.,1303 the Federal Circuit re-
jected an interpretation of the claims that would preserve their valid-
ity.1304  In pertinent part, the appeal focused on Saunders’ ‘690 patent 
(U.S. Patent Number 6,899,690), which was a continuation of the 
‘174 patent (U.S. Patent Number 6,506,174).1305  The ‘174 patent 
claimed a lumbar traction system having a pneumatic cylinder with at 
least one pressure activated seal; claims 1 and 16 of the ‘690 patent 
had no such limitation.1306 
The district court found that “‘[a]t the very least, the specification 
and prosecution history . . . make claims 1 and 16 of the ‘690 patent 
ambiguous as to whether the pneumatic cylinder must utilize at least 
                                                          
 1297. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 1298. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 1299. Id. at 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 
(2000)). 
 1300. Id. at 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 1301. Id. at 1327,  75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336 (citing Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1368–69, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458, 1461–62 
(Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 1302. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad, Inc., 
358 F.3d 898, 911, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see also Gen-
eration II Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech. Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1365, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1919, 1927 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345, 
51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[C]laims can only be construed 
to preserve their validity where the proposed claim construction is ‘practicable,’ is 
based on sound claim construction principles, and does not revise or ignore the ex-
plicit language of the claims.”). 
 1303. 492 F.3d 1326, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1304. Id. at 1329, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226. 
 1305. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226. 
 1306. Id. at 1329–30, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226–27. 
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one pressure activated seal.’”1307  The only pneumatic cylinder de-
scribed in the specification had at least one pressure-activated seal, 
according to the court, while “the inventors made clear that they did 
not believe an ordinary O-ring seal would work in a device of the sort 
they claimed.”1308  Accordingly, the district court construed the claims 
narrowly to preserve their validity because a broader construction 
would have rendered the claims invalid for lack of enablement.1309  
The Federal Circuit reversed and found that it was error for the dis-
trict court to consider the possible invalidity of the broader claims as 
a basis for construing them narrowly.1310  In particular, the Federal 
Circuit stated, “[t]hat is not to say that we reject the district court’s 
validity analysis; we hold only that the court’s validity analysis cannot 
be used as basis for adopting a narrow construction of the claims.”1311  
Instead, any invalidity defenses “the defendants [may] have preserved 
and wish[ed] to press [could] be addressed on remand.”1312 
When construing a patent’s claims, a court must begin by 
“look[ing] to the words of the claims themselves . . . to define the 
scope of the patented invention.”1313  “In some cases, the ordinary 
meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the 
art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construc-
tion in such cases involves little more than the application of the 
widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.”1314 
In Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,1315 Acumed sued Stryker for in-
fringement of a patent on “an orthopedic nail for treatment of frac-
tures in the humerus.”1316  Stryker argued on appeal that the district 
court had erred in construing the term “curved shank” to mean a 
shank having “a bend or deviation from a straight line without sharp 
corners or sharp angles.”1317  Stryker argued that the term “curved” 
                                                          
 1307. Id. at 1335, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231. 
 1308. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231. 
 1309. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 
1303, 1326, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 1310. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231. 
 1311. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231. 
 1312. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231 (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, 
Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 1313. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 1314. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1352, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 1315. 483 F.3d 800, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1316. Id. at 802–03, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482. 
 1317. Id. at 804, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483–84. 
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should not be afforded its ordinary meaning.1318  Instead, Stryker as-
serted that the patent specification implicitly assigned the term a 
more narrow meaning as “a nonangular continuous bend,” which 
covered only embodiments having a curvature that allowed them to 
be inserted into a broached hole without bends or small radius 
curves.1319  The majority disagreed, stating that Stryker’s “assertion is 
flawed:  it is an attempt to import a feature from a preferred em-
bodiment into the claims.”1320 
The Federal Circuit similarly rejected Stryker’s argument that the 
term “transverse holes” should be limited to holes that are perpen-
dicular to the nail shaft, and exclude holes that are tilted so that one 
end of the hole is vertically offset from the other end.1321  According 
to the majority, once again Stryker was improperly trying to read into 
the claims a limitation from the preferred embodiments, all of which 
featured the transverse holes as going perpendicularly through the 
shaft.1322  Quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit stated 
“‘[a]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodi-
ments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining 
the claims to those embodiments.’”1323  The majority concluded that 
the district court had properly defined “transverse holes” to mean 
“holes across the butt portion of the nail.”1324 
Judge Moore disagreed with the majority’s construction of the term 
“transverse holes.”1325  Judge Moore believed the district court had 
improperly begun its construction with the dictionary and construed 
the claim term in accord with the broader of “two definitions for the 
term ‘transverse’:  ‘(1) acting, lying, or being across:  set crosswise; 
(2) made at right angles to the anterior-posterior axis of the 
body.’”1326  According to Judge Moore, “the patentee used the two 
words to clearly specify which of the definitions of transverse applied 
to his invention; the purpose of using the word ‘perpendicular’ was 
to further describe what the inventor meant by the term ‘transverse,’ 
not to distinguish it as the majority suggests.”1327 
                                                          
 1318. Id. at 805, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 1319. Id. at 804, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 1320. Id. at 805, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 1321. Id. at 803, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1322. Id. at 807, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486. 
 1323. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 
1303, 1323, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 1324. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486. 
 1325. Id. at 812–18, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-95 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 1326. Id. at 813, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490. 
 1327. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491. 
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In Foremost in Packaging Systems, Inc. v. Cold Chain Technologies, 
Inc.,1328 the Federal Circuit relied on the claims themselves to affirm 
the district court’s claim construction and non-infringement find-
ing.1329  Specifically, in a patent directed to insulated containers, the 
claims required that an “insulated block,” which extended from the 
container cover, “slidably engage the coolant cavity, thereby the cool-
ant and the insulated block together substantially filling the coolant 
cavity.”1330  The district court construed this term to require that the 
container cover extend into the coolant cavities on the sides of the 
device and concluded that the accused products did not infringe be-
cause their insulated blocks merely covered the coolant cavities but 
did not extend into them.1331 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected appellant Foremost’s ar-
gument that the term “slidably engage” did not require that the insu-
lated block extend into the coolant cavities.1332  The court explained, 
if the insulated block did not extend into the cavity then the block 
and coolant “together” did not fill the cavity or “minimiz[e] air 
spaces within the cavities,” as required by the claims.1333  The court in-
dicated that since “[o]ur interpretation of these claims rests upon 
their language,” it did not need to analyze the specification or file 
history to any degree in its opinion.1334  The Federal Circuit thus af-
firmed the district court’s claim construction and summary judgment 
of non-infringement.1335 
Similarly, in In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation,1336 the Federal Circuit 
was not persuaded by the Appellees’ extensive reliance on the prose-
cution history to support their construction, particularly since the 
claim language and specification provided a clear definition of the 
disputed claim term.1337  According to the court, “the plain language 
of the claim supports the construction that the anion specifically is 
derived from a mineral acid.”1338  Accordingly, the court found the 
“assertion that the claimed anion refer[ed] to total chloride ions or 
anions from any source that is ‘capable of’ forming a mineral acid 
                                                          
 1328. 485 F.3d 1153, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1329. Id. at 1154, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
 1330. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
 1331. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
 1332. Id. at 1155–56, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607–08. 
 1333. Id. at 1156, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608. 
 1334. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608. 
 1335. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608. 
 1336. 503 F.3d 1254, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1651 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1337. Id. at 1264, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 1338. Id. at 1263, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
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[wa]s unsupported by the claim language.”1339  Moreover, if the pat-
entees had “intended the anion to refer to any anion, regardless of its 
source, the patentees could have simply claimed ‘anions’ and omitted 
the phrase ‘of a mineral acid.’”1340  The Federal Circuit further ex-
plained that “the construction adopted by the district court g[ave] 
full meaning to every word of the entire claim term.”1341  Thus, in light 
of the Federal Circuit’s “review of the prosecution history, [it found] 
no basis for reversing the district court’s construction, 
which . . . comport[ed] with the claim language and specification.”1342 
In explaining the importance of referring to the specification in 
determining and understanding the meaning and scope of a patent 
claim, the Federal Circuit has stated that “the specification ‘is always 
highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.  Usually, it is dispo-
sitive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed 
term.’”1343 
In SafeTCare Manufacturing, Inc. v. Tele-Made, Inc.,1344 the Federal 
Circuit found the specification dispositive in determining the inven-
tor’s intention.1345  In particular, the Federal Circuit considered 
whether a claimed motor that “exert[ed] a pushing force on said . . . 
deck section” of a hospital bed included a motor that exerted a pull-
ing force against a lift dog, or bracket, which caused the deck section 
to rotate upward.1346  The Federal Circuit rejected this broad con-
struction of the claim because the patentee had repeatedly empha-
sized in the specification that its invention applied pushing forces, 
not pulling forces, to the lift dogs and distinguished prior art beds 
that exerted pulling forces on the structural members of the bed 
frame.1347  Based on the patentee’s clear disavowal of the use of pull-
ing forces, the appeals court affirmed the district court’s summary 
judgment of non-infringement, both literally and under the doctrine 
of equivalents.1348 
The court again focused on the importance of the specification in 
In re Buszard.1349  In this case, applicants attempting to patent “a flame 
                                                          
 1339. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 1340. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 1341. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 1342. Id. at 1264, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 1343. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 
39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 1344. 497 F.3d 1262, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1618 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1345. Id. at 1269, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623. 
 1346. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622 (emphasis added). 
 1347. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623. 
 1348. Id. at 1270–71, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1624. 
 1349. 504 F.3d 1364, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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retardant composition that produces a flexible polyurethane foam” 
sought “review of the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and In-
terferences holding all of the claims in the[ir] patent application un-
patentable on the ground of anticipation.”1350  Particularly, “[t]he 
Board held Buszard’s claims to be anticipated because the appellants 
claimed reaction mixture includes any reaction mixture which pro-
duces, at least ultimately, a flexible polyurethane foam.”1351  Buszard 
argued “that his claims explicitly state[d] the requirement of a flexi-
ble polyurethane foam reaction mixture, and that this claim element 
is not shown in the [cited] reference, thereby negating anticipa-
tion.”1352  The Board interpreted the claim term “‘flexible polyure-
thane foam reaction mixture’ to mean ‘any reaction mixture which 
produces, at least ultimately, a flexible polyurethane foam.’”1353  
Buszard argued that those “persons experienced in the field of poly-
urethane foams know that a flexible polyurethane foam reaction mix-
ture is different from a rigid polyurethane foam reaction mixture, 
and that this process limitation cannot be found in [the reference], 
no matter how broadly that reference is read.”1354 
The Federal Circuit determined that Buszard’s specification and 
claims specifically require a flexible polyurethane foam reaction mix-
ture.1355  The court explained that “[n]o matter how broadly ‘flexible 
foam reaction mixture’ is construed, it is not a rigid foam reaction 
mixture.”1356  Here, the reference “describes only a rigid foam reac-
tion mixture that produces a rigid product.”1357  In dissent, Judge 
Prost took a more stringent approach, stating “[i]t is the applicant[‘s] 
burden to precisely define the invention, not the PTO’s.”1358  Accord-
ing to Judge Prost, “courts examine the claims, the specification, the 
prosecution history, and possibly extrinsic evidence—all in an effort 
to determine what the applicant regards as his invention.”1359  There is 
no need to “engage in a guessing game during patent prosecution.  If 
a claim term is ambiguous or confusing, the applicant can (and 
                                                          
 1350. Id. at 1365, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (internal footnote omitted). 
 1351. Id. at 1366, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (internal quotations omitted). 
 1352. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (internal quotations omitted). 
 1353. Id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 1354. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 1355. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 1356. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 1357. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 1358. Id. at 1369, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (Prost, J., dissenting) (quoting In re 
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 1359. Id. at 1368, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752 (internal quotations omitted) (cit-
ing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325  
(Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
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should) clarify it.”1360  Judge Prost continued, explaining that “if an 
applicant wants a claim term to have a specific meaning, the appli-
cant can either amend the claim to expressly convey the applicant’s 
intended meaning or provide an express definition for the claim 
term in the specification.”1361 
In E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp.,1362 the Federal Circuit ulti-
mately agreed with the district court that the specification made clear 
the construction of the term at issue.1363  The Federal Circuit affirmed 
an order granting summary judgment that none of the multiple de-
fendants (including Palm, Handspring, and Visa) infringed, either 
literally or by equivalents, E-Pass’s patents on a method and device 
for simplifying the use of credit cards.1364 
This was the second appeal in this litigation.1365  In the earlier case, 
which involved two of the defendants, the Federal Circuit had held 
that the district court erred in its claim construction by limiting the 
term “card” to the “dimensions of a standard credit card.”1366  On re-
mand, the district court again granted summary judgment of non-
infringement as to all defendants, based on two independent 
grounds:1367 
First, it held that even under a broader construction of “card,” 
none of the accused devices could infringe the “electronic multi-
function card” limitation.  Second, it held that E-Pass had failed to 
adduce sufficient evidence to support a finding that any of the de-
fendants or their customers had practiced all of the steps of the 
claimed method.1368 
E-Pass again appealed to the Federal Circuit.1369  On the second ap-
peal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court, explaining as 
follows:  “By vacating, we signaled that, although the district court’s 
prior decision rested upon erroneous grounds, a proper claim con-
struction might support a judgment (summary or otherwise) in favor 
of either party . . . .”1370  The Federal Circuit agreed with the district 
court that “the specification . . . ma[de] it clear that a ‘card,’ as used 
                                                          
 1360. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752. 
 1361. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752 (citing In re Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28; In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571–72, 222 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 934, 936–37 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 1362. 473 F.3d 1213, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1363. Id. at 1215, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 1364. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 1365. Id. at 1216, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386–87. 
 1366. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 1367. Id. at 1216–17, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 1368. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (internal citations omitted). 
 1369. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 1370. Id. at 1218, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
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in the patent’s claims, is something a user will ‘carry about.’”1371  The 
accused devices, however, had buttons, joysticks and keyboards, 
which projected above the surface.1372  “Although not a precise restric-
tion on size or portability, the attributes of being able to be ‘carried 
about’ and of not having protruding buttons, keyboards, antennae, 
indented display screens, or hinged covers are characteristics that a 
complete claim construction of ‘card’ can be expected to em-
brace.”1373  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s ruling of no literal infringement.1374 
The Federal Circuit also stated that it need not decide whether the 
district court’s judgment as to the doctrine of equivalents could be 
sustained on other grounds.1375  To survive the defendants’ motions 
for summary judgment, E-Pass had to “make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of [each] element essential to [its] case.”1376  
Because most of the steps of the “method claim refer[red] to the 
completed results of the prior step, E-Pass [had to] show that all of 
those steps were performed in order.”1377  E-Pass failed to meet its 
burden because its evidence showed, at best, that the defendants 
taught their customers to perform each step of the claimed method 
in isolation.1378  “Nowhere do the manual excerpts teach all of the 
steps of the claimed method together, much less in the required or-
der.”1379 
Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.1380 also turned on issues 
of claim construction.1381  Vonage appealed from a jury verdict that 
found that Vonage had infringed three of Verizon’s patents.1382  The 
majority agreed with Verizon with respect to two patents and found 
that Vonage was improperly attempting to read limitations from the 
                                                          
 1371. Id. at 1219, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 1372. Id. at 1220, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390. 
 1373. Id. at 1219, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 1374. Id. at 1220, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390. 
 1375. Id. at 1220–21, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390–91. 
 1376. Id. at 1222, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). 
 1377. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (citing Mantech Envtl. Corp. v. Hudson 
Envtl. Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1368, 1376, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1732, 1739 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)) (holding that “the sequential nature of the claim steps is apparent from the 
plain meaning of the claim language and nothing in the written description suggests 
otherwise”). 
 1378. Id. at 1222–23, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392. 
 1379. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 
 1380. 503 F.3d 1295, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1381. Id. at 1301, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614. 
 1382. Id. at 1298, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611. 
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specification into the claims of two patents, when there was no valid 
basis to depart from the ordinary meanings of those terms.1383 
With respect to a third patent, the majority agreed with Vonage 
that the district court had construed the term “localized wireless 
gateway system” too broadly by not limiting it to systems that operated 
within a “range of a few feet.”1384  The majority found that the patent-
ees had limited their invention to short-range systems by unambigu-
ously disavowing longer-range systems during prosecution of a related 
patent to overcome the prior art.1385  Interestingly, this disclaimer was 
effective against the third patent even though it had been made after 
that patent had already issued.1386  Relying on Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-
Tech Systems,1387 the court reiterated “that a statement made by the 
patentee during prosecution history of a patent in the same family as 
the patent-in-suit can operate as a disclaimer.”1388  The majority also 
found that the district court had erred in not limiting the claimed 
“localized wireless gateway system” to systems that compress, decom-
press, and packetize voice signals because the “Disclosure of the In-
vention” portion of the specification described the “present inven-
tion” as including that limitation.1389  “When a patent thus describes 
the features of the ‘present invention’ as a whole, this description 
limits the scope of the invention,” the majority held.1390 
In other cases, the Federal Circuit also examined the doctrine of 
claim differentiation, which presumes that there is a difference in 
claim meaning and scope when different words or phrases are used 
in separate claims.1391  To the extent that the absence of such differ-
ence in meaning and scope would make a claim superfluous, the doc-
trine of claim differentiation states the presumption that the differ-
ence between claims is significant.1392 
                                                          
 1383. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611. 
 1384. Id. at 1306, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 1385. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617–18. 
 1386. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 1387. 357 F.3d 1340, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1815 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1388. Verizon, 503 F.3d at 1306, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617 (citing Microsoft Corp., 
357 F.3d at 1356–57, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1828) (“To operate as a disclaimer, the 
statement in the prosecution history must be clear and unambiguous, and constitute 
a clear disavowal of scope.”). 
 1389. Id. at 1308, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618. 
 1390. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618 (citing Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., 
Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1318–19, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294, 1300-01 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 
SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1343, 58 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 1391. E.g., D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1574, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
236, 239 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 1392. Id., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 239. 
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In Intamin, Ltd. v. Magnetar Technologies Corp.,1393 the Federal Circuit 
vacated and remanded the district court’s summary judgment that 
Magnetar did not infringe a patent directed to a magnetic braking 
system for amusement park rides.1394  Specifically, Intamin sued Mag-
netar for infringement of a patent that required, inter alia, “an in-
termediary disposed between adjacent pairs of [a] plurality of magnet 
elements.”1395  Magnetar moved for summary judgment of non-
infringement on the basis that its brakes did not include the claimed 
“intermediary” or “conductive rail.”1396  The district court granted 
Magnetar’s motion, based on its construction of the term “intermedi-
ary” to require a non-magnetic structure.1397  The district court did 
not rule, however, on whether there was infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents.1398  The Federal Circuit, citing Phillips,1399 reversed 
the district court claim construction of the term “intermediary.”1400  
The Federal Circuit found that “the term ‘intermediary’ can embrace 
magnetic substances, albeit only if the additional term requirement 
of ‘alternating polarity’ allows for it.”1401  The court also concluded 
that, pursuant to the doctrine of claim differentiation, claim 1 impli-
edly embraced non-magnetic intermediaries because dependent 
claim 2 required the intermediary to be magnetic.1402  Accordingly, 
the Federal Circuit directed the district court to determine on re-
mand “whether the patent limit[ed] the term ‘adjacent magnets of 
alternating polarity’ to magnet’s of opposite polarity” and thus 
whether Magnetar’s brakes infringed literally or under the doctrine 
of equivalents.1403 
In contrast to the doctrine of claim differentiation, which assumes 
that different words in different claims describe a separate invention, 
the Federal Circuit will apply a “presumption that the same terms ap-
pearing in different portions of the claims should be given the same 
meaning unless it is clear from the specification and prosecution his-
tory that the terms have different meanings at different portions of 
                                                          
 1393. 483 F.3d 1328, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1394. Id. at 1339, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552. 
 1395. Id. at 1332, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547. 
 1396. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547. 
 1397. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547–48. 
 1398. Id. at 1337, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551. 
 1399. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 1400. Intamin, 483 F.3d at 1335, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549. 
 1401. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
 1402. Id. at 1334-35, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549. 
 1403. Id. at 1335, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
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the claims.”1404  In PODS, Inc. v. Porta Stor, Inc.,1405 “Porta Stor argue[d] 
that the district court erred in not construing the phrases ‘carrier 
frame’ and ‘around’ in claim 29 to have the same meaning as they 
undisputedly have in claim 1, namely a four-sided rectangular shaped 
frame that completely surrounds the container on all four sides.”1406  
The Federal Circuit determined that because the parties agreed that 
the structure described as a “carrier frame” in claim 1 is “a four-sided 
or rectangular-shaped carrier frame” that surrounds the container on 
all sides,1407 and PODS failed to provide evidence in the specification 
or the prosecution history that the term “carrier frame” in claim 29 
had a meaning different from the uncontested meaning in claim 1; 
the term “carrier frame” in claim 29, as in claim 1, required “a four-
sided or rectangular shape.”1408  Moreover, PODS had noted in its 
brief that a claim that “recites a four-sided ‘carrier frame’ . . . placing 
that four-sided carrier frame ‘around the container’ would result in 
‘all four sides’ of the carrier frame being ‘around’ the container.”1409  
Based on that representation, the court construed the term “around” 
to require the frame to be on all sides of the container.1410  The court 
found that under that claim construction, there was no infringe-
ment.1411 
In determining the breadth of a claim’s scope, the term “compris-
ing” raises a presumption that the list of elements is nonexclusive.1412  
However, the Federal Circuit has stated “‘[c]omprising’ is not a wea-
sel word with which to abrogate claim limitations.”1413  In two cases, 
the Federal Circuit reviewed the breadth of the term “comprising” 
and in a third clarified the scope of the term “comprised of.” 
In Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey,1414 the Federal Circuit limited the 
scope of the term “comprising.”1415  The claims at issue were directed 
                                                          
 1404. Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1318, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1203, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom, Inc., 
133 F.3d 1459, 1465, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1421, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); see also Phil-
lips, 415 F.3d at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (explaining that the usage of a 
term in one claim can elucidate the meaning of the same term in other sections). 
 1405. 484 F.3d 1359, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1406. Id. at 1366, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558. 
 1407. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558. 
 1408. Id. at 1367, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558. 
 1409. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558. 
 1410. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558. 
 1411. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558. 
 1412. Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1608, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 1413. Spectrum Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1380, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1065, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 1414. Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
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to “[a] method of preparing and storing a free-flowing, frozen ali-
mentary dairy product, comprising the steps of . . . freezing said drip-
ping alimentary composition into beads.”1416  The Federal Circuit 
found that the district court had properly interpreted the term 
“beads” to mean “small frozen droplets . . . which have a smooth, 
spherical (round or ball shaped) appearance” and rejected Dippin’ 
Dots’ argument that it could also include “irregular or odd shaped 
particles such as ‘popcorn.’”1417  Having failed on this issue, Dippin’ 
Dots tried to reach the same result by arguing that the claim should 
be broadly construed to cover processes that produce some irregu-
larly shaped particles because “comprising the steps of” in the pre-
amble is a non-exclusive term.1418  The Federal Circuit was not per-
suaded, stating that although “comprising” does indicate that an 
infringing process could practice other steps in addition to those re-
cited in the claim, nonetheless those enumerated steps must all be 
practiced as recited in order for an accused process to infringe.1419  
“The presumption raised by the term ‘comprising’ does not reach 
into each of the six steps to render every word and phrase therein 
open-ended—especially where, as here, the patentee has narrowly de-
fined the claim term it now seeks to have broadened.”1420  The Federal 
Circuit concluded that the district court had properly excluded from 
the claim processes that produce some irregularly shaped particles.1421 
In Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C. v. Cabela’s, Inc.,1422 Bass Pro tried to 
use the term “comprising” to overcome limitations imputed on the 
claim by the prosecution.1423  In particular, Bass Pro stressed that the 
use of “comprising” in claim 1 allowed the claim’s “combination vest 
and pivotable seat member,” which phrase was added in response to a 
rejection, to encompass “Cabela’s device that contain[ed] only a dor-
sal member and shoulder supports, and that it [wa]s incorrect to read 
the claim as also requiring a vest, a term that appears in what Bass Pro 
designate[d] as a preamble.”1424  Cabela’s argued that “vest” is a sub-
stantive claim limitation, not merely a word of “preamble.”1425  Ca-
                                                                                                                                      
 1415. Id. at 1343, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637 (citing Spectrum Int’l, 164 F.3d at 
1380, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070). 
 1416. Id. at 1340, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635. 
 1417. Id. at 1342–43, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637. 
 1418. Id. at 1343, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637. 
 1419. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637. 
 1420. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637. 
 1421. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637. 
 1422. 485 F.3d 1364, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1423. Id. at 1366–67, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366. 
 1424. Id. at 1368–69, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367–68. 
 1425. Id. at 1369, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367. 
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bela’s also argued that the district court erred in ruling that the claim 
did not require a full vest because the specification and claim de-
scribed the invention as a “combination of a vest and a folding seat, 
and that the prosecution history reinforces that the invention is more 
than a ‘dorsal’ panel of fabric on the wearer’s back with shoulder 
support means.”1426  The Federal Circuit agreed, and further found 
that the applicants had amended the claims during prosecution to 
include a vest, and had “relied on the vest to distinguish the combina-
tion from the [prior art].”1427  Therefore, Bass Pro’s argument that the 
vest “adds nothing” to the claim was contrary to the claims, specifica-
tion, and prosecution history.1428  Because the vest was a material part 
of the claim, the Federal Circuit found the garment produced by Ca-
bela’s did not infringe the claim and vacated the district court’s rul-
ing.1429 
In CIAS, Inc. v. Alliance Gaming Corp.,1430 “[t]he district court found 
that the meaning of ‘comprised of’ ha[d] not been clearly resolved in 
patent-specific precedent, and therefore the court held that the ‘or-
dinary and customary meaning’ should be used.”1431  In so ruling, the 
court found that “‘comprised of’ does not have the same open-ended 
meaning as ‘comprising,’ which also appears in [the claim at is-
sue].”1432  Additionally, the court stated that 
“comprised of” should be construed as a closed-end term that ex-
cludes the presence of all elements beyond those presented in the 
“comprised of” clause.  Thus the court defined “comprised of” as “a 
limiting description of composition,” reasoning that “[t]his con-
struction preserves the distinction between ‘comprised of’ and 
‘comprising,’ the latter of which in fact is a patent term of art when 
used in a transitional phrase . . . .”1433 
The Federal Circuit reversed this ruling, stating that “[a]lthough 
‘comprised of’ is not used as regularly as ‘comprising,’ and ‘com-
prised of’ is sometimes used other than as a ‘transition phrase,’ none-
theless it partakes of long-standing recognition as an open-ended 
term.”1434  According to the court, “[t]he usual and generally consis-
tent meaning of ‘comprised of,’ when it is used as a transition phrase, 
is, like ‘comprising,’ that the ensuing elements or steps are not limit-
                                                          
 1426. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367. 
 1427. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367. 
 1428. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367. 
 1429. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367. 
 1430. 504 F.3d 1356, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1431. Id. at 1359, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740. 
 1432. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740. 
 1433. Id. at 1359–60, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740 (alteration in original). 
 1434. Id. at 1360, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740. 
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ing.  The conventional usage of ‘comprising’ generally also applies to 
‘comprised of.’”1435 
The Federal Circuit turned to the precision of claimed logarithmic 
ranges in U.S. Philips Corp. v. Iwasaki Electric Co.1436  Philips argued on 
appeal that the district court had erred in construing the term “be-
tween 10-6 and 10-4 µmol/mm3” to mean “between 1 x 10-6 and 1 x 10-4 
µmol/mm3” because the term expresses a range of orders of magni-
tude, not a range of more-precise numbers.1437 
According to U.S. Philips, one of ordinary skill in the art of lamp 
chemistry would understand ‘10-4’ to mean something different and 
less precise than ‘1 x 10-4’; i.e., the absence of the coefficient (‘1’) 
means that the term encompasses all values that are closer on a 
logarithmic scale to 10-4 than to 10-5 or 10-3.1438 
The Federal Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court’s con-
struction.1439  Even though the “upper and lower bounds of the 
claimed range [were] expressed as powers of ten,” the Federal Circuit 
found “no reason for treating them as anything other than the ordi-
nary numbers they [were].”1440  As the district court had noted, the 
phrase “‘a quantity between —— and ——’ . . . ‘implies a specific 
range . . . . It does not imply a range between two values which are 
themselves ranges.”1441  Nonetheless, the court emphasized that the 
endpoints of the claimed ranges “should not be read . . . with greater 
precision than the claim language warrants.”1442  The court explained 
that, “in some specific contexts, [the number] ‘1’ represents a less 
precise quantity than ‘1.0,’ and ‘1’ may encompass values such as 1.1 
that ‘1.0’ may not.”1443  As “‘10-6’ and ‘10-4’ are simply the numbers 
0.000001 and 0.0001 expressed as powers of ten, the claim language 
provide[d] no basis for inferring any level of precision beyond the 
single digit ‘1.’”1444  The use of power-of-ten quantities in the specifica-
tion confirmed that the claims were not intended to express precise 
quantities.1445  Thus, appellee’s assertion that “10-x” should be inter-
                                                          
 1435. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740. 
 1436. 505 F.3d 1371, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1437. Id. at 1376, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 1438. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 1439. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101. 
 1440. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101. 
 1441. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101. 
 1442. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
 1443. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (citing Viskase Corp. v. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 
261 F.3d 1316, 1320–21, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1825 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 1444. Id. at 1377, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
 1445. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101. 
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preted to mean “1.0 x 10-x” was technically incorrect.1446  Rather, the 
claim simply referred to “1 x 10-x,” which is less precise than “1.0 x 
10 x.”1447 
Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 
Ltd.1448 focused on the proper construction of the term “about 1:5” in 
Ortho’s claim “to a pharmaceutical composition comprising certain 
weight ratios of two known drugs, tramadol and acetaminophen.”1449  
The patent taught that the pharmacological effects of these compo-
nents are synergistic when they are used in certain ratios.1450  While 
Ortho found that the preferred ratios of tramadol to acetaminophen 
are from about 1:19 to about 1:50, it also disclosed and claimed com-
positions wherein the ratio is from about 1:1 to 1:5.1451  In claim 6 in 
particular, Ortho recited a pharmaceutical composition with a ratio 
of tramodol to acetaminophen of about 1:5.1452  Ortho sued Caraco 
for infringement of claim 6 after Caraco filed an ANDA for regulatory 
approval to market a pharmaceutical composition containing these 
ingredients in a ratio of no less than 1:7.5.1453 
On Caraco’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement, 
the district court interpreted “about 1:5” to mean “approximately 1:5, 
encompassing a range of ratios no greater than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1,” based 
on both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, including opinions from Or-
tho’s experts.1454  The district court held that Caraco’s product, which 
had an average weight ratio of 1:8.67, did not infringe the claim at is-
sue literally or by equivalents.1455 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment of non-infringement, agreeing with the district court that 
the term “about 1:5” should be construed to mean “approximately 
1:5, encompassing a range of ratios no greater than about 1:3.6 to 
1:7.1.”1456  The Federal Circuit focused on the fact that in some of the 
claims, Ortho recited a single weight ratio, while in other claims it re-
cited ranges of weight ratios.1457  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 
noted, “one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the inven-
                                                          
 1446. Id. at 1377–78, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101–02. 
 1447. Id. at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
 1448. 476 F.3d 1321, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1449. Id. at 1322–23, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (“Both of these drugs are pain 
relievers, i.e., analgesics.”). 
 1450. Id. at 1323, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428. 
 1451. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428. 
 1452. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428. 
 1453. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428. 
 1454. Id. at 1324, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429. 
 1455. Id. at 1325, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430. 
 1456. Id. at 1328, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432 (internal quotations omitted). 
 1457. Id. at 1327–28, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
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tors intended a range when they claimed one and something more 
precise when they did not.”1458  Moreover, the court noted that the 
patentees, despite disclosing data points for ratios of 1:1, 1:3, 1:5, 
1:5.7, and 1:15, chose to specifically claim ratios of 1:1 and 1:5 instead 
of ratios in the “range of ‘about 1:1 to about 1:5’ or even a ratio range 
of ‘about 1:3 to about 1:5.’”1459  The Federal Circuit concluded that 
the “dichotomy between the specific ratio of 1:5 and the broader ra-
tio ranges of the other claims points to a narrow scope for the ‘about 
1:5’ limitation.”1460  In view of this construction, the Federal Circuit 
agreed with the district court that there was no literal infringe-
ment.1461  The court also agreed that there was no infringement under 
the doctrine of equivalents, for to expand the weight ratio of “about 
1.5” to encompass a composition having an average weight ratio of 
1:8.76 “would eviscerate the limitation.”1462 
The Federal Circuit has further held that in addition to consulting 
the specification, “a court should also consider the patent’s prosecu-
tion history, if it is in evidence.”1463  The prosecution history, which is 
“designated as part of the ‘intrinsic evidence,’ consists of the com-
plete record of the proceedings before the PTO and includes the 
prior art cited during the examination of the patent.”1464  Much 
“[l]ike the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of 
how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.”1465 
In Gillespie v. Dywidag Systems International, USA,1466 the Federal Cir-
cuit found that prosecution arguments limited the claim scope.1467  In 
particular, the Federal Circuit held that a patentee was bound by lim-
iting remarks made during prosecution, even if the distinction drawn 
between the invention and the prior art was not material to the grant 
                                                          
 1458. Id. at 1327, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 1459. Id. at 1327–28, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 1460. Id. at 1328, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 1461. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 1462. Id. at 1329–30, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 1463. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980, 
34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); see also Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 473 (1966) (“[A]n invention is con-
strued not only in the light of the claims, but also with reference to the file wrapper 
or prosecution history in the Patent Office.”). 
 1464. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 1465. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329  (citing Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 968 
F.2d 1202, 1206, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1284, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (determining 
the meaning of a claim by closely examining claim language and prosecution his-
tory) (internal citation omitted). 
 1466. 501 F.3d 1285, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1467. Id. at 1290, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055. 
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of the patent.1468  The patents at issue were directed to a mine roof 
bolt having a drive collar with a hexagonal outer shape to engage the 
driving mechanism of a mine roof bolting machine.1469  The examiner 
had rejected the original claims as obvious over a bolt-like rock an-
chor that had a recessed head for accepting a rotational tool.1470  The 
patentee distinguished his invention by arguing that the outer surface 
of the prior art bolt was cylindrical and thus incapable of being 
driven by a mine roof bolting machine.1471  Nonetheless, Gillespie ar-
gued on appeal that its claims did not exclude the prior art structure 
“because the [examiner’s] Reasons for Allowance did not depend on 
how the drive collar is rotated.”1472 
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument.1473  During prosecution, 
Gillespie had clearly argued that the cylindrical outside surface of the 
prior art “bolt head rendered it incapable of being driven by a mine 
roof bolting machine.”1474  The fact that the examiner had not men-
tioned this distinction in the Reasons for Allowance was not mate-
rial.1475  A patentee is bound by what he declares during prosecution, 
and thus Gillespie had disclaimed coverage of roof bolts having a cy-
lindrical outer surface that could not be grasped by a drive tool.1476  
Based on this construction, the Federal Circuit reversed the district 
court’s summary judgment of literal infringement.1477 
In contrast, in Elbex Video, Ltd. v. Sensormatic Electronics Corp.,1478 the 
Federal Circuit majority found that the district court had erred in de-
termining that the inventor’s remarks during prosecution limited the 
claimed “receiving means for receiving said video signals and said 1st 
code signals” to “a structure through which a video monitor receives 
the 1st code signal from a camera.”1479  According to the majority, the 
statement in question was not a clear disavowal of other structures 
because the applicants also referred to the receipt of the first code 
signals by other receiving devices, statements that were “fully sup-
ported” by the specification.1480  In contrast, the court found the 
statement relied upon by the district court to be “unsupported by 
                                                          
 1468. Id. at 1291, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055. 
 1469. Id. at 1287, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053–55. 
 1470. Id. at 1290, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054. 
 1471. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055. 
 1472. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054. 
 1473. Id. at 1291, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054. 
 1474. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055. 
 1475. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055. 
 1476. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055. 
 1477. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055. 
 1478. 508 F.3d 1366, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1479. Id. at 1369, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138. 
 1480. Id. at 1372, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
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even a shred of evidence from the specification[,]” which “never sug-
gests that the monitor of the receiving means receives the first code 
signals.”1481  The court further noted that the accused infringer’s own 
expert had attested that if the statement in question were taken liter-
ally, the claimed system would be “inoperable.”1482  The Federal Cir-
cuit concluded that the district court had based its summary judg-
ment of non-infringement on this unduly narrow construction of 
“receiving means.”1483  Nonetheless, the court found independent 
bases to affirm that two of the three accused systems did not infringe 
the claims.1484  District Judge Cote, sitting by designation, dissented, 
finding “clear and unambiguous evidence” in the intrinsic record 
that Elbex had made a strategic choice and unmistakably surren-
dered receiving devices other than a “monitor.”1485  In her view, Elbex 
was improperly attempting to recapture that which it had chosen to 
abandon during prosecution.1486 
In Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC,1487 Anderson had four pat-
ents on composite materials made from polymers and wood fibers 
(the “Group I” patents) and two patents on extruded members made 
from polymers and wood fibers (the “Group II” patents).1488  On 
summary judgment, the district court found that Fiber Composites’s 
products did not infringe the Group I products because the “‘com-
posite compositions’ claimed in the Group I patents [were] limited to 
materials . . . extruded to make pellets or the linear extrudate from 
which pellets can be cut.”1489  However, the district court found that 
some Fiber Composite products infringed the Group II patents be-
cause the composite structural members of Group II were not limited 
to items made of the Group I composite compositions.1490 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s construction of 
the Group I claims, noting that “[t]he portions of the specification 
that describe how the physical properties of the claimed composite 
composition are obtained make clear that the formation of linear ex-
trudates or pellets is not merely a preferred embodiment, but is a 
critical element in the process that produces those properties.”1491  
                                                          
 1481. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141. 
 1482. Id. at 1373, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 1483. Id. at 1375, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144. 
 1484. Id. at 1373–75, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142–44. 
 1485. Id. at 1376, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144 (Cote, J., dissenting). 
 1486. Id. at 1375, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144. 
 1487. 474 F.3d 1361, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1488. Id. at 1364, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547–48. 
 1489. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. 
 1490. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. 
 1491. Id. at 1367, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
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The Federal Circuit thus affirmed that Fiber Composite’s products 
did not infringe the Group I patents because Fiber Composite did 
not use pellets or a linear extrudate introducing its products.1492 
However, the Federal Circuit reversed with respect to the Group II 
claims, finding that the claims were limited to structural members 
made from pellets claimed in the Group I patents because Andersen 
had distinguished the structural members from the prior art by rely-
ing heavily on the role of pelletization in fabricating the structural 
members.1493  In addition, the  Federal Circuit found that the specifi-
cations of both groups of patents use language of “requirement” 
rather than preference insofar as they stated that the composition of 
the structural members required a pelletizing step and attributed the 
desirable properties of the structural members to the nature of the 
pellets.1494  As a result, the court reversed the district court’s determi-
nation of infringement with respect to the Group II claims.1495 
B. Infringement 
1. Literal infringement 
The determination of whether a claim of a patent is infringed re-
quires a two-step analysis:  first, the claims are construed to determine 
their scope and meaning; second, the claims are compared to the ac-
cused device or process.1496  Each element is considered to be material 
and essential to the claim; thus, a finding of infringement requires 
that each or every element or its equivalent be present in the accused 
device.1497  Dependent claims can be found infringed, literally or un-
der the doctrine of equivalents, only if the claims from which they 
depend are infringed.1498  “It is axiomatic that dependent claims can-
not be found infringed unless the claims from which they depend 
have been found to have been infringed.”1499 
                                                          
 1492. Id. at 1376, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558. 
 1493. Id. at 1372–74, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557–58. 
 1494. Id. at 1373–74, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557. 
 1495. Id. at 1374, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557. 
 1496. E.g., Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1573, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 
967, 976, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 1497. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1535, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1367, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (articulating how to establish infringement). 
 1498. See, e.g., Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1553, 10 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201, 1207–08 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (reviewing the state of the law for 
dependent claim infringement). 
 1499. Wahpeton Canvas, 870 F.2d at 1553 n.9, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208 n.9. 
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In Z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,1500 the Federal Circuit re-
jected Microsoft’s arguments that the district court had erred in de-
nying JMOL of non-infringement.1501  The patent was directed to pre-
venting software piracy by requiring users to submit registration 
information in order to control the number of authorized copies that 
could be made.1502  The parties disputed the level of user interaction 
in the registration process required to infringe the claims.1503  Both 
the district court and Federal Circuit found that even though the 
specification and claims “clearly contemplate[] a user choice as to 
whether registration will be automatic or manual,” the claims them-
selves were silent as to the initiation of a registration process.1504  The 
court found that “the claims require at least a minimal level of user 
interaction to select [‘automatic’] registration mode.”1505  Even 
though the specification teaches that automatic registration is per-
formed “without user intervention,” nothing in the claims or specifi-
cation precludes user interaction in the selection or initialization of 
the automatic registration.1506 Thus, the Federal Circuit found that 
“the district court correctly rejected Microsoft’s attempt to exclude 
any user interaction from the claims” and affirmed its construction of 
this term.1507 
The Federal Circuit elaborated that “even under Microsoft’s pro-
posed construction, its sole non-infringement argument [was] artifi-
cial at best.”1508  More precisely, Microsoft argued that “although the 
accused products allow users to choose between [activation by] 
Internet (i.e., automatic or electronic) or phone (i.e., manual),” se-
lection of the Internet option means “nothing happens after that 
manual choice until the user additionally manually presses the ‘next’ 
button.”1509  Therefore, even under Microsoft’s construction, a rea-
sonable juror could conclude that “manually press[ing] the ‘next’ 
button’ is merely part of the selection process.”1510  Therefore, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of infringement with respect 
to those limitations.1511 
                                                          
 1500. 507 F.3d 1340, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1501. Id. at 1351, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348. 
 1502. Id. at 1347, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342. 
 1503. Id. at 1350–51, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347. 
 1504. Id. at 1351, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348 (alteration in original). 
 1505. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348. 
 1506. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348. 
 1507. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348 (emphasis removed). 
 1508. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348. 
 1509. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348. 
 1510. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348. 
 1511. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348. 
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In Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc.,1512 Monsanto appealed the 
district court’s summary judgment ruling of non-infringement argu-
ing that Syngenta infringed the asserted patents under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(a) or, in the alternative, under § 271(g).1513  The lower court 
determined that “because Syngenta did not infringe the methods of 
the independent claims, it could not infringe the methods of the as-
serted dependent claims.”1514  Monsanto contended that, even if the 
asserted claims of the patents were dependent, Syngenta should still 
be liable for infringing them because it had performed each limita-
tion of the independent claims.1515  Alternatively, Monsanto also con-
tended that, even if the asserted claims of the patents were depend-
ent claims, “Syngenta should still be liable for infringing them, 
because Syngenta infringes any ‘four-step’ claimed process by com-
pleting the last step of ‘obtaining progeny’ during the patent 
term.”1516 
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded.  Relying on Wahpeton Can-
vas Co. v. Frontier, Inc.,1517 the court stated Monsanto’s argument “can-
not prevail.”1518  The Federal Circuit quoted Wahpeton as follows:  
“One may infringe an independent claim and not infringe a claim 
dependent on that claim.  The reverse is not true.  One who does not 
infringe an independent claim cannot infringe a claim dependent on 
(and thus containing all the limitations of) that claim.”1519 
BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.1520 addressed “the proper 
standard for [determining] joint infringement by multiple parties of 
                                                          
 1512. 503 F.3d 1352, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1513. Id. at 1354, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.  For the text of § 271(a), see infra 
text accompanying note 1527.  Section 271(g) states: 
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, 
sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process 
patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importa-
tion, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such 
process patent.  In an action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy 
may be granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial use or 
retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this title 
for infringement on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or 
sale of that product.  A product which is made by a patented process will, for 
purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after— 
(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or 
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product. 
35 U.S.C. § 274(g) (2000). 
 1514. Monsanto, 503 F.3d at 1359, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 1515. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 1516. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 1517. 870 F.2d 1546, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 1518. Monsanto, 503 F.3d at 1359, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709–10. 
 1519. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710 (quoting Wahpeton Canvas, 870 F.2d at 1552 
n.9, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211 n.9). 
 1520. 498 F.3d 1373, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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a single claim.”1521  BMC Resources (“BMC”) appealed the district 
court’s summary judgment that Paymentech did not infringe two 
BMC patents because it did not perform all of the steps of the as-
serted method claims.1522  Interestingly, the parties did not dispute 
that Paymentech did not perform every step of the claimed method, 
and that certain third-party financial institutions performed the other 
steps.1523  Paymentech could not be held liable for indirect infringe-
ment, the court explained, because there was no showing that “some 
party amongst the accused actors has committed the entire act of di-
rect infringement.”1524  Paymentech and the third parties collectively 
practiced all of the claimed steps, but none of them practiced all the 
steps individually.1525 
The Federal Circuit also examined whether Paymentech may be li-
able for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).1526  Section 
271(a) states:  “Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever 
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented in-
vention, within the United States or imports into the United States 
any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, in-
fringes the patent.”1527  The court determined Paymentech could not 
be held liable as a direct infringer because it did not perform all the 
claimed steps.1528  Consequently, Paymentech could be held liable for 
infringement only if it were vicariously liable for the acts of the third 
parties if Paymentech “controlled the conduct of the acting party.”1529  
The Federal Circuit explained that “[i]n the context of patent in-
fringement, a defendant cannot thus avoid liability for direct in-
fringement by having someone else carry out one or more of the 
claimed steps on its behalf.”1530 
The Federal Circuit, however, found no evidence of a contractual 
or other relationship between Paymentech and the third-party finan-
                                                          
 1521. Id. at 1378, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. 
 1522. Id. at 1375–78, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546–48. 
 1523. Id. at 1378, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. 
 1524. Id. at 1379–80, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548 (citing Dynacore Holdings 
Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1272, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369, 1376 
(Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 1525. Id. at 1375–78, 1381, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545–47, 1550–51. 
 1526. Id. at 1378, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. 
 1527. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
 1528. BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1379, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549 (citing Cross 
Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1311, 76 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, 
Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1568, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1137, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 1529. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. 
 1530. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. 
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cial institutions.1531  “Without this direction or control of both the 
debit networks and the financial institutions, Paymentech did not 
perform or cause to be performed each and every element of the 
claims.”1532  None of the financial institutions, debit networks, pay-
ment services provider, or Paymentech, bore responsibility for any 
the actions of the other parties.1533  “Because the record contain[ed] 
no basis to hold Paymentech vicariously responsible for the actions of 
the unrelated parties who carried out the other steps, [the Federal 
Circuit] affirm[ed] the finding of non-infringement.”1534 
2. Induced infringement 
In order to prevail on an inducement claim, the patentee must es-
tablish “first that there has been direct infringement, and second that 
the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed 
specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.”1535  Specific in-
tent requires a “showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced 
infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions 
would induce actual infringements.”1536 
In ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Manufacturer Co.,1537 Belkin Com-
ponents (“Belkin”) appealed from the judgment of the district court 
following a jury verdict that Belkin willfully induced infringement.1538  
Belkin also appealed from the court’s denial of JMOL that the patent 
was invalid and unenforceable, its grant of enhanced damages and 
attorney fees, and its claim construction order.1539  The Federal Cir-
cuit determined that the verdict of direct infringement was not sup-
ported by “substantial evidence.”1540  The court reversed the district 
court’s judgment of infringement and inducement and vacated the 
court’s judgment with respect to willfulness, enhanced damages, and 
attorney fees.1541 
The parties did not dispute that the accused device could “be op-
erated in either of two modes—the infringing Dornfeld method or 
                                                          
 1531. Id. at 1381–82, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
 1532. Id. at 1382, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
 1533. Id. at 1381–82, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
 1534. Id. at 1375, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545. 
 1535. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1304–05, 64 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1270, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). 
 1536. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 
1246 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part) (internal quotations omitted) (quot-
ing Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 554, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1587, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 1537. 501 F.3d 1307, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1538. Id. at 1309, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268. 
 1539. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268. 
 1540. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268. 
 1541. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268. 
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the non-infringing press-to-lock method.”1542  The Federal Circuit 
stated that in order to prove direct infringement, ACCO “must either 
point to specific instances of direct infringement or show that the ac-
cused device necessarily infringes the patent in suit.”1543  ACCO con-
tended that the jury was entitled to accept its expert’s testimony that 
all users of the key lock would use it in an infringing manner at least 
some of the time.1544  The Federal Circuit was not persuaded, explain-
ing that “[b]ecause the accused device can be used at any given time 
in a noninfringing manner,” it did not necessarily infringe the pat-
ent.1545 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit was not convinced by ACCO’s reli-
ance on Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp.,1546 which held “that an ac-
cused device may be found to infringe a product claim ‘if it is rea-
sonably capable of satisfying the claim limitations, even though it may 
also be capable of non-infringing modes of operation.’”1547  According 
to the court, that broad legal statement did not alter ACCO’s need to 
prove specific instances of direct infringement or that the accused 
device necessarily infringes the patent in suit.1548  “Hypothetical in-
stances of direct infringement are insufficient to establish vicarious 
liability or indirect infringement.”1549  Quoting Dynacore Holdings Corp. 
v. U.S. Phillips Corp.,1550 the court stated “[t]he mere sale of a product 
capable of substantial non-infringing uses does not constitute indirect 
infringement of a patent.”1551 
In Wechsler v. Macke International Trade, Inc.,1552 the Federal Circuit 
examined when the sole shareholder of an inducing corporation can 
be held personally liable for infringement.1553  The defendant in this 
case was the founder, president, sole stockholder, and sole employee 
of Macke International Trade, Inc. (“Macke”), which developed, 
                                                          
 1542. Id. at 1313, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270. 
 1543. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270 (citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. 
Phillips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1275–76, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)). 
 1544. Id. at 1312, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270. 
 1545. Id. at 1313, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270. 
 1546. 265 F.3d 1336, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 1547. Id. at 1343, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296, quoted in ACCO Brands, 501 F.3d at 
1313, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271. 
 1548. ACCO Brands, 501 F.3d at 1313, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271. 
 1549. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271. 
 1550. 363 F.3d 1263, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1551. ACCO Brands, 501 F.3d at 1313–14, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271  (quoting 
Dynacore, 363 F.3d at 1275, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378) (alteration in original). 
 1552. 486 F.3d 1286, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1553. Id. at 1289, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743. 
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manufactured, and marketed pet products.1554  While prosecuting a 
patent application for a portable water dispensing device for pets 
(called “Handi-Drink”), the owner learned of another patent (the 
“‘592 patent”) on a similar device.1555  After negotiations for a license 
proved unsuccessful, the patentee, Wechsler, sued Macke and its 
owner for infringement.1556  Defendants subsequently redesigned the 
Handi-Drink device but kept the original Handi-Drink on the market 
for another year.1557 
The jury found that the defendants had willfully infringed the ‘592 
patent but the owner was not personally liable for inducement.1558  
The district court found these verdicts “inconsistent and unreason-
able” because the company could not act independently of its 
owner.1559  In an attempt to reconcile these two verdicts, the district 
court essentially discarded the verdict finding the owner not person-
ally liable.1560  The owner appealed and the Federal Circuit re-
versed.1561 
The Federal Circuit explained that “[u]nless the corporate struc-
ture is a sham, . . . personal liability for inducement must be sup-
ported by evidence of personal culpability.”1562  This requires a show-
ing that the officer possessed “a specific intent to ‘aid and abet’ the 
infringement.”1563  Willful infringement, however, considers “whether 
the infringer had a good faith belief that the patent was invalid 
and/or not infringed.”1564  The two standards are different, the court 
stated.1565  For example, if a corporate officer negligently believed a 
patent was invalid or not infringed, the corporation may be liable for 
willful infringement but not the officer.1566  The Federal Circuit con-
                                                          
 1554. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743. 
 1555. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743–44. 
 1556. Id. at 1289–90, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744. 
 1557. Id. at 1290, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744. 
 1558. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744. 
 1559. Id. at 1292, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 1560. Id. at 1291, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745. 
 1561. Id. at 1289, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743. 
 1562. Id. at 1292, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745  (citing Hoover Group, Inc. v. Cus-
tom Metalcraft, Inc., 84 F.3d 1408, 1412, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1860, 1862 (Fed. Cir. 
1996)). 
 1563. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745 (citing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 
850 F.2d 660, 668, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 1564. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745 (citing SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. 
Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422, 1423–24 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)). 
 1565. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745. 
 1566. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745 (citing Biotec Biologische Naturverpackun-
gen GmbH & Co. KG v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1356, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1737, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
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cluded that the district court had erred in finding the two verdicts in-
consistent and reinstated the jury’s original verdicts.1567 
3. Contributory infringement 
Section 271(c) of the Patent Act provides, in pertinent part, that a 
contributory infringer is one who “offers to sell or sells within the 
United States . . . a patented machine, manufacture, combination or 
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a pat-
ented process.”1568  Although that language describes various ways of 
creating liability for contributory infringement, all of those descrip-
tions refer to the sale of a product, not the sale or provision of a ser-
vice.1569  Under the plain language of the statute, a service provider 
that assists another in committing patent infringement may be sub-
ject to liability under § 271(b), for active inducement of infringe-
ment, but not under § 271(c), for contributory infringement.1570 
The legislative background of § 271(c) makes it clear that this in-
terpretation is correct.  Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, there was no 
statute that defined contributory infringement.  Instead, courts had 
divided infringement into two categories:  “‘direct infringement,’ 
which was the unauthorized making, using or selling of the patented 
invention and ‘contributory infringement,’ which was any other activ-
ity where, although not technically making, using or selling, the de-
fendant displayed sufficient culpability to be held liable as an in-
fringer.”1571  The 1952 Act did not make a substantive change in the 
law of contributory infringement, but it divided the judicially created 
category of contributory infringement into two statutory subsections:  
§ 271(b) (inducement of infringement) and § 271(c) (contributory 
infringement).  Section 271(c) in particular codified the most com-
mon type of pre-1952 contributory infringement cases, namely, those 
in which a seller would sell a component that was not covered by the 
                                                          
 1567. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745. 
 1568. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).  
 1569. In two recent decisions, the Federal Circuit restated that claims not tied to a 
tangible medium are not patentable under 35 U.S.C.  See generally In re Comiskey, 499 
F.3d 1365, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (human-implemented arbitra-
tion process for legal documents); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1495 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (electrical and electromagnetic signals containing digital wa-
termarks). 
 1570. Compare § 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be 
liable as an infringer.”) (emphasis added), with § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or 
sells . . . shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”). 
 1571. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
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claims of a patent but which did not have any other use except the 
claimed product or process.1572 
In PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc.,1573 Pharmastem ar-
gued that defendants had contributorily infringed the patented 
method because they did not themselves practice all of the claimed 
steps.1574  The jury returned verdicts in favor of the patentee.1575  The 
district court, however, entered JMOL reversing the jury’s verdict 
with respect to contributory infringement because the defendants 
could not be found liable under § 271(c) merely for providing a ser-
vice to their customers.1576 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s JMOL and rejected 
PharmaStem’s argument that the defendants could still be held liable 
under § 271(c) for selling a service.1577  Not only are sales of services 
excluded under § 271(c), but the Federal Circuit concluded that 
there was no evidence that any of the defendants actually sold any 
products or services.1578  To the contrary, the evidence showed that 
the defendants provided a service to donor families, for which the 
families paid a fee, but “there was no sale of any sort by the defen-
dants to transplanters or any fee paid by the transplanters to the de-
fendants.”1579  “The defendants simply transferred the cord blood 
units to designated transplanters upon direction from the fami-
lies.”1580  Thus, the Federal Circuit determined, “such a transaction 
did not constitute a ‘sale’ to a transplanter under any definition of 
the term ‘sale.’”1581  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit upheld that por-
tion of the district court’s JMOL finding no contributory infringe-
ment of the patent.1582 
4. Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 
The doctrine of equivalents was judicially created to “prevent[] the 
pirating of the patentee’s invention in the absence of literal in-
fringement when liability is nevertheless warranted.”1583  If a device 
                                                          
 1572. Id. at 1469, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529. 
 1573. 491 F.3d 1342, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1574. Id. at 1346, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291. 
 1575. Id. at 1347, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291. 
 1576. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291. 
 1577. Id. at 1347, 1355, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291, 1297. 
 1578. Id. at 1355, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297. 
 1579. Id. at 1359, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301. 
 1580. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301. 
 1581. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301. 
 1582. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301. 
 1583. Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 876, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, 
Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1564, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1039, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
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does not literally infringe a patent, it may still be found to infringe 
under the doctrine of equivalents.1584  Under this doctrine, a product 
that is not literally covered by the express terms of a patent claim may 
nevertheless infringe if there is “equivalence” (i.e., an insubstantial 
change) between the accused product and each and every element of 
the claimed invention.1585 
Equivalency is determined by whether each limitation of a claim is 
present literally or by equivalence in the accused product, and not by 
looking at the invention as a whole.1586  The context of the patent, the 
prior art, and the particular circumstance of the case must all be con-
sidered in determining equivalence.1587  If the accused device escapes 
literal infringement solely because of some inconsequential or insub-
stantial change from the patented device, the doctrine of equivalents 
may be applied to find the accused device infringing.1588  To be a 
“substantial equivalent,” the element substituted in the accused de-
vice for the element set forth in the claim must not be such as would 
substantially change the way in which the function of the claimed in-
vention is performed.1589 
An objective standard is used to assess the substantiality of the dif-
ferences between the claimed and accused products or processes.1590  
For example, the tripartite “function-way-result” test may be applied, 
which considers whether the accused product or process “performs 
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain 
[substantially] the same result.”1591  The “essential inquiry” of equiva-
lence may also be determined by considering whether there are “in-
substantial differences” between the claimed element and the ele-
                                                          
 1584. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21, 41 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1869 (1997). 
 1585. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 85 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328, 331 (1950) (“An important factor is whether persons reasonably 
skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not 
contained in the patent with one that was.”). 
 1586. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (“Where a 
claim to an invention is expressed as a combination of elements, as here, ‘equiva-
lents’ in the sobriquet ‘Doctrine of Equivalents’ refers to the equivalency of an ele-
ment or part of the invention with one that is substituted in the accused product or 
process.”) (citation omitted). 
 1587. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330. 
 1588. Id. at 608, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330. 
 1589. See id., 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330 (recognizing that “if two devices do the 
same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same re-
sult, they are the same”). 
 1590. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330. 
 1591. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 
280 U.S. 30, 3 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 40 (1929)). 
 980 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:821 
ment of the accused product.1592  “[A]nalysis of the role played by 
each element in the context of the specific patent claim . . . inform[s] 
the inquiry as to whether a substitute element matches the function, 
way, and result of the claimed element, or whether the substitute 
element plays a role substantially different from the claimed ele-
ment.”1593  Important factors include whether a person skilled in the 
art would recognize the interchangeability of two elements.1594  Evi-
dence of independent experimentation by the alleged infringer may 
be probative of such knowledge.1595 
The doctrine of equivalents does not permit claim limitations to be 
ignored.1596  “It is . . . well settled that each element of a claim is mate-
rial and essential, and that in order for a court to find infringement, 
the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or its substan-
tial equivalent in the accused device.”1597  For example, there can be 
no infringement if the theory of equivalence would vitiate a claim 
term.1598  This doctrine is known as the “all-elements rule.”1599  The is-
sue of equivalents must therefore be tested on an element-by-element 
basis for each and every element of the claim.1600  Thus, infringement 
by equivalents may only be found if each limitation in the claim is 
found somewhere in the accused device, either literally or by equiva-
lents.1601  Although the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to 
every limitation in the claim, a one-to-one correspondence of claim 
limitations and components is not required.1602  So, for example, in-
fringement may be found if two components of an accused device 
perform the function of a single claim limitation, or if separate claim 
limitations are combined into a single component of an accused de-
vice.1603 
                                                          
 1592. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 19, 41 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1867 (1997). 
 1593. Id. at 40, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875. 
 1594. Id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875. 
 1595. Id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875. 
 1596. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1737, 1740 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 1597. Id., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740 (alteration in original) (quoting Lemelson v. 
United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 526, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 1598. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683, 
14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (examining alleged infringement 
of a golf ball). 
 1599. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 949, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751–52. 
 1600. Id., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 1601. Athletic Alternatives v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581–82, 37 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934–35, 4 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739–40. 
 1602. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 946, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749. 
 1603. Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 398, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1767, 1770 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.1604 came before the 
Federal Circuit again in 2007.  This time, the Federal Circuit exam-
ined the question of whether an equivalent was foreseeable within the 
meaning of Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.1605 and 
thus subject to surrender under the doctrine of prosecution history 
estoppel.1606  The court concluded that “foreseeability does not re-
quire the applicant to be aware that a particular equivalent would sat-
isfy the insubstantial differences test or the function/way/result test 
with respect to the claim as amended.”1607  According to the Federal 
Circuit, Festo proffered no persuasive explanation as to why the func-
tion-way-result test applied to the claims, as amended, should be used 
to determine foreseeability.1608  The insubstantial differences test or 
function-way-result test is devised “to determine whether the alterna-
tive is sufficiently close to the claimed feature that the patentee 
should be able to capture the equivalent and bar its use by a competi-
tor.”1609  It “is not designed to determine whether prosecution history 
estoppel applies as a result of a limiting amendment.”1610 
The court warned that accepting Festo’s understanding of foresee-
ability would likely dispose of prosecution history estoppel as a con-
straint on the doctrine of equivalents in most cases.1611  The Federal 
Circuit determined that the issue is “not whether after the narrowing 
amendment the alternative was a known equivalent, but rather 
whether it was a known equivalent before the narrowing amend-
ment.”1612  If the equivalent was known at the time of the amendment 
in the pertinent prior art, “the applicant should not be able to recap-
ture it simply by establishing that a property of the equivalent—
irrelevant to the broader claim before amendment—was relevant but 
unknown with respect to the objectives of the narrower amended 
claim.”1613  Stated differently, “an equivalent that is foreseeable as an 
alternative to the broader claimed feature does not become unfore-
seeable simply because the claimed feature is narrowed.”1614  The 
court stated the following as an example: 
                                                          
 1604. 493 F.3d 1368, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1605. 535 U.S. 722, 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1713 (2002). 
 1606. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1370, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 1607. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 1608. Id. at 1380, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393. 
 1609. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393. 
 1610. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393. 
 1611. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393. 
 1612. Id. at 1381, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394 (emphasis removed). 
 1613. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394. 
 1614. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394. 
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[I]f a claim before amendment broadly claimed a metal filament 
for a light bulb but was later amended to avoid prior art and to 
specify metal A because of its longevity, the equivalent metal B, 
known in the prior art to function as a bulb filament, is not unfore-
seeable even though its longevity was unknown at the time of 
amendment.1615 
Judge Newman dissented because “[f]oreseeability is determined as 
of the time of the application,” not at the time of the amendment.1616  
Judge Newman stated that the majority had departed from prece-
dent: 
[T]his court has confounded the issue by creating a new and incor-
rect criterion for the measurement of “foreseeability,” the court 
now holding that an existing structure need not be recognized, or 
even recognizable, as an equivalent at the time of the patent appli-
cation or amendment, in order to be “foreseeable” if it is later used 
as an equivalent.1617 
Judge Newman went on to express that “[t]he unforeseen does not 
become foreseeable after someone later discovers it.  If the prior art 
does not support a finding of equivalency, the applicant cannot be 
charged with foreseeability of the equivalent.”1618 
A patentee’s evidentiary burden under the doctrine of equivalents 
must be addressed on a limitation-by-limitation basis.1619  A fundamen-
tal principal in establishing infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents requires that a patentee must “provide particularized tes-
timony and linking argument as to the ‘insubstantiality of the differ-
ences’ between the claimed invention and the accused device or 
process.”1620  Or, with respect to the function-way-result test, the pat-
entee must meet the same burden when such evidence is presented 
to support a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.1621  Since evidence must be presented on a limitation-by-
limitation basis, “[g]eneralized testimony as to the overall similarity 
between the claims and the accused infringer’s product or process 
will not suffice.”1622 
In Aquatex Industries, Inc. v. Techniche Solutions,1623  the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of no infringe-
                                                          
 1615. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394. 
 1616. Id. at 1383, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 1617. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395. 
 1618. Id. at 1385, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397. 
 1619. Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567, 
39 U.S.Q.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492, 1499 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 1620. Id., 39 U.S.Q.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499. 
 1621. Id., 39 U.S.Q.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499. 
 1622. Id., 39 U.S.Q.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499. 
 1623. 479 F.3d 1320, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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ment by equivalents due to the patentee’s failure to present evidence 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.1624  In particular, 
the court found that AquaTex, in response to Techniche’s summary 
judgment motion:  (1) “provided no particularized testimony from an 
expert or person skilled in the art that specifically addressed equiva-
lents ‘on a limitation-by-limitation basis;’” (2) did not explain the “in-
substantiality of the differences between the patented method and 
the accused product;” and (3) did not address the function-way-result 
test.1625  The only evidence presented by AquaTex on the issue of 
equivalents was the deposition testimony of Techniche’s Chief Execu-
tive Officer, which was found to be inadequate on these points.1626 
Similarly, in Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp.,1627 the Federal 
Circuit found that “the accused . . . Sidewinder joysticks” did “not lit-
erally infringe” the Motionless patent because they “lack[ed] a con-
cavity in the housing and a keyboard within the cavity.”1628  Neither 
was there sufficient evidence of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents, as Motionless had presented only conclusory statements 
about equivalents, and not particularized evidence that connected 
the accused products to the patent on a limitation-by-limitation ba-
sis.1629  The Federal Circuit found Motionless’s conclusory statements 
were inadequate to defeat a motion for summary judgment of non-
infringement, which demands that the patentee present “particular-
ized evidence and linking argument as to the ‘insubstantiality of the 
differences’ between the claimed invention and the accused device, 
or with respect to the ‘function/way/result’ test.”1630 
In contrast, the Federal Circuit found that expert testimony offered 
by Paice in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.1631 plainly satisfied the re-
quirement that “a patentee . . . provide particularized testimony and link-
ing argument . . . with respect to the function, way, result test when 
such evidence is presented to support a finding of infringement un-
der the doctrine of equivalents.”1632  In this case, the expert gave sub-
                                                          
 1624. Id. at 1323, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866. 
 1625. Id. at 1329, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
 1626. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871. 
 1627. 486 F.3d 1376, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1628. Id. at 1381, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. 
 1629. See id. at 1382–83, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805 (explaining that absent par-
ticularized evidence, a court cannot find infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents). 
 1630. Id. at 1882, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805 (citation omitted). 
 1631. 504 F.3d 1293, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1632. Id. at 1304–05, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009 (quoting Tex. Instruments Inc. 
v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492, 
1499 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
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stantial testimony, which covered over seventy pages of transcript per-
taining to the technology of the patents and the inner workings of 
the vehicles’ transaxle units at issue before he began to discuss the 
topic of infringement.1633 
“Prosecution history estoppel continues to be available as a defense 
to infringement.”1634  Under this theory, statements, claim amend-
ments, and arguments made during prosecution of a patent applica-
tion can create an estoppel that prevents the patentee from recaptur-
ing subject matter through equivalents that was surrendered during 
prosecution.1635  In addition, concessions or positions taken to dem-
onstrate patentability in view of the prior art may also create an es-
toppel.1636  Thus, estoppel can arise from arguments made by an ap-
plicant to distinguish a prior art reference regardless of whether they 
are associated with claim amendments.1637  In addition, “the limits im-
posed by prosecution history estoppel on the permissible range of 
equivalents can be broader than those imposed by the prior art.”1638  
Moreover, “[c]lear assertions made during prosecution in support of 
patentability, whether or not actually required to secure allowance of 
the claim, may also create an estoppel.”1639 
The Supreme Court has affirmed that “a narrowing amendment 
made to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act may give rise to an 
estoppel.”1640  The statutory requirements for patentability include 
novelty (§ 102), nonobviousness (§ 103), patentable subject matter 
(§§ 101, 102, 103, 112), utility (§ 101), written description (§ 112(1)), 
                                                          
 1633. Id. at 1305, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009–10. 
 1634. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40, 41 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1876 (1997). 
 1635. See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 
96 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that prosecution history estoppel is judicially created 
to provide liability when there is no actual infringement); see also Warner-Jenkinson, 
520 U.S. at 30, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (noting that any surrender of material 
precludes the patentee from using the doctrine of equivalents to recapture the sub-
ject matter); Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1580, 34 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that the court must look into 
the reason for a surrender of materials when applying prosecution history estoppel). 
 1636. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1220, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1225, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 1637. See Ekchian v. Home Depot, Inc., 104 F.3d 1299, 1304, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1364, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (determining that prosecution history estoppel was 
present from an argument that distinguished prior art presented in an information 
disclosure statement); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 952–53, 28 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936, 1939–40 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding prosecution history es-
toppel from an argument without an accompanying amendment made to distinguish 
prior art). 
 1638. Southwall, 54 F.3d at 1581, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681. 
 1639. Id. at 1583, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 1640. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VIII), 535 U.S. 
722, 736, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1711–12 (2002). 
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enablement (§ 112(1)), best mode disclosure (§ 112(1)) and defi-
niteness (§ 112(2)).1641  If the patentee is unable to explain the reason 
for amendment, the court should presume that the “patentee sur-
rendered all subject matter between the broader and the narrower 
language” and find an estoppel.1642 
Nonetheless, prosecution estoppel is not necessarily a complete 
bar, for its effect requires a close examination of the subject matter 
surrendered.1643  An amendment is considered to disclaim “the terri-
tory between the original claim and the amended claim.”1644  The Su-
preme Court has further clarified that because “language remains an 
imperfect fit for invention . . . [t]here is no reason why a narrowing 
amendment should be deemed to relinquish equivalents unforesee-
able at the time of the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation 
of what was surrendered.”1645  The Supreme Court has indicated that 
there are some cases where a particular equivalent has not been sur-
rendered by the amendment, such as when the equivalent is “unfore-
seeable at the time of the application,” or when the rationale underly-
ing the amendment bears “no more than a tangential relation to the 
equivalent in question,” or if there is another “reason suggesting that 
the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the 
insubstantial substitute in question.”1646 
In Hutchins v. Zoll Medical Corp.,1647 the Federal Circuit found that 
the patentee was estopped from reading the term “general purpose 
computer” to cover a RISC microprocessor because he had dis-
claimed that subject matter scope during prosecution in order to dis-
tinguish his invention from the prior art, which disclosed similar de-
vices with dedicated microprocessor units.1648  In particular, the 
patentee, representing himself pro se, had charged Zoll Medical 
Corporation with infringing his ‘685 patent (United States Patent No. 
5,913,685) on “CPR Computer Aiding.”1649  All of the ‘685 claims re-
quired a “general purpose computer system,” which the parties 
agreed should be defined as “a computer capable of running multi-
ple unrelated programs, which are selected by the user and loaded 
                                                          
 1641. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 566–67, 
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870–71 (Fed. Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S. 
722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002). 
 1642. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 1643. Id. at 741, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 1644. Id. at 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 1645. Id. at 738, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 1646. Id. at 740–41, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 1647. 492 F.3d 1377, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1648. Id. at 1381–82, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266–67. 
 1649. Id. at 1380, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266. 
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into the device.”1650  Zoll’s accused device contained a dedicated Hi-
tachi SuperH RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computer) microproc-
essor.1651  The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court in finding 
the term “general purpose computer” was added to Hutchins’ claims 
during prosecution in order to differentiate the invention from prior 
art that displayed similar devices with dedicated microprocessor 
units.1652  According to the court, “[t]his produced an estoppel against 
reading the term ‘general purpose computer’ to include a dedicated 
microprocessor such as a RISC, for the claims had been amended in 
response to the PTO rejection, thereby estopping recovery of the 
same subject matter that the claims had been amended to ex-
clude.”1653  The court also noted that the term “general purpose com-
puter” was incorporated into every dependent claim because it was 
recited in each independent claim.1654 
In Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc.,1655 the Federal Circuit found 
that although statements in the specification did not conclusively 
limit the claims for forming “ideal dental archforms” to automatic 
methods for determining final tooth positions, certain statements 
made by the inventors during prosecution made that limitation 
clear.1656  Statements made during prosecution of a “parent” applica-
tion can be binding on the “child” application.1657  In addition, the 
Federal Circuit held that before a disclaimer can narrow claim scope, 
there must be some relationship between the disclaimer and the af-
fected claim.1658  Thus, the Federal Circuit proceeded to affirm the 
summary judgment of non-infringement.1659 
District Judge Kathleen O’Malley, sitting by designation, chastised 
the majority because “[p]rosecution disclaimer requires a patentee to 
clearly and unmistakably disavow certain interpretations, and I find no 
such disavowal here.”1660  She continued: 
Importantly, while the quotations lifted from the . . . patent history 
do appear to support the majority’s conclusion that the process 
contemplated in that potential invention was a highly automated 
                                                          
 1650. Id. at 1381, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267. 
 1651. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267. 
 1652. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267. 
 1653. Id. at 1381–1382, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267. 
 1654. Id. at 1382, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267. 
 1655. 498 F.3d 1307, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1656. Id. at 1314–15, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151–52. 
 1657. Id. at 1315, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151. 
 1658. Id. at 1313, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150. 
 1659. Id. at 1317, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154. 
 1660. Id. at 1325, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159 (O’ Malley, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (citing SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 
1287, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
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one, that language was proffered to the examiner in connection 
with claims in that patent which do not share claim language with 
the majority of the claims at issue in this suit.1661 
Judge O’Malley thus dissented, finding that the patent claims did 
require a fully automated process.1662 
In Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Laboratories, Inc.,1663 the district 
court determined that an estoppel was created when the applicants 
amended their claims by replacing a “metal containing solubilizer” 
and “an alkali or alkaline earth-metal salt” in the original claims with 
“an alkali or alkaline earth metal carbonate” in order to overcome an 
obviousness rejection.1664  Schwarz argued on appeal that a person 
skilled in the art would construe “metal containing stabilizer” and 
“alkali or alkaline earth metal salt” in the original claims to include 
only alkali or alkaline earth metal cations and carbonate, borate, or 
silicate anions, and not MgO.1665  Since MgO had never fallen within 
the scope of the claims, there had been no disclaimer of composi-
tions and processes involving MgO, according to Schwarz.1666  The 
Federal Circuit disagreed. 
The Federal Circuit determined that the alleged equivalent was 
“clearly . . . within the territory between the language of the original 
and the amended claims,” which gave rise to the presumption of sur-
render.1667  Schwarz, however, had failed to rebut the presumption 
that MgO was surrendered during prosecution as a foreseeable 
equivalent of an alkali or alkaline earth metal carbonate because it 
was known in the art to use the alleged equivalent as a stabilizer.1668  
The Federal Circuit explained that “‘an alternative is foreseeable if it 
is known in the field of the invention as reflected in the claim scope 
before amendment’ and that it would be inappropriate to apply an 
insubstantial differences or function/way/result test in order to de-
termine foreseeability.”1669  Since prosecution history estoppel barred 
Schwarz from claiming the MgO as an equivalent, the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 1661. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159–60. 
 1662. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159–60. 
 1663. 504 F.3d 1371, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1900 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1664. Id. at 1373, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1902. 
 1665. Id. at 1375, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
 1666. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
 1667. Id. at 1376–77, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905. 
 1668. Id. at 1377, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905. 
 1669. Id. at 1377, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368, 1379, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1392 
(Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
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affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of non-
infringement.1670 
Cross Medical Products, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.1671 simi-
larly involved Festo’s presumption that a patentee is estopped from re-
capturing subject matter surrendered during prosecution to obtain a 
patent.1672  Accused infringer Medtronic had replaced the threading 
below the diameter of a rod with an undercut that did not engage any 
surface on the corresponding set screw.1673  The district court rejected 
Medtronic’s argument that that limitation had been the subject of a 
narrowing amendment by Cross Medical during prosecution of its 
patent, and found instead that Cross Medical had successfully rebut-
ted the Festo presumption by showing that the amendment bore no 
more than a tangential relationship to the equivalent structure.1674  
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that Cross Medical did not sat-
isfy its burden of overcoming the Festo presumption by showing either 
that the amendment was only tangentially related to the limitation or 
that it was unforeseeable.1675  In particular, a patentee can rebut the 
presumption of prosecution history estoppel only 
by showing that the alleged equivalent was unforeseeable at the 
time the amendment was made, that the alleged equivalent was 
tangential to the purpose of the amendment, or that there was 
some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasona-
bly be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in 
question.1676 
Judge Rader, in a concurrence, explained that the tangential rela-
tion criterion for overcoming the Festo presumption is very narrow: 
In my view, the tangential rebuttal principle exacerbates the policy 
deficiencies of the doctrine of equivalents.  Upon invoking tangen-
tiality, the patentee has already admitted that the equivalent falls 
within the scope of surrendered subject matter.  Further, if the case 
permitted, any patentee would invoke the primary “foreseeability” 
rebuttal factor.  Thus, an invocation of “tangentiality” often admits 
that the equivalent was both within the scope of the surrender and 
foreseeable at the time of prosecution.  In other words, the patent 
drafter could have claimed the surrendered and foreseeable tech-
nology, but declined to do so.1677 
                                                          
 1670. Id. at 1378, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906. 
 1671. 480 F.3d 1335, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 1672. Id. at 1341, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
 1673. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069. 
 1674. Id. at 1341–42, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
 1675. Id. at 1344, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 1676. Id. at 1341, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (quoting Chimie v. PPG Indus. Inc., 
402 F.3d 1371, 1382, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 1677. Id. at 1347, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074 (Rader, J., concurring). 
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Judge Rader further asserted that “[t]his ‘tangential’ rebuttal prin-
ciple becomes even more difficult in practice.  What neutral standard 
makes some surrendered and unclaimed technologies infringing 
equivalents while others enjoy no protection?  This tangential con-
cept has no analogue in patent law.  How tangential does it have to 
be?”1678 
Prosecution history estoppel can also arise in the context of con-
tinuation applications, as shown in Hakim v. Cannon Avent Group, 
PLC.1679  Hakim had re-filed his patent application with broader 
claims in order to avoid any unnecessary restrictions that may have 
crept in during prosecution of the original application.1680  The Fed-
eral Circuit “recognized that an applicant can broaden as well as re-
strict his claims during the procedures of patent examination, and 
that continuing applications may present broader claims than were 
allowed in the parent.”1681  The court noted, however, that an appli-
cant cannot ordinarily recapture claim scope that he has surrendered 
or disclaimed.1682  Although an applicant may attempt to rescind a 
disclaimer made during prosecution in order to recapture disclaimed 
subject matter, “the prosecution history must be sufficiently clear to 
inform the examiner that the previous disclaimer, and the prior art 
that it was made to avoid, may need to be re-visited.”1683  In this case, 
Hakim’s attempted rescission was not sufficiently clear as to preclude 
the examiner from allowing the continuation claims without further 
prosecution based on limiting arguments made during prosecution 
of the parent application.1684  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement.1685 
It is well-established that “when a specification excludes certain 
prior art alternatives from the literal scope of the claims and criticizes 
those prior art alternatives, the patentee cannot then use the doc-
trine of equivalents to capture those alternatives.”1686  The Federal 
Circuit has also established that the doctrine of equivalents is un-
available to recapture subject matter that was “specifically identified, 
                                                          
 1678. Id. at 1348, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 1679. 479 F.3d. 1313, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1900 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1680. Id. at 1317, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903. 
 1681. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903 (citing Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson 
Med., Educ. & Research Found., 422 F.3d 1378, 1385, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1354, 
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 1682. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
 1683. Id. at 1318, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
 1684. Id. at 1317, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
 1685. Id. at 1318, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
 1686. L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Prods., Inc., 499 F.3d 1303, 1309, 84 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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criticized, and disclaimed;” thus, a “patentee cannot . . . invoke the 
doctrine of equivalents ‘to embrace a structure that was specifically 
excluded from the claims.’”1687 
In L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Products, Inc.,1688 the Federal 
Circuit found that the patentee could not invoke the doctrine of 
equivalents to capture certain alternatives to the claimed attachment 
means, when the specification specifically criticized those alternatives 
in the prior art.1689  In particular, the specification stated: 
Unlike some prior art gutter guards which have a relatively fine-
mesh metal layer overlying a perforated polymer guard panel, the 
gutter guard of the present invention includes a coated mesh layer 
and perforated guard panel formed of like polymer materials, such 
as PVC. This novel construction facilitates an effective and secure 
attachment of the composite by ultrasonic or heat welding along 
the entire length of the gutter guard. The attachment means used 
in other prior art gutter guards incorporating multiple layers is 
generally less effective, and more costly, time consuming, and labor 
intensive.1690 
L.B. Plastics contended “that the prior art referenced in the speci-
fication did not specifically disclose a continuous attachment using 
adhesives.”1691  The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that adhesives 
were among the prior art attachment means criticized in the specifi-
cation as “generally less effective, and more costly, time consuming, 
and labor intensive.”1692  Furthermore, the patentee had limited its 
claims to continuous welded attachments.1693  As a result, the court 
found that persons skilled in the art who read the specification would 
“conclude that the inventor thought that adhesive attachments gen-
erally were undesirable.”1694  Under these circumstances L.B. Plastics 
could not use the doctrine of equivalents to include adhesive attach-
ments in the scope of the claims.1695 
                                                          
 1687. SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 
1345, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Dolly, Inc. v. Spal-
ding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 400, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1771 (Fed. Cir. 
1994)). 
 1688. L.B. Plastics, 499 F.3d 1303, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1341. 
 1689. Id. at 1309, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345 (citing Schwing GmbH v. Putzmeis-
ter Aktiengesellschaft, 305 F.3d 1318, 1329, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1649 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002); SciMed Life Sys., 242 F.3d at 1345, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066; Dawn 
Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1015, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1113 
(Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 1690. Id. at 1309 n.3, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345 n.3. 
 1691. Id. at 1310, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 1692. Id. at 1309, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 1693. Id. at 1310, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 1694. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 1695. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
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Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has held that: 
A holding that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be applied to an 
accused device because it “vitiates” a claim limitation is nothing 
more than a conclusion that the evidence is such that no reason-
able jury could conclude that an element of an accused device is 
equivalent to an element called for in the claim, or that the theory 
of equivalence to support the conclusion of infringement otherwise 
lacks legal sufficiency.1696  
The Federal Circuit rejected the accused infringer’s theory of claim 
vitiation in Abbott Laboratories v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1697  The 
patent claims in question recited a “pharmaceutically acceptable 
polymer,” but the accused products used a glyceryl monostearate 
(“GMS”) material.1698  Andrx asserted that GMS, a hydrophobic, water 
insoluble non-polymer was the opposite of the hydrophilic, water 
soluble polymer required by the claims.1699  Andrx thus argued that 
equivalency would vitiate the claim limitation in its entirety, regard-
less of any insubstantial differences between the claimed and accused 
devices.1700 
The Federal Circuit disagreed.  The Federal Circuit found that the 
district court had erred in limiting the claimed “pharmaceutically ac-
ceptable polymer” to hydrophilic, water-soluble substances.1701  None-
theless, the court concluded that despite the district court’s errone-
ous claim construction and equivalence analysis, its finding of 
equivalence would apply even under a claim construction that was 
not erroneously narrowed.1702  The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the 
district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction against the accused 
infringer, albeit on different grounds.1703 
In contrast to the above case, the Federal Circuit accepted the ac-
cused infringer’s theory of claim vitiation in Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceuti-
cal, Inc. v. Caraco Pharmaceutical, Ltd.1704  The case turned primarily on 
the proper construction of the term “about 1:5” in Ortho’s claim to 
“a pharmaceutical composition comprising certain weight ratios of 
the two known [analgesics], tramadol and acetaminophen.”1705  The 
                                                          
 1696. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1018–
19, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1874 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1697. 473 F.3d 1196, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1698. Id. at 1207–08, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297. 
 1699. Id. at 1211, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1300–01. 
 1700. Id. at 1211–12, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1300–01. 
 1701. Id. at 1212–13, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301. 
 1702. Id. at 1213, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301–02. 
 1703. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302. 
 1704. 476 F.3d 1321, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1705. Id. at 1323–24, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428–29. 
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Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s interpretation of the term 
“‘about 1:5’ to mean approximately 1:5, encompassing a range of ra-
tios no greater than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1”1706  In accordance with this con-
struction, the Federal Circuit agreed that there was no infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents, for to expand the weight ratio of 
“about 1.5” to encompass a composition having an average weight ra-
tio of 1:8.76 “would eviscerate the limitation.”1707 
Claim precision and vitiation were also issues in U.S. Philips Corp. v. 
Iwasaki Electric Co.1708  In particular, the district court held that the 
numerical ranges in the claim were expressed with “the type of preci-
sion that is closely analogous to the metes and bounds of a deed of 
real property.”1709  Accordingly, the district court concluded that a de-
termination of infringement would vitiate the claim limitation and 
foreclose an application of the doctrine of equivalents as a matter of 
law.1710 
The Federal Circuit disagreed, “conclud[ing] that resort to the 
doctrine of equivalents [was] not foreclosed with respect to the 
claimed concentration range.”1711  In this respect, the court found this 
case indistinguishable from Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemi-
cal Co.1712 or Abbott Laboratories v. Dey, L.P.,1713 wherein the Federal Cir-
cuit permitted consideration of proposed equivalents to a claimed 
numerical range because “the fact that a claim recites numeric ranges 
does not, by itself, preclude . . . [reliance] on the doctrine of equiva-
lents.”1714  The court continued: 
Here, as in Abbott Labs and Warner-Jenkinson, a numeric range is 
claimed.  The language “between x and y” of the present case has 
the same meaning as the phrase “x-y” of Abbott Labs.  Likewise, the 
phrase is also essentially the same as that used in Warner-Jenkinson, 
with the exception of the absence of the qualifier “approximately.”  
However, terms like “approximately” serve only to expand the 
scope of literal infringement, not to enable application of the doc-
trine of equivalents.  Notably, the Supreme Court in Warner-
                                                          
 1706. Id. at 1328, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. 
 1707. Id. at 1329, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433. 
 1708. 505 F.3d 1371, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1709. Id. at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
 1710. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
 1711. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
 1712. 520 U.S. 17, 32–33, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1872 (1997) (allowing the 
court to consider the doctrine of equivalents with respect to a claim to a pH range 
from approximately 6.0 to 9.0). 
 1713. 287 F.3d 1097, 1107–08, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(allowing consideration of a claim with a range of phospholipids content of 68.6% to 
90.7%). 
 1714. U.S. Phillips, 505 F.3d at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Abbott Labs., 287 F.3d at 1107–08, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552). 
 2008] 2007 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 993 
 
Jenkinson did not even mention the qualifier in allowing considera-
tion of the doctrine of equivalents.1715 
The Federal Circuit further rejected Iwasaki’s argument that the 
doctrine of equivalents was unavailable to the patentee because Phil-
ips had included the upper concentration limit to avoid a prior art 
patent.1716  The court found instead that Philips had not “surren-
dered” anything with respect to the claims at issue because there had 
been no narrowing amendment to the claim at issue and thus no 
prosecution history estoppel.1717  The only relevant inquiry, according 
to the court, was “whether ‘a hypothetical claim that literally recites 
the range of equivalents asserted to infringe . . . could have been al-
lowed by the PTO over the prior art.’”1718  The Federal Circuit con-
cluded that such a claim could have issued because the allegedly 
equivalent halogen concentrations were below the ranges disclosed in 
the prior art; none of the prior art lamps in question met all of the 
limitations of the claims; and Iwasaki had not established that the 
prior art reference, alone or in combination with others, would have 
obviated the claimed lamps.1719  The court thus vacated the district 
court’s summary judgment of non-infringement under the doctrine 
of equivalents.1720 
5. Section 271(e)(1)—Research exemption to infringement 
In Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA,1721 the Federal Circuit 
explored the scope of the safe harbor created by 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1), which exempts from infringement all uses of patented 
compounds “reasonably related to the development and submission 
of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, 
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.”1722  The Fed-
eral Circuit had originally found that the statute’s safe harbor did not 
apply to the accused infringer’s research activities,1723 but that deci-
sion was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court.1724  In particu-
                                                          
 1715. Id. at 1379, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. 
 1716. Id. at 1379–80, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103–04. 
 1717. Id. at 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104. 
 1718. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104 (alteration in original) (quoting Abbott 
Labs., 287 F.3d at 1105, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551). 
 1719. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104. 
 1720. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104. 
 1721. 496 F.3d 1334, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1722. Id. at 1337, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (quoting 35 U.S.C. 274(e)(1) 
(2000)). 
 1723. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 201, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1801, 1805 (2005). 
 1724. Id. at 208, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808. 
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lar, the Supreme Court held that § 271(e)(1) “exempted from in-
fringement all uses of patented compounds ‘reasonably related’ to 
the process of developing information for submission” to the FDA.1725  
“Reasonably related” may include “research . . . conducted after the 
biological mechanism and physiological effect of a candidate drug 
have been recognized, such that if the research is successful it would 
appropriately be included in a submission to the FDA.”1726  The FDA 
Exemption may also apply to experimentation on drug candidates or 
the use of patented compounds even if they are not ultimately sub-
mitted to the FDA, for “§ 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor leaves adequate 
space for experimentation and failure on the road to regulatory ap-
proval.”1727  The FDA Exemption does not apply, however, “to basic 
scientific research unrelated to the development of a particular 
drug.”1728 
On remand, the Federal Circuit found that all of the challenged 
experiments were performed after the discovery that a cyclic RGD 
peptide inhibited angiogenesis, and that “[a]ll of the experiments 
charged with infringement were conducted for the purposes of de-
termining the optimum candidate angiogenesis inhibitor and pro-
ceeding with commercial development of the selected candidate in 
compliance with regulatory procedures, initially using three structur-
ally related RGD peptides.”1729  The court added “[t]hat the experi-
ments contributed to scientific knowledge does not deprive them of 
the safe-harbor benefit of § 271(e)(1) when the requirements there-
for are met.”1730 
The court further rejected Integra’s argument that Scripps’s ex-
periments were “not within the FDA Exemption because the other 
peptides were not the subject of an IND application.”1731  The FDA 
Exemption, the Supreme Court has held, applies to research on a 
“compound for which there was a reasonable basis for believing that 
it may have the desired biological property, research that ‘if success-
ful would be appropriate for FDA submission.’”1732  The court also re-
jected Integra’s argument that Scripps’s experiments should be classi-
fied as “discovery” or “routine,” and thus outside the FDA 
                                                          
 1725. Id. at 206, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 1726. Merck KGaA, 496 F.3d at 1339, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677. 
 1727. Id. at 1340, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 207, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807). 
 1728. Id. at 1339, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677. 
 1729. Id. at 1340, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678. 
 1730. Id. at 1347, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1731. Id. at 1340, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678. 
 1732. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678 (quoting Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 207, 74 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807). 
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Exemption.1733  The safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) “does not depend on a 
distinction between ‘discovery’ and ‘routine,’ but on whether the 
threshold biological property and physiological effect had already 
been recognized as to the candidate drug.”1734  The court recognized 
that experiments are conducted in order to gain information, no 
matter the phase of the research.1735 
The Federal Circuit did not address “research tools” because “the 
parties emphatically confirmed that research tools were not at is-
sue.”1736  Although he found the majority’s interpretation of 
§ 271(e)(1) “overly expansive,” Judge Rader stated in his dissent-in-
part and concurrence-in-part that he would have addressed research 
tool patents.1737  In his view, 
the exemption covers activities that develop information that will 
ultimately be submitted to the FDA, not patented processes and 
tools beyond the scope of the “patented compounds” that the Su-
preme Court placed within the statutory exemption.  In this case, 
two of the patents are research tools that deserve protection.  This 
court should remand with instructions that the district court exam-
ine and protect these research tool patents.1738 
6. Design patents 
There are two distinct requirements for establishing design patent 
infringement.1739  The first, called the ordinary observer test, requires 
that “in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a 
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the 
resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to 
purchase one supposing it to be the other.”1740  The second, called the 
point of novelty test, requires that “no matter how similar two items 
look, ‘the accused device must appropriate the novelty in the pat-
ented device which distinguishes it from the prior art.’”1741  “Both the 
                                                          
 1733. Id. at 1347, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1734. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1735. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1683 (citing Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 202, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1805). 
 1736. Id. at 1348, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1737. Id. at 1348–49, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684–85 (Rader, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 1738. Id. at 1348, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1739. See Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1383, 72 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1901, 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that a claim alleging design 
patent infringement is only successful if both the ordinary observer and point of 
novelty tests are satisfied). 
 1740. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871). 
 1741. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
97, 109 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Talge, 140 F.2d 395, 396, 
60 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 434, 434 (8th Cir. 1944)). 
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ordinary observer and point of novelty tests are factual inquiries that 
are undertaken by the fact finder during the infringement stage of 
proceedings, after the claim has been construed by the court.”1742 
Because the point of novelty determination is part of the infringe-
ment analysis, the initial burden is on the patentee to “present, in 
some form, its contentions as to points of novelty.”1743  The point of 
novelty can be either a single novel design element or a combination 
of elements that are individually known in the prior art.1744  The pat-
entee is not free to set forth any combination of elements as the point 
of novelty; rather, the point of novelty must include features of the 
claimed design that distinguish it from the prior art.1745 
In Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,1746 Egyptian Goddess asserted 
its design patent on an “ornamental nail buffer.”1747  The district court 
granted Swisa’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement 
on the ground that the Swisa nail buffers did not contain the point of 
novelty of the patented design, i.e., the “fourth side without a pad” 
required by the claims.1748  Egyptian Goddess appealed the judgment 
but not the underlying claim construction.1749 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to limit 
the claimed design to a “hollow tubular frame of generally square 
cross section . . . with rectangular abrasive pads . . . affixed to three 
sides of the frame . . . with the fourth side of the frame bare.”1750  Be-
cause the parties agreed that the “Swisa buffers do not contain a 
fourth side without a raised pad,” the Federal Circuit found that the 
summary judgment of non-infringement had been properly 
granted.1751  The court concluded that “no reasonable juror could 
conclude that [the patentee’s] asserted point of novelty constituted a 
non-trivial advance over the prior art”1752 because the difference be-
                                                          
 1742. Bernhardt, 386 F.3d at 1383, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 1743. Id. at 1384, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 1744. See Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int’l, LLC, 449 F.3d 1190, 1192, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (supplemental opinion on petition 
for rehearing) (clarifying the definition of a point of novelty to include a combina-
tion of design elements in appropriate situations). 
 1745. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d 
1113, 1118, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1770 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The accused design 
must also contain substantially the same points of novelty that distinguished the pat-
ented design from the prior art.”); Litton, 728 F.2d at 1444, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 
110 (declaring that infringement occurs when the point of novelty is not distinguish-
able from the prior art). 
 1746. 498 F.3d 1354, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1747. Id. at 1355, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047. 
 1748. Id. at 1356, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048. 
 1749. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048. 
 1750. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047. 
 1751. Id. at 1358–59, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049. 
 1752. Id. at 1358, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049. 
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tween the Swisa buffer and the claimed design was not minor in view 
of the prior art.1753 
Judge Dyk dissented.  In his view, the “non-trivial advance” stan-
dard created a new rule that “eviscerates the statutory presumption of 
validity” because it “conflat[es] the criteria for infringement and ob-
viousness,” and thus improperly requires the patentee to affirmatively 
prove non-obviousness.1754  Judge Dyk also believed that the “non-
trivial advance” test was too narrow to be applied to all designs, im-
properly extended a “obviousness-like test” to each point of novelty, 
and was “devoid of support in the case law” and “contrary” to several 
precedential cases.1755 
On November 27, 2007, the Federal Circuit vacated the majority 
opinion and granted Egyptian Goddess’s petition to rehear the case 
en banc.1756 
In Arminak & Associates, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc.,1757 Calmar 
argued that the district court had construed the claims of its design 
patent too narrowly by adding excessive detail on the ornamental fea-
tures rather than simply describing what is shown in their drawings.1758  
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the court’s “meticulous 
and accurate description . . . did not constitute error.”1759  The Fed-
eral Circuit explained, “[o]ur case law does not prohibit detailed 
claim construction of design patent drawings.  It merely disapproves 
claim construction that goes beyond the novel, nonfunctional orna-
mental features visually represented by the claimed drawings, or that 
fails to encompass the claimed ornamental features of the design as a 
whole.”1760 
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding that 
an “ordinary observer” was a “contract or industrial buyer for compa-
nies that purchase the stand-alone trigger sprayer devices, not the re-
tail purchasers of the finished product,” as Calmar had argued.1761  
This marked the first time that the court had “squarely addressed” 
this “unanswered question remaining after Gorham.”1762  Ordinary ob-
                                                          
 1753. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049. 
 1754. Id. at 1359, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 1755. Id. at 1359–60, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050–51. 
 1756. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., No. 2006–1562, 2007 WL 4179111 (Fed. 
Cir. Nov. 26, 2007). 
 1757. 501 F.3d 1314, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1758. Id. at 1319, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. 
 1759. Id. at 1321, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1760. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262 (citation omitted). 
 1761. Id. at 1324, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264. 
 1762. Id. at 1322, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263 (discussing Gorham Co. v. White, 
81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871)). 
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servers, the court noted, are typically “those who buy and use . . . the 
actual product that is presented for purchase,” even if it is but a com-
ponent of an assembled product.1763  In this case, the record showed 
that Calmar had never sold any of its patented shrouds directly to re-
tail customers but to contract buyers or industrial purchasers who as-
sembled the final product.1764  The court then stated the following: 
To hold that such a purchaser is the appropriate hypothetical or-
dinary observer fits squarely with our precedent that the ordinary 
observer is a person who is either a purchaser of, or sufficiently in-
terested in, the item that displays the patented designs and who has 
the capability of making a reasonably discerning decision when ob-
serving the accused item’s design whether the accused item is sub-
stantially the same as the item claimed in the design patent.1765 
Since the evidence showed that a contract or industrial purchaser 
would not be deceived into thinking that Arminak’s accused shroud 
was one of the patented designs, there was no infringement.1766 
The Federal Circuit also determined no infringement under the 
“point of novelty” test because the Arminak products did not appro-
priate the “prominent horizontal line” or “bulge outwardly in a bul-
bous fashion” features of the Calmar patents.1767  In so holding, the 
court found that the district court had not improperly merged the 
point of novelty test and the ordinary observer test, and had properly 
compared the accused design to “the design feature, as it appears in 
the Figures of the patent as issued,” and not to the patentee’s own 
description of its patents.1768 
V. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
The Federal Circuit recently stated in Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, 
Ltd.1769 that “[t]o hold a patent unenforceable due to inequitable 
conduct, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the appli-
cant (1) made an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact, 
failed to disclose material information, or submitted false material in-
formation, and (2) intended to deceive the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office (“PTO”).”1770 
The court further added that the materiality element of inequita-
ble conduct may be satisfied by “the standard for materiality set forth 
                                                          
 1763. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263 (quoting Gorham, 81 U.S. at 527). 
 1764. Id. at 1321, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1765. Id. at 1323, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264. 
 1766. Id. at 1324, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264. 
 1767. Id. at 1325, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265. 
 1768. Id. at 1327, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267. 
 1769. 476 F.3d 1359, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1770. Id. at 1363, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
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in the current version of PTO Rule 56 . . . [or] the earlier ‘reasonable 
examiner’ standard.”1771  “The intent element of inequitable conduct 
requires that ‘the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evi-
dence, including evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate suf-
ficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive.’”1772  Intent 
to deceive in certain instances is “inferred from the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the conduct at issue.”1773 
The court continued, stating that “[i]f a district court finds that the 
requirements of materiality and intent have been established by clear 
and convincing evidence, it must then ‘balance the equities to de-
termine whether the patentee has committed inequitable conduct 
that warrants holding the patent unenforceable.’”1774  Accordingly, 
“[u]nder the balancing test, ‘[t]he more material the omission or the 
misrepresentation, the lower the level of intent required to establish 
inequitable conduct, and vice versa.’”1775 
The Federal Circuit reviews “the district court’s findings on the 
threshold issues of materiality and intent for clear error.”1776  By con-
trast, “the ultimate decision regarding inequitable conduct [is re-
                                                          
 1771. Id. at 1364, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.  The pertinent part of the current 
version of Rule 56 states as follows: 
[I]nformation is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to infor-
mation already of record or being made of record in the application, and 
(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a 
prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or 
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: 
(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the       
Office, or 
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability. 
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the information 
compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance 
of evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its 
broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification, and be-
fore any consideration is given to evidence which may be submitted in an at-
tempt to establish a contrary conclusion of patentability. 
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2006).  The earlier reasonable examiner standard states that “in-
formation is material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable exam-
iner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to is-
sue as a patent.”  Cargill, 476 F.3d at 1364, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (quoting 37 
C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991)). 
 1772. Cargill, 476 F.3d at 1364, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (quoting Impax Labs., 
Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1374-75, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1007 
(Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 1773. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 1774. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (citations omitted). 
 1775. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (quoting Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson 
Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 1668 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997)). 
 1776. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
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viewed] for abuse of discretion.”1777  The court will find abuse of dis-
cretion “when (1) the court’s decision is clearly unreasonable, arbi-
trary, or fanciful, (2) the court’s decision is based on an erroneous 
construction of the law, (3) the court’s factual findings are clearly er-
roneous, or (4) the record contains no evidence upon which the 
court rationally could have based its decision.”1778 
In Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey,1779 the Federal Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s judgment of inequitable conduct.1780  The court relied on 
the “reasonable examiner” standard in determining that the appli-
cant’s failure to disclose sales more than a year prior to the filing of 
the patent application was material, because the reasonable examiner 
would have considered the sales important in determining whether to 
allow the application.1781  Combining the omission of disclosure of 
sales prior to the critical date with the applicant’s touting of post-
critical sales as evidence of commercial success to overcome an obvi-
ousness rejection provided justification for an inference of deceptive 
intent required for a finding of inequitable conduct.1782 
In Cargill Inc. v. Canbra Foods Ltd.,1783 discussed above, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that two related patents 
were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.1784  The district court 
found that two documents, which contained the applicant’s internal 
testing data but were not disclosed to the examiner during prosecu-
tion, “unquestionably would have been viewed as worthy of serious 
consideration by the PTO.”1785  The Federal Circuit determined that 
the district court’s finding effectively applied the “reasonable exam-
iner” standard for materiality because the undisclosed documents 
contained data on a “crucial issue during prosecution” and were con-
trary to assertions made by applicants to the Patent Office about a 
claimed feature (i.e., the oxidative stability) of the claimed inven-
tion.1786  The Federal Circuit found that “[a] reasonable examiner 
would certainly want to consider test data that is directly related to an 
important issue of patentability, along with the applicant’s interpreta-
tion of that data,” and thus held that the district court’s determina-
                                                          
 1777. Id. at 1365, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 1778. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709 (quoting Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis 
Pharm., Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1375, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 
2006)). 
 1779. 476 F.3d 1337, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1780. Id. at 1346, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642. 
 1781. Id. at 1345, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639. 
 1782. Id. at 1346, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639-40. 
 1783. Cargill, 476 F.3d 1359, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705. 
 1784. Id. at 1362, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706. 
 1785. Id. at 1365, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 1786. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
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tion regarding the materiality of the undisclosed documents was not 
clearly erroneous.1787 
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding of an 
intent to deceive, based on three circumstantial factors:  (1) the ap-
plicant’s repeated omission of the data, (2) the applicant’s “specific 
motive to conceal the two specific documents,” and (3) “the high de-
gree of materiality of the undisclosed test data.”1788  The Federal Cir-
cuit found that each of the examiner’s five rejections involved the is-
sue of the oxidative stability of the applicant’s claimed composition, 
and thus “[t]he repeated nature of that rejection demonstrates that 
the applicant should have been aware of the materiality of the omit-
ted test data.”1789  Relying on Critikon, Inc. v. Beacton Dickinson Vascular 
Access Inc.,1790 the Federal Circuit held that “[s]uch a high degree of 
materiality, coupled with evidence that applicant should have known 
of that materiality, creates a strong inference of an intent to de-
ceive.”1791 
With respect to the ultimate issue of inequitable conduct, the Fed-
eral Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of unenforceabil-
ity, finding it within the district court’s discretion to weigh its findings 
of materiality and intent against the reasons offered for withholding 
the highly material test data to determine that the rationale for with-
holding the test data did not overcome the weight of the evidence 
proving inequitable conduct.1792 
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s judgment of 
inequitable conduct in eSpeed, Inc. v. Brokertec USA, LLC.1793  First, the 
Federal Circuit found that the district court had not clearly erred in 
concluding that the false statements in the declarations the appli-
cants had submitted to the PTO were material.1794  Second, the Fed-
eral Circuit, relying on Rohm & Hass v. Crystal Chemical Co.,1795 af-
firmed the district court’s finding of an intent to deceive, stating 
“[t]he district court was free to draw an inference that these declara-
tions were ‘the chosen instrument of an intentional scheme to de-
                                                          
 1787. Id. at 1366, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 1788. Id. at 1366–68, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710–11. 
 1789. Id. at 1366, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 1790. 120 F.3d 1253, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 1791. Cargill, 476 F.3d at 1367, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 1792. Id. at 1368, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 1793. 480 F.3d 1129, 1139, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1183, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1794. Id. at 1137, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189. 
 1795. 722 F.2d 1556, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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ceive the PTO,’ because ‘[t]he affirmative act of submitting an affida-
vit must be construed as intended to be relied upon.’”1796 
In In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation,1797 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s conclusion that Andrx’s counterclaims were moot, 
that there was no inequitable conduct, fraud, or unclean hands in As-
tra’s prosecution of one patent, and that Astra’s two related patents 
were not unenforceable through “infectious unenforceability.”1798  In 
particular, when the district court found that the asserted claims of 
the last patent at issue were invalid as anticipated, the court properly 
declined to consider defendant Andrx’s related inequitable conduct 
and fraud defenses.1799  “The district court did consider Andrx’s ‘un-
clean hands’ argument, but found no evidence to support a finding 
of ‘unclean hands.’”1800 
In McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc.,1801 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that the ‘716 
patent at issue (U.S. Patent No. 4,857,716) was unenforceable due to 
McKesson’s failure to disclose three items of information during 
prosecution.1802  The facts in McKesson are complex and only briefly 
described here. 
First, the Federal Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s 
finding of inequitable conduct due to the non-disclosure of the so-
called Baker patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,456,793), a prior art reference 
upon which a patent examiner had relied in rejecting claims of a co-
pending patent application being prosecuted by the same prosecut-
ing attorney.1803  The Federal Circuit agreed that the Baker patent was 
material to the prosecution of the ‘716 patent because the ‘716 pat-
ent contained the same limitations that had been rejected in the co-
pending application over Baker.1804  In so holding, the Federal Circuit 
rejected McKesson’s argument that Baker was not material because 
similar subject matter had been disclosed in other references cited in 
the ‘716 patent’s application.1805  The court found instead that “the 
importance of Baker” was not limited to one particular limitation but 
“could be material quite apart from the disclosure of anything analo-
                                                          
 1796. eSpeed, 480 F.3d at 1138, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190 (citations omitted). 
 1797. 483 F.3d 1364, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1798. Id. at 1376, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 1799. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652–53. 
 1800. Id. at 1374, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651. 
 1801. 487 F.3d 897, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1802. Id. at 926, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886. 
 1803. Id. at 919, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 1804. Id. at 909, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873. 
 1805. Id. at 916, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
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gous to [that] unique identifier limitation.”1806  In addition, “the exis-
tence of differences between Baker and the ‘716 claims does not, 
standing alone, render Baker immaterial.”1807  The court concluded 
that, “[a]s the district court held, the overwhelming circumstantial 
evidence, coupled with the lack of any credible explanation for non-
disclosure of Baker, supports the finding of deceptive intent.”1808 
The Federal Circuit also affirmed that inequitable conduct arose 
from the prosecuting attorney’s failure to disclose the first examiner’s 
rejections of the co-pending application, which contained similar sub-
ject matter and limitations as the ‘716 patent at issue.1809  The district 
court had not erred, the Federal Circuit found, by considering 
whether the claims between the two applications were “in some re-
spects identical,” as opposed to “‘substantially similar,’ and substantial 
similarity ‘in content and scope.’”1810  According to the court, “materi-
ality may be proven in numerous ways,” and “to the extent there is a 
difference among ‘in some respects identical,’ ‘substantially similar,’ 
and substantial similarity ‘in content and scope,’ that difference is in-
consequential so long as the evidence clearly and convincingly proves 
materiality in one of the accepted ways.”1811  On that basis, the Federal 
Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s finding that the 
first examiner’s rejections in the first application were material to the 
second application.1812 
The Federal Circuit also rejected as “untenable” McKesson’s argu-
ment that the prosecuting attorney had acted in good faith by twice 
disclosing the co-pending application during prosecution of the ‘716 
patent.1813  According to the Federal Circuit, the MPEP in the mid-
1980s broadly defined the duty of disclosure to include material in-
formation obtained from co-pending applications, which left “no 
doubt that material rejections in co-pending applications fall squarely 
within the duty of candor.”1814  The Federal Circuit concluded that the 
district court had not clearly erred in finding that the prosecuting at-
torney intended to deceive the PTO by not disclosing the first exam-
                                                          
 1806. Id. at 914, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 1807. Id. at 915, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878. 
 1808. Id. at 919, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880. 
 1809. Id. at 901, 908, 911, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867, 1872, 1875. 
 1810. Id. at 920, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881. 
 1811. Id. at 919–20, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881. 
 1812. Id. at 926, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886. 
 1813. Id. at 922, 924–25, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883, 1885. 
 1814. Id. at 923, 925, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884–85. 
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iner’s rejections of the co-pending application during prosecution of 
the ‘716 patent.1815 
The Federal Circuit also found inequitable conduct based on the 
prosecuting attorney’s failure to disclose a notice of allowance of a 
third co-pending application, which ultimately issued as the ‘372 pat-
ent (U.S. Patent No. 4,835,372).1816  In so holding, the court rejected 
McKesson’s argument that inequitable conduct required a “substan-
tial likelihood” that the examiner would have issued a double-
patenting rejection in view of the allowance of the ‘372 patent.1817  
Rather, materiality could be found where the allowance of the ‘372 
patent “plainly [gave] rise to a conceivable double patenting rejec-
tion.”1818  “Material information,” the court explained, “is not limited 
to information that would invalidate the claims under examination” 
but includes information a reasonable examiner would have consid-
ered important, whether or not the information would have conclu-
sively decided the issue of patentability.1819  The fact that the same ex-
aminer had examined both of the applications in question, and that 
the prosecuting attorney had informed the examiner of the two ap-
plications, did not alter this result, where the prosecuting attorney 
testified that the identity of the examiner had not been a factor in his 
decisions and materiality rested on other grounds.1820  Consequently, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that there was no clear error in the dis-
trict court’s findings on materiality or deceptive intent, and hence af-
firmed the district court’s judgment that the ‘716 patent was unen-
forceable due to inequitable conduct before the PTO.1821 
Judge Newman dissented from this result, finding that the facts did 
not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence of deceptive in-
tent, as opposed to a mere mistake, particularly where the applicant 
had informed the examiner of the co-pending applications and the 
same examiner had been involved in the prosecution of two of the 
applications.1822  “This court,” she warned, “returns to the ‘plague’ of 
encouraging unwarranted charges of inequitable conduct, spawning 
the opportunistic litigation that here succeeded despite consistently 
contrary precedent.”1823 
                                                          
 1815. Id. at 924–25, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885. 
 1816. Id. at 925–26, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885–86. 
 1817. Id. at 925, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885. 
 1818. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885. 
 1819. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885. 
 1820. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885. 
 1821. Id. at 926, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886. 
 1822. Id. at 926–27, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 1823. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886. 
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In In re Metoprolol Succinate Patent Litigation,1824 the Federal Circuit 
vacated the district court’s finding of inequitable conduct because it 
had erroneously equated an incentive to deceive with an intent to de-
ceive on summary judgment.1825  In particular, the district court had 
found “that Astra’s motivation to not reveal the [inventorship] dis-
pute was great based on the risk of losing its [claims] . . . as antici-
pated by the prior art,” and thus concluded on summary judgment 
that “[t]he intent to deceive [was] clearly present.”1826  The Federal 
Circuit, however, found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Astra had intended to deceive the PTO because Astra’s in-house pat-
ent counsel testified in his deposition that he “did not know of and 
was not concerned about the incentives identified by the district 
court in its but for analysis.”1827 
In Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc.,1828 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s judgment that fifteen patents prosecuted pro se by the 
inventor were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.1829  In par-
ticular, the court agreed that the applicant had:  (1) submitted affi-
davits in support of patentability without informing the examiner of 
the affiant’s relationship to the inventor, (2) misrepresented small 
entity status to justify small entity payments, (3) misclaimed priority 
dates, (4) failed to disclose relevant litigation, and (5) failed to dis-
close material prior art.1830  Regarding the applicant’s misrepresenta-
tion of priority dates, the court relied on Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles 
Machine Works1831 for the proposition that “a misrepresentation that 
would not have immediately affected the patentability is still mate-
rial.”1832  The Federal Circuit then held that “a claim for priority is in-
herently material to patentability because a priority date may deter-
mine validity, whether an issue arises in prosecution or later in court 
challenges to validity.”1833 
In Apotex Corp. v. Merck & Co.,1834 the Federal Circuit affirmed sum-
mary judgment that Merck had not committed fraud on the court or 
made false statements or misrepresentations in an earlier district 
                                                          
 1824. 494 F.3d 1011, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1825. Id. at 1013, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556. 
 1826. Id. at 1020, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551. 
 1827. Id. at 1021, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551. 
 1828. 504 F.3d 1223, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1829. Id. at 1229, 1235–36, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815, 1820. 
 1830. Id. at 1229–36, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815–20. 
 1831. 437 F.3d 1309, 1318, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1830 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 1832. Nilssen, 504 F.3d at 1233, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (citing Digital Control, 
437 F.3d at 1318, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830). 
 1833. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818. 
 1834. 507 F.3d 1357, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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court case such as to warrant reopening that litigation.1835  The allega-
tions stemmed from the district court’s ruling that the Apotex patents 
at issue were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) because Merck had in-
vented and been using the claimed process before Apotex had made 
the claimed invention.1836  The Federal Circuit affirmed this ruling.1837  
Apotex subsequently alleged that Merck had obtained these invalidity 
rulings by fraud, e.g., by leaving out the type of mixing equipment, 
duration of mixing, and other key details of its process of making the 
drug at issue during a videotaped deposition in a Canadian litigation 
and making other misrepresentations and misstatements of material 
fact.1838  The district court rejected Apotex’s arguments as attorney ar-
gument, unsupported by factual testimony or evidence.1839 
The Federal Circuit unanimously affirmed.1840  “We agree that 
Merck’s processing details, which are not asserted to be invented by 
Apotex, did not warrant detailed disclosure, and that the presenta-
tion of the Merck process did not establish fraud on the court,” the 
court explained.1841  The Federal Circuit further noted, “Fraud upon 
the court requires that there was a material subversion of the legal 
process . . . [and] it requires rigorous proof, as do other challenges to 
final judgment, lest the finality established by Rule 60(b) be over-
whelmed by continuing attacks on the judgment.”1842  In addition, the 
court found that Merck’s omission of certain process details was im-
material, in that those details were not a part of Apotex’s patented 
process.1843 
VI. REMEDIES 
A. Permanent Injunction 
Historically, permanent injunctions have been a standard part of 
patent cases that result in final judgments of infringement and no in-
                                                          
 1835. Id. at 1361–62, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305–06. 
 1836. Id. at 1359, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
 1837. Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1139 
(Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 1838. Apotex Corp., 507 F.3d at 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305. 
 1839. Id. at 1360, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
 1840. Id. at 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306. 
 1841. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305–06. 
 1842. Id. at 1360–61, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304–05 (citing Broyhill Furniture 
Indus. v. Craftmaster Furniture Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1085, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1283, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 1843. Id. at 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305. 
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validity.1844  The Federal Circuit applied a “general rule that courts will 
issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent ex-
ceptional circumstances.”1845  In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed this “general rule.”1846  In particular, in eBay Inc. v. MercEx-
change, L.L.C.,1847 the Court stated that the principles of equity “apply 
with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act.”1848  The 
Court recognized, “a major departure from the long tradition of eq-
uity practice should not be lightly implied.  Nothing in the Patent Act 
indicates that Congress intended such a departure.  To the contrary, 
the Patent Act expressly provides that injunctions ‘may’ issue ‘in ac-
cordance with the principles of equity.’”1849 
The Court stated as follows: 
[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-
factor test before a court may grant such relief.  A plaintiff must 
demonstrate:  (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inade-
quate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the bal-
ance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.1850 
In Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Ivax Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1851 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of a permanent injunction 
against co-defendants Ivax and Cipla but narrowed it to cover only 
the pharmaceutical product (escitalopram oxalate, or “EO”) that was 
the subject of the Ivax abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”), 
which had given rise to the infringement suit.1852  The original lan-
guage of the injunction “extending to ‘any products that infringe the 
‘712 patent’” was overly broad because a court could enjoin in-
fringement of the patent by an adjudicated product, or colorable 
variations thereof.1853  Thus, the injunction could not extend to any 
                                                          
 1844. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1913, 1929 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (confirming the existence of a long standing 
general rule in favor of issuing an injunction upon a finding of infringement). 
 1845. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1225, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 
(2006). 
 1846. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1577 (2006). 
 1847. Id. at 1837, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577. 
 1848. Id. at 1839, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. 
 1849. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (citations omitted). 
 1850. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. 
 1851. 501 F.3d 1263, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1852. Id. at 1271–72, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
 1853. Id. at 1271, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
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drug that was not the subject of the ANDA, even if that drug were 
within the scope of the ‘712 patent.1854 
At the same time, the Federal Circuit affirmed the inclusion of co-
defendant Cipla in the injunction.1855  Cipla had been providing in-
formation and material that Ivax was using to obtain FDA approval, 
and was actively inducing Ivax’s direct infringement by planning “to 
manufacture and sell infringing EO products to Ivax for resale in the 
United States.”1856  Even though there was no infringement as long as 
Ivax was pursuing FDA approval, Ivax would be liable for, and hence 
could be enjoined from, commercial exploitation of EO once it was 
approved by the FDA.1857  Thus, Cipla could also be enjoined because 
“[t]hey are partners.”1858  Judge Schall dissented from this portion of 
the opinion because Cipla did not file the ANDA and only provided 
information protected by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); thus, its actions did 
not trigger a cause of action under § 271(e)(2).1859 
The permanent injunction in Cross Medical Products, Inc. v. Med-
tronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.1860 raised unique jurisdictional issues for the 
court to consider.  Medtronic argued that the Federal Circuit did not 
have jurisdiction to consider arguments related to a permanent      
injunction that Cross Medical did not present on cross-appeal.1861  
Cross Medical responded that the court may consider arguments as 
an “alternative” basis for supporting the court’s permanent              
injunction.1862  The Federal Circuit found, “[o]n the jurisdictional in-
quiry, this court need not consider whether the district court could 
have issued the second permanent injunction on some other 
grounds.  Rather, this court reviews the district court’s judgment with 
an eye to whether an alternative basis might support that decision.”1863  
In light of the court’s finding that there were genuine issues of mate-
rial fact regarding infringement, the court declined to consider the 
merits of the arguments and vacated and remanded the district 
court’s summary judgment for further proceedings.1864 
                                                          
 1854. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
 1855. Id. at 1272, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
 1856. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
 1857. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106. 
 1858. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105–06. 
 1859. Id. at 1274, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108 (Schall, J., dissenting). 
 1860. 480 F.3d 1335, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 1861. Id. at 1345, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 1862. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 1863. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (citing Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 115 
F.3d 947, 954, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1903 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 1864. Id. at 1345–46, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073. 
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In Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,1865 the Federal Circuit vacated a    
permanent injunction because the district court had relied on an out-
dated rule “that an injunction will issue, once infringement and valid-
ity have been adjudged . . . unless there are some exceptional circum-
stances that justify denying injunctive relief.”1866  That rule has since 
been replaced by the traditional four-factor test for injunctions in 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.1867  The Federal Circuit declined to 
determine whether the “facts found by the district court [could] serve 
as independent support for the injunction,” even under the new rule, 
because the court “would effectively be exercising [its] own discretion 
as if [it] were the first-line court of equity.  That role belongs           
exclusively to the district court.”1868 
In Abbott Laboratories v. TorPharm, Inc.,1869 the Federal Circuit af-
firmed that a district court has jurisdiction to entertain a contempt 
proceeding to enforce a permanent injunction, even though it re-
versed the district court on the merits.1870  The district court had en-
joined co-defendant Apotex from “commercially manufacturing, us-
ing, selling, offering to sell, or importing into the United States” a 
generic anti-seizure medication after finding that Apotex’s filing of 
an ANDA infringed two of Abbott’s patents.1871  While Apotex at-
tempted to design around the Abbott patents, it arranged for Nu-
Pharm to file a new ANDA and assume the “litigation risks” in ex-
change for Apotex’s payment of the costs.1872  The district court found 
no colorable difference between the Apotex and Nu-Pharm drug 
products and held Apotex in contempt for violating the injunction.1873  
The Federal Circuit held that even though the Hatch-Waxman Act 
does not specifically grant a district court jurisdiction to pursue a 
contempt proceeding, filing an ANDA is an act of infringement and 
is therefore subject to the same discretionary authority of the district 
court to entertain contempt proceedings as in any other case of pat-
ent infringement.1874  The Federal Circuit concluded that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in holding contempt proceedings 
                                                          
 1865. 483 F.3d 800, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1866. Id. at 811, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 1867. 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1579 (2006). 
 1868. Acumed, 483 F.3d at 811, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 1869. 503 F.3d 1372, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1870. Id. at 1375–76, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831. 
 1871. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831. 
 1872. Id. at 1377, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832. 
 1873. Id. at 1377–78, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833. 
 1874. Id. at 1378–79, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833–34. 
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and expanding its injunction to prohibit the FDA from approving not 
only the original Apotex ANDA but the Nu-Pharm ANDA as well.1875 
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s find-
ing of contempt.1876  Apotex’s efforts to design around the drug oc-
curred entirely outside the United States, and thus did not violate the 
injunction’s prohibition on making, using, selling, offering to sell, or 
importing the generic drug into the United States before the Abbott 
patents expired.1877  The injunction also contained no “explicit no-
tice” to Apotex that filing a new ANDA, whether by itself or through a 
“straw party,” was forbidden.1878 
Judge Dyk dissented from this portion of the opinion, finding that 
the majority’s conclusion raised a “fair ground of doubt as to the 
wrongfulness” of Apotex’s conduct, which should have rendered the 
summary contempt proceedings inappropriate in the first place.1879  
He argued that the finding of infringement should have been vacated 
and remanded for further consideration.1880 
B. Preliminary Injunction 
Unlike a permanent injunction, a preliminary injunction is entered 
before trial to protect the rights of parties while an infringement trial 
is pending.1881  Preliminary injunctions are rarely granted and require 
a consideration of four factors, none of which is dispositive:  
(1) probability of success on the merits, (2) harm to the moving party 
if the injunction is not granted, (3)  the balance of hardships, and 
(4) the impact of the injunction on the public interest.1882 
In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,1883 the district court enjoined a farmer 
from infringing a Monsanto patent by saving and replanting geneti-
cally modified soybean seeds in subsequent years, in violation of his 
license agreement with Monsanto.1884  The injunction, however, al-
lowed the farmer to “plant Roundup Ready soybeans acquired from 
any lawful dealer, but to do so [the farmer] must sign any applicable 
                                                          
 1875. Id. at 1381, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835. 
 1876. Id. at 1383, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837. 
 1877. Id. at 1382, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836. 
 1878. Id. at 1383, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837. 
 1879. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 1880. Id. at 1385, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838. 
 1881. See, e.g., Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 835 F.2d 859, 863, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1118, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to 
preserve the status quo and to protect the respective rights of the parties pending a 
determination on the merits.”). 
 1882. Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 869, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 
1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 1883. 488 F.3d 973, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1884. Id. at 976, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943–44. 
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technology agreement required by Monsanto.”1885  Monsanto objected 
to the clause allowing the farmer to buy the seeds from a lawful 
dealer, but the Federal Circuit found it was up to Monsanto to ensure 
that its dealers did not sell the seeds against its wishes.1886 
GP Industries, Inc. v. Eran Industries, Inc.1887 involved a rare form of 
an injunction against communications.1888  After Eran Industries fired 
several employees, they formed a competing company, GP Industries, 
Inc.1889  Eran sent letters to its distributors and contractors warning 
them not to buy a GP product that Eran alleged infringed its pat-
ent.1890  On GP’s complaint, the district court granted a preliminary 
injunction enjoining Eran from sending such letters due to its tor-
tious interference with GP’s business relationships.1891  In addition, 
the district court found “that Eran’s accusations were made in disre-
gard of the truth or falsity of the purported infringement” because 
Eran had not examined any product actually sold or distributed by 
GP or made any effort to determine whether the GP prototype it had 
examined was on the market.1892  The court also reasoned that Eran 
had an adequate remedy if GP were found to have infringed the pat-
ent.1893 
The Federal Circuit reversed the grant of a preliminary injunction 
as an abuse of discretion.1894  Injunctions against communicating with 
others about one’s patent rights are rare, the court explained, be-
cause they are much more serious than injunctions against infringe-
ment.1895  “One has a right to inform others of his or her patent rights.  
Thus, an injunction against communication is strong medicine that 
must be used with care and only in exceptional circumstances.”1896 
The Federal Circuit also found that Eran’s conduct did not reach 
the “objectively baseless” threshold for bad faith required by Globetrot-
                                                          
 1885. Id. at 981, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948. 
 1886. Id. at 981–82, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948. 
 1887. 500 F.3d 1369, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1604 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1888. Id. at 1372, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 1889. Id. at 1371, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 1890. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 1891. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 1892. Id. at 1372, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606. 
 1893. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606 (stating that, if successful, Eran “can recoup 
any royalties under its patent and can recover damages for other breaches if 
proven”). 
 1894. Id. at 1374, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
 1895. Id. at 1373–74, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
 1896. Id. at 1374, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607 (citation omitted). 
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ter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc.1897  “Objectively baseless,” 
the Supreme Court explained in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. 
v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,1898 requires a showing “that no rea-
sonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”1899  In 
GP Industries, the Federal Circuit found that the district court had 
“not considere[d] the objectively baseless standard in its discussion of 
bad faith” and had even made statements that demonstrated that 
Eran’s allegations were not objectively baseless, which rendered its 
findings of subjective bad faith immaterial.1900  Finding that Eran’s as-
sertions were not objectively baseless, the court reversed the entry of 
preliminary injunction.1901 
C. Damages 
1. Lost profits 
In Wechsler v. Macke International Trade, Inc.,1902 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the lower court’s denial of JMOL, because “the jury’s award 
of lost profit damages was not supported by substantial evidence.”1903  
The court noted that the plaintiff did not produce a product and did 
not have the capacity to do so until after the infringement ended.1904  
In particular, “Wechsler’s expert’s opinion that Wechsler had the ca-
pability to manufacture and market his device during the period of 
infringement was based solely on the fact that Wechsler manufac-
tured and marketed his product after the period of infringement.”1905  
The court also found no evidence that Macke’s infringing sales pre-
empted subsequent sales by Wechsler or resulted in a lower price for 
Wechsler’s sales because “Wechsler and his expert presented little 
more than conclusory evidence on these theories.”1906 
In Mitutoyo Corp. v. Central Purchasing, LLC,1907 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s finding that Mitutoyo was not entitled to 
lost profits due to the lack of evidence of any market overlap between 
                                                          
 1897. Id. at 1375, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608 (citing Globtrotter Software, Inc. v. 
Elan Computer Group, Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1375, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1168 
(Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 1898. 508 U.S. 49, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1992). 
 1899. Id. at 60, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646. 
 1900. GP Indus., 500 F.3d at 1375, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607–08. 
 1901. Id. at 1375–76, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608. 
 1902. 486 F.3d 1286, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1903. Id. at 1297, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749. 
 1904. Id. at 1293, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. 
 1905. Id. at 1294, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. 
 1906. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. 
 1907. 499 F.3d 1284, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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its products and Central’s infringing products.1908  Mitutoyo’s prod-
ucts were much more complex and expensive than those sold by Cen-
tral, so there was little overlap in price or prospective customers.1909  
Central also showed that demand for its products was sensitive to 
price, “meaning that Mitutoyo’s products are sold almost entirely out-
side the price range in which Central customers are likely to buy.”1910 
2. Reasonable royalty 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the court’s award of a 140% royalty in 
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling.1911  The case involved a farmer who had 
saved and replanted patented genetically modified soybean seeds in 
violation of a license agreement with Monsanto.1912  The district court 
awarded a reasonable royalty of $40 per fifty-pound bag even though 
the customary royalty was only $6.50 per bag, in addition to $22 for 
the seeds themselves.1913  The Federal Circuit affirmed the royalty 
award of 140% of the normal sales price of the seeds, explaining that 
the license agreement conferred non-monetary advantages on Mon-
santo, such as decreasing the risk of underreporting and the conse-
quent harm to Monsanto’s reputation among farmers, “ensur[ing] 
Monsanto’s knowledge of the quality of seeds planted each year, and 
. . . provid[ing] a bargaining chip for signing up new seed compa-
nies.”1914  The court also considered that farmers using Monsanto’s 
genetically modified seeds saved approximately $31–61 per acre com-
pared to using conventional soybean seeds.1915 
The Federal Circuit also found no clear error in the 29.2% royalty 
rate awarded in Mitutoyo Corp. v. Central Purchasing, LLC, in light of 
the contentious history between Central and Mitutoyo and other evi-
dence of record.1916  However, the Federal Circuit reversed the district 
court’s inclusion of sales to consumers by another company in the 
royalty base, finding that there was no corporate relationship between 
Central and that third-party, “and there are no courses of dealing or 
other evidence to suggest that Central would have agreed to pay roy-
                                                          
 1908. Id. at 1291, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 1909. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 1910. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 1911. 488 F.3d 973, 981, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1912. Id. at 976, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943–44. 
 1913. Id. at 976–77, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944. 
 1914. Id. at 980, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947. 
 1915. Id. at 981, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947. 
 1916. 499 F.3d 1284, 1292, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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alties based on both its sales” and the consumer sales of the other 
company.1917 
The Federal Circuit vacated the royalty award in Paice LLC v. Toyota 
Motor Corp.1918 due to a lack of evidence.1919  The district court had im-
posed sua sponte an “ongoing royalty” of twenty-five dollars per 
automobile after a jury found that Toyota had infringed one of 
Paice’s patents on drive trains for hybrid automobiles under the doc-
trine of equivalents.1920  The Federal Circuit vacated the district 
court’s “ongoing royalty” because the order provided “no reasoning 
to support the selection of . . . the royalty rate.”1921  In so holding, the 
court also noted that “the fact that monetary relief is at issue in this 
case does not, standing alone, warrant a jury trial” under the Seventh 
Amendment because not all monetary relief is properly characterized 
as “damages.”1922 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rader contended that the case 
should have been remanded for a determination of the reasonable 
royalty rate because “the parties had no meaningful chance to pre-
sent evidence to the district court on an appropriate royalty rate to 
compensate Paice for Toyota’s future acts of infringement.”1923  Judge 
Rader added, “in the case of the patentee, who has proven infringe-
ment of its property right, an opportunity to negotiate its own ongo-
ing royalty is a minimal protection for its rights extending for the re-
mainder of the patent term.”1924 
3. Enhanced damages 
The Federal Circuit has held that an award of enhanced damages 
requires a showing of willful infringement.1925  The court fashioned a 
                                                          
 1917. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 1918. 504 F.3d 1293, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1919. Id. at 1315–16, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017–18. 
 1920. Id. at 1296, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003. 
 1921. Id. at 1315, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
 1922. Id. at 1316, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017 (citing Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 
189, 207 (1881)). 
 1923. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 1924. Id. at 1317, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018. 
 1925. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 
923 F.2d 1576, 1578, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Reac-
tive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1582, 226 U.S.P.Q. 821, 824 
(Fed. Cir.1985)) (“[I]f a district court enhances damages, it must explain and articu-
late through findings the basis upon which it concludes that there has been willful 
infringement or bad faith.”); see also Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570, 38 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1397, 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that bad faith infringement, which 
is a type of willful infringement, is required for enhanced damages). 
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standard for evaluating willful infringement in Underwater Devices Inc. 
v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.:1926 
Where . . . a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s pat-
ent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to deter-
mine whether or not he is infringing. Such an affirmative duty in-
cludes, inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain competent legal 
advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing 
activity.1927 
The term “willful” is not unique to patent law and has a well-
established meaning in the civil context.  The Supreme Court ad-
dressed the meaning of willfulness as a statutory condition of civil li-
ability for punitive damages.1928  The case involved the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act (“FCRA”), which imposes civil liability for failure to 
comply with its requirements.1929  Whereas an affected consumer can 
recover only actual damages for negligent violations of the FCRA,1930 
he can also recover punitive damages for willful violations.1931  The 
Court concluded that the “standard civil usage” of “willful” includes 
reckless behavior.1932  “In contrast, the duty of care announced in Un-
derwater Devices sets a lower threshold for willful infringement that is 
more akin to negligence.”1933 
A unanimous en banc panel substantially rewrote the law of will-
fulness and enhanced damages in In re Seagate Technology, LLC.1934  
The portion of the court’s decision that is likely to have the greatest 
long-term impact is its determination to replace the “affirmative duty 
of care” standard set forth in Underwater Devices with a requirement 
that the patentee prove that the accused infringer was “objectively 
reckless” in infringing the patent at issue.1935  In other words, “a pat-
entee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer 
acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions consti-
tuted infringement of valid patent” in order to establish willful in-
fringement.1936  This requires a two-step analysis:  (1) there must be 
                                                          
 1926. 717 F.2d 1380, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569 (Fed. Cir. 1983), overruled by In re Sea-
gate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1927. Id. at 1389–90, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 576 (citations omitted). 
 1928. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007). 
 1929. Id. at 2205. 
 1930. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a) (2006). 
 1931. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2006). 
 1932. Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2203. 
 1933. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 
1870 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussing Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 
717 F.2d 1380, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 1934. 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865. 
 1935. Id. at 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 1936. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
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clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an ob-
jectively high likelihood that the actions infringed a valid patent, and 
(2) if the patentee meets the first requirement, it must then show that 
that risk was known or should have been known by the infringer.1937  
The infringer’s subjective state of mind is irrelevant to the first 
prong.1938  As the court explained: 
We fully recognize that “the term [reckless] is not self-defining.”  
However, “[t]he civil law generally calls a person reckless who 
acts . . . in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is ei-
ther known or so obvious that it should be known.”  Accordingly, to 
establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively 
high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid 
patent.  The state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant 
to this objective inquiry.  If this threshold objective standard is satis-
fied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this objectively-
defined risk (determined by the record developed in the infringe-
ment proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it should 
have been known to the accused infringer.  We leave it to future 
cases to further develop the application of this standard.1939 
As a result of abandoning the “duty of care” standard, the court 
also emphasized that “there is no affirmative obligation to obtain 
opinion of counsel.”1940  The court, as explained in an earlier section, 
also emphasized that “asserting the advice of counsel defense and 
disclosing opinions of opinion counsel do not constitute waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege for communications with trial counsel,”1941 
and “relying on opinion counsel’s work product does not waive work 
product immunity with respect to trial counsel.”1942 
4. Attorney’s fees and costs 
In Propat International Corp. v. RPost, Inc.,1943 the district court re-
fused to award the defendant its attorneys’ fees and costs even 
though it had dismissed the suit because Propat did not own the sub-
ject patent and thus lacked standing to sue.1944  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s refusal to award fees and costs because 
Propat’s interpretation of the ownership issue “was not so reckless as 
                                                          
 1937. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 1938. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 1939. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870–71 (citations omitted). 
 1940. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870. 
 1941. Id. at 1374, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873. 
 1942. Id. at 1376, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
 1943. 473 F.3d 1187, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1944. Id. at 1188–89, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1351. 
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to warrant sanctioning” and “the conduct of both parties’ counsel 
‘fell far short of a model prosecution and defense of a patent ac-
tion.’”1945  Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s decision “to 
leave the parties where it f[ound] them.”1946 
In RFR Industries, Inc. v. Century Steps, Inc.,1947 the Federal Circuit 
found the award of attorney’s fees to be improper because the action 
was dismissed upon RFR’s filing of a notice of dismissal.1948  Voluntary 
dismissal did not bestow “prevailing party” status on Century, which is 
a prerequisite for the award of attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 285.1949 
Digeo, Inc. v. Audible, Inc.1950 involved an allegedly “exceptional” case 
under 35 U.S.C. § 285.1951  Digeo acquired the patent at issue at a 
bankruptcy sale from IPDN Corporations, the successor in interest to 
Microtome.1952  About a year after filing suit against Audible for in-
fringement, however, Digeo discovered that the signatures allegedly 
assigning the patent to Microtome had been forged.1953  The district 
court dismissed Digeo’s case for lack of title, but denied Audible’s 
motion for attorneys’ fees under § 285.1954 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees.1955  The 
court explained, “If there is clear and convincing evidence that a 
plaintiff has brought a baseless or frivolous suit against an accused in-
fringer, that is a sufficient basis to require a district court to deem the 
case exceptional under § 285.”1956  The court, however, rejected Audi-
ble’s argument that the district court had improperly shifted “the 
burden of proof to Audible to show that Digeo had not performed an 
appropriate pre-suit” inquiry into its claim.1957  Audible, the court 
noted, had not filed a motion under Rule 11, which authorizes “sanc-
tions for failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the legal and 
factual bases of claims.”1958  Rather, Audible brought its motion under 
§ 285, which “grant[s] district courts discretionary authority to award 
reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in exceptional cas-
                                                          
 1945. Id. at 1195, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356. 
 1946. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356. 
 1947. 477 F.3d 1348, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1948. Id. at 1352, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918. 
 1949. Id. at 1353, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918–19. 
 1950. 505 F.3d 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1951. Id. at 1366–67, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248. 
 1952. Id. at 1365, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247. 
 1953. Id. at 1366, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247. 
 1954. Id. at 1367, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247–48. 
 1955. Id. at 1366–67, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248–49. 
 1956. Id. at 1367, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248. 
 1957. Id. at 1367–69, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249–50. 
 1958. Id. at 1368, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249. 
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es.”1959  Whereas Rule 11 shifts the burden to the nonmovant (plain-
tiff) to prove that it had made a reasonable pre-suit inquiry into its 
claim, under § 285 the burden remains on the movant to show by 
clear and convincing evidence that the case is exceptional.1960  Al-
though a Rule 11 violation can serve as the basis for finding a case 
exceptional, Audible’s failure to file such a motion rendered that 
point moot.1961 
The Federal Circuit also rejected Audible’s argument that buying 
something “as-is” raised the standard for a pre-suit investigation be-
cause of a greater likelihood that the patent is faulty.1962  The court 
found that not only did Audible’s argument lack legal support, but 
“negligent conduct does not suffice to establish that a case is excep-
tional.”1963  Rather, a party moving under § 285 “must prove actual 
wrongful intent or gross negligence” in order to show that a case is 
exceptional, explained the court.1964  Since there was no evidence 
suggesting that Digeo had been negligent in not learning of the de-
fect in the patent title, the Federal Circuit found that the district 
court had properly determined that this was not an exceptional 
case.1965 
5. Pre-filing investigation under Rule 11 
In Intamin, Ltd. v. Magnetar Technologies, Corp.,1966 the Federal Cir-
cuit held that there was no blanket rule that a plaintiff in a patent in-
fringement suit must obtain and thoroughly analyze a sample of the 
alleged infringer’s product in order to satisfy its Rule 11 obligation.1967  
In so holding, the Federal Circuit distinguished Judin v. United 
States,1968 in which the patentee could have very easily obtained a sam-
ple of the accused product for a nominal price and deconstructed 
that sample to avoid violating Rule 11.1969  The Federal Circuit held 
that Judin did not create a blanket rule for all cases, however.1970  The 
court explained that in this case, unlike Judin, “the technology pre-
sented the patentee with unreasonable obstacles to any effort to ob-
                                                          
 1959. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249. 
 1960. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249. 
 1961. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249. 
 1962. Id. at 1369, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250. 
 1963. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250. 
 1964. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250 (citing Mach. Corp. of Am. v. Gullfiber AB, 
774 F.2d 467, 473, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 368, 373 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 1965. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250. 
 1966. 483 F.3d 1328, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1967. Id. at 1338, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552. 
 1968. 110 F.3d 780, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 1969. Intamin, 483 F.3d at 1338, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552. 
 1970. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552. 
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tain a sample of Magnetar’s amusement ride brake system, let alone 
the difficulty of opening the casing.”1971  Thus, the Federal Circuit re-
jected the defendant’s argument that the suit was frivolous and sanc-
tions appropriate merely because Intamin had not obtained the al-
legedly infringing product and cut it open for analysis.1972 
VII. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 
A. Standing 
Standing to appeal from an ITC determination was the central is-
sue in Fuji Photo Film Co. v. International Trade Commission,1973 which 
also marked the fifth time that the Federal Circuit had heard an ap-
peal from the ITC’s investigation into lens-fitted film packages,1974  or 
from related district court and U.S. Customs proceedings.1975 
This particular appeal stemmed from an ITC enforcement pro-
ceeding, in which the Commission imposed a civil penalty of $13.7 
million on respondent Jazz Camera for importing over twenty-five 
million disposable cameras that had been impermissibly recon-
structed.1976  The Commission also imposed civil penalties on two of 
Jazz’s officers, one of whom appealed while the other settled with the 
ITC.1977  Fuji, the patent holder and complainant, appealed the 
Commission’s determination that the remaining 1.7 million dispos-
able cameras imported by Jazz had been permissibly repaired.1978 
The Federal Circuit dismissed Fuji’s appeal for lack of standing.1979  
A private plaintiff, unlike the federal government, may not sue to as-
sess civil penalties for past violations, unless the private plaintiff is 
threatened with injury as a consequence of ongoing unlawful con-
duct.1980  In this case, there was no threat of ongoing harm to Fuji be-
cause Jazz had gone bankrupt and been liquidated under Chapter 11, 
while its sanctioned officer was proscribed only from activities con-
                                                          
 1971. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552. 
 1972. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552. 
 1973. 474 F.3d 1281, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1974. For the International Trade Commission’s notice of determination on re-
mand, see Certain Lens-Fitted Film Packages, Inv. No. 337-TA-406 (Int’l Trade 
Comm’n Sept. 12, 2007), http://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/337/337-
TA-406.Notice.1189628776.pdf (reducing the civil penalty on remand). 
 1975. Fuji, 474 F.3d at 1285, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497. 
 1976. Id. at 1288–89, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499. 
 1977. Id. at 1289, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499–1500. 
 1978. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. 
 1979. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. 
 1980. Id. at 1289–90, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d  (BNA) at  1500 (citing Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 188 (2000)). 
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ducted “‘for, with, or otherwise on behalf of’ Jazz.”1981  Moreover, even 
if Fuji had been harmed by Jazz’s importation of 1.7 million allegedly 
reconstructed cameras, the Commission would not necessarily im-
pose any additional penalties for those cameras, while any penalties it 
did impose would have been paid to the U.S. government, not Fuji.1982 
The cessation of Jazz’s operations also meant there was no continu-
ing need for Customs to determine which Jazz cameras would be ex-
cluded from entry.1983  Thus, even if the Federal Circuit’s interpreta-
tion of Jazz’s cease and desist order might affect the interpretation of 
the general exclusion order, this was not a sufficient basis to establish 
standing.1984  The appropriate route to clarify the exclusion order was 
through the ITC, where all parties could participate, and not by ob-
taining an advisory opinion from the Federal Circuit when there was 
no Article III case or controversy.1985 
B. Claim Construction 
In OSRAM GmbH v. International Trade Commission,1986 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the Commission’s determination of no violation of 
§ 337 due to an erroneous claim construction.1987  The patent claims 
in question included certain luminous pigment powders, “which pro-
duce a spectral shift in the light emitted by . . . LEDs” and other elec-
troluminescent devices such that the light appears white.1988  The 
claims required that the pigments have a “mean grain diameter” of a 
certain size.1989  The Commission interpreted this term to refer to the 
“volume-based average[, which] is calculated by multiplying the di-
ameter of each grain by its volume, summing the products thereof, 
and dividing that sum by the sum of the volumes of the grains.”1990 
The panel majority disagreed, finding that the “mean grain diame-
ter” should be calculated as a “number-based average,” which is “the 
sum of the diameters of all the grains, divided by the number of 
grains.”1991  Although both methods were used in the art to calculate 
mean grain diameter, the majority found that “experts for both sides 
were in full and emphatic agreement that the ordinary meaning of 
                                                          
 1981. Id. at 1290, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. 
 1982. Id. at 1289, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500. 
 1983. Id. at 1290, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501. 
 1984. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501. 
 1985. Id. at 1290–91, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501. 
 1986. 505 F.3d 1351, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 1987. Id. at 1359, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166. 
 1988. Id. at 1354, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
 1989. Id. at 1355, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163. 
 1990. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 1991. Id. at 1355, 1357, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164, 1165. 
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the average diameter of these particles is the number-based average,” 
although respondent’s expert later changed his position when he re-
alized this question could decide the issue of liability.1992  The court 
also found that the patent specifications were “in accordance with the 
number-based” mean, which better reflects the homogeneity of parti-
cle size.1993  In contrast, the volume-based mean overemphasizes large 
particles, which are “not as effective at scattering light to produce a 
uniform color and intensity” and are thus detrimental to the inven-
tion.1994  Furthermore, it was undisputed that “a volume-based meas-
ure would exclude the OSRAM products the patents were designed to 
cover.”1995 
Judge Dyk dissented, finding no “full and emphatic agreement” 
among the experts on this construction nor any “conflicting testi-
mony” on the part of respondent’s expert.1996  Judge Dyk also found 
the majority’s assumption that the claim term sought to emphasize 
small particles over large particles to be “unsupported” and “entirely 
speculative.”1997 
The Federal Circuit also reversed the Commission’s claim construc-
tion in Sinorgchem Co., Shandong v. International Trade Commission1998 
and adopted instead a more narrow construction of the term “con-
trolled amount” of protic material.1999  Although there was no dispute 
that “controlled amount” had no well-accepted meaning in the 
chemical arts, the inventors defined the term in the specification as 
follows:  “A ‘controlled amount’ of protic material is an amount up to 
that which inhibits the reaction of aniline with nitrobenzene, e.g., up 
to about 4% of H2O based on the volume of the reaction mixture 
when aniline is utilized as the solvent.”2000 
The panel majority interpreted this passage as imposing a numeri-
cal limit of up to about 4% H2O on the “controlled amount”; thus, 
“each asserted claim can encompass processes that utilized at most 
4% water when aniline is the solvent.”2001  Since it was undisputed that 
respondent Sinorgchem always uses more than 4% water when it re-
acts aniline with nitrobenzene, the majority reversed the Commis-
                                                          
 1992. Id. at 1356, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 1993. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 1994. Id. at 1357, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165. 
 1995. Id. at 1358, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166. 
 1996. Id. at 1360, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167–68 (Dyke, J., dissenting). 
 1997. Id. at 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169. 
 1998. No. 2006-1633, 2007 WL 4465270 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 21, 2007). 
 1999. Id. at *3-7. 
 2000. Id. at *4 (emphasis added). 
 2001. Id. at *8. 
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sion’s determination of literal infringement and remanded the case 
for consideration of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 
and invalidity under the new construction.2002 
In so holding, the Federal Circuit rejected the ITC’s finding that 
the phrase “e.g., up to 4% H2O . . . when aniline is utilized as the sol-
vent” was only exemplary language and not part of the limiting defi-
nition of “controlled amount.”2003  The Commission had relied on a 
passage in the specification that “the amount of protic material toler-
ated will vary with type of base, amount of base, and base cation, used 
in the various solvent systems.”2004  The panel majority, however, 
found “[t]his vague language cannot override the express defini-
tional language,” which they found unambiguously and completely 
defined the “controlled amount” as “up to about 4% H2O based on 
the volume of the reaction mixture” when aniline is the solvent.2005  
The panel also “attribute[d] no weight” to the expert testimony cited 
by the ITC because “the experts did not identify any evidence that 
those skilled in the art would recognize that ‘controlled amount,’ or 
any term used in the specification has an accepted meaning in the 
field of chemistry.”2006  In addition, the panel rejected the ITC’s ar-
gument that this construction was inconsistent with certain embodi-
ments in the specification, explaining, “where . . . multiple embodi-
ments are disclosed, we have previously interpreted claims to exclude 
embodiments where those embodiments are inconsistent with unam-
biguous language in the patent’s specification or prosecution his-
tory.”2007 
Judge Newman sharply dissented: 
[T]here was no disclaimer of the scope set forth in the patent 
specifications and claims; there is no prior art to limit the claims in 
the way selected by the panel majority; and there is no reason to in-
sert an absolute numerical limit of “about 4%” protic material into 
the claims that do not contain a numerical limit, when the specifi-
cations of both patents demonstrate significantly higher percent-
ages.  There was no evidence contradicting the evidence of the ex-
perts concerning the range of protic material set forth in the 
specifications’ text and illustrated in the specific examples.2008 
“The panel majority,” she continued, “adds inconsistency and un-
predictability [to claim construction] by arbitrarily limiting the scope 
                                                          
 2002. Id. 
 2003. Id. at *4-5. 
 2004. Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,117,063 (filed June 21, 1991)). 
 2005. Id. at *5. 
 2006. Id. at *5 n.3. 
 2007. Id. at *6. 
 2008. Id. at *8 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 2008] 2007 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 1023 
 
of the claimed invention in a way that conflicts with the teachings of 
the specifications and the knowledge in the field of the inven-
tions.”2009  In contrast, she found “no error of fact or law” in the 
Commission’s claim construction or infringement finding, which 
were “not only supportable on the required standard of review, but 
they also are correct.”2010 
C. Imposing a Cease and Desist Order Against an Individual 
In the same Fuji Photo Film Co. v. International Trade Commission2011 
opinion discussed above in Part VII.A, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the authority of the ITC to impose and enforce a cease and desist or-
der against a corporate officer.2012  The Federal Circuit found that the 
Commission “could properly enjoin Jazz’s officers, employees, and 
agents from causing Jazz to engage in future violations” when it 
found Jazz was infringing Fuji’s patents.2013  In addition, the cease and 
desist order against Jazz was specifically directed against Jazz’s “prin-
cipals, stockholders, officers, directors, employees, agents, . . . and to 
each of them, insofar as they are engaging in conduct prohibited by” 
the cease and desist order.2014  The Federal Circuit, however, declined 
to consider the corporate officer’s argument that he had not been 
given adequate notice of the cease and desist order, finding that he 
had failed to properly raise it in his opening brief.2015 
D. Stay of District Court Proceedings 
In In re Princo Corp.,2016 the Federal Circuit examined when an ITC 
decision “becomes final” for purposes of lifting a district court’s stay 
of related proceedings, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a).2017  In par-
ticular, § 1659 provides that a district court, on timely request by an 
ITC respondent, must stay a related proceeding with respect to any 
                                                          
 2009. Id. at *13. 
 2010. Id. at *8-9. 
 2011. 474 F.3d 1281, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see supra Part 
VII.A (discussing standing to appeal). 
 2012. Fuji, 474 F.3d at 1291, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501. 
 2013. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501; see Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 
376 (1911) (“A command to the corporation is in effect a command to those who are 
officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs.”). 
 2014. Fuji, 474 F.3d at 1292, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502. 
 2015. Id. at 1293, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502. 
 2016. 478 F.3d 1345, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1997 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, 486 
F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 2017. Id. at 1348, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1998. 
 1024 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:821 
claim that involves the same issues as those before the ITC until the 
ITC’s determination “becomes final.”2018 
In this case, Philips sued Princo in district court for infringing six 
patents on technology for manufacturing compact disks.2019  Princo 
intervened in an ITC investigation on the same patents and moved 
the district court to stay its proceedings, pursuant to § 1659(a).2020  
The district court granted the stay but refused to extend it after the 
Commission made a final determination.2021  While the appeal was 
pending, the district court rejected Princo’s patent misuse defense 
and entered summary judgment of infringement in favor of Phil-
ips.2022  The Federal Circuit, in separate appeals, reversed the Com-
mission’s patent misuse determination, vacated the district court’s 
judgment against Princo, and remanded both matters back to the 
presiding forums.2023  The district court again denied Princo’s motion 
for a stay, granted summary judgment to Philips, and rejected 
Princo’s patent misuse defense.2024 
Princo filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate the district 
court’s order and stay the case until the Commission had concluded 
its remand proceedings.2025  The Federal Circuit temporarily stayed 
the district court’s proceedings pending its decision.2026  On the mer-
its, the Federal Circuit found that the phrase “becomes final” in 
§ 1659 is similar to language in other statutes, which have been inter-
preted to refer to the time when the decision is no longer subject to 
appellate review.2027  In contrast, other statutes that use “materially dif-
ferent” phrases, such “final decisions,” have been construed as refer-
ring to finality by the presiding forum.2028  The court also found that 
the purpose behind § 1659, to avoid concurrent infringement pro-
ceedings in two different forums, would be best served by extending 
the stay to include the appeal.2029  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 
granted Princo’s petition and held that the district court proceedings 
must remain stayed until the Commission’s determination was no 
longer subject to judicial review.2030 
                                                          
 2018. Id. at 1348–49, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. 
 2019. Id. at 1348, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. 
 2020. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. 
 2021. Id. at 1349, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. 
 2022. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. 
 2023. Id. at 1349–50, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000. 
 2024. Id. at 1350, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000. 
 2025. Id. at 1350–51, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000. 
 2026. Id. at 1351, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000. 
 2027. Id. at 1354, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2003. 
 2028. Id. at 1355, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2003. 
 2029. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004. 
 2030. Id. at 1357, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2005. 
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The Federal Circuit added that the stay should be continued even 
though the only issue before the district court was damages, an issue 
over which the Commission has no jurisdiction.2031  Section 1659, the 
court explained, does not limit the stay to individual issues pending 
in the Commission, but extends to any district court “proceedings” 
on a claim that involves the same issues in the proceeding before the 
Commission.2032  Since the damages involved the same issues as the in-
fringement issues in the Commission, the district court’s proceeding 
remained stayed.2033 
The Federal Circuit also rejected Philips’s argument that Princo 
was not entitled to a stay because the appeals court had already re-
jected Princo’s patent misuse defense.2034  Princo had diligently pur-
sued its motion to stay, and its entitlement to a stay was not depend-
ent upon a showing that Princo was likely to prevail on the common 
issues.2035 
Philips petitioned for a panel rehearing, arguing that the term “be-
comes final” in § 1659 should be construed in the same fashion as in 
19 U.S.C. § 1337, which authorizes the ITC to conduct the type of in-
tellectual property investigations at issue.2036  The panel disagreed and 
found that the different purposes and legislative histories behind the 
two statutory provisions “make it appropriate to interpret the ‘be-
comes final’ language in § 1337 and § 1659 differently.”2037  The panel 
reiterated:  “‘Becomes final’ in that context [in § 1659] refers to final-
ity after judicial review.”2038 
E. Temporary Stay of an Exclusion Order 
In Epistar Corp. v. ITC,2039 appellant/respondent Epistar Corpora-
tion moved the Federal Circuit to stay the ITC’s limited exclusion or-
der pending the appeal.2040  Interestingly, the Federal Circuit did not 
require Epistar to first exhaust its administration remedies in the ITC 
before filing its stay motion in the Federal Circuit.2041  Instead, the 
                                                          
 2031. Id. at 1356, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004. 
 2032. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004. 
 2033. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004. 
 2034. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004. 
 2035. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2005. 
 2036. In re Princo Corp., 486 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 2037. Id. at 1368. 
 2038. Id. 
 2039. No. 07-1457 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2007). 
 2040. Motion of Appellant, Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 07-1457 (Fed. 
Cir. July 13, 2007). 
 2041. This allowance was in stark contrast to general procedural rules.  See FED. R. 
APP. P. 18(a) (stating that a motion must either show that the agency denied the mo-
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Federal Circuit permitted Epistar to pursue its stay motion in the 
court at the same time it was pursuing the same stay motion in the 
ITC.2042  The Federal Circuit also temporarily granted Epistar’s stay 
motion before the ITC or the complainant/intervenor even had a 
chance to respond.2043  Although the Federal Circuit ultimately de-
nied Epistar’s motion for a stay, the cost was a two-month delay in en-
forcing the exclusion order.2044 
                                                                                                                                      
tion or that moving before the agency would be impracticable); FED. CIR. R. 18(a) 
(stating the same). 
 2042. Brief of Intervenor at 16-17, Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 07-
1457 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 26, 2007). 
 2043. See Epistar v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 07-1457 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2007) (ref-
erencing, in docket entry number eleven, the Federal Circuit temporarily granting 
Epistar Corp.’s motion to stay).  
 2044. Id. (referencing, in docket entry number fifty-seven, the Federal Circuit deny-
ing the Epistar Motion to stay). 




Table 1 presents the total number of patent appeals adjudicated on 
the merits during the twelve-month period ending December 31, 
2007. 
The dispositions are broken down by precedential (“P”) opinions 
and non-precedential (“N”) opinions and orders as designated by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) on 
its daily log, which can be accessed at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/d 
ailylog.html. 
Table 1 also includes the origin of the precedential and non-
precedential opinions and orders, the reversal percentage, and the 
time in months from docketing date to disposition date. 
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Table 2 
Table 2 summarizes the disposition of precedential opinions and 
non-precedential patent opinions and orders of the Federal Circuit 
from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007.  A list of the pat-




 2008] 2007 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 1029 
 
Table 3 
Table 3 shows the disposition of precedential opinions and non-
precedential patent opinions and orders according to the unanimity 
of the panel.  Decisions where all the judges on the panel join the 
opinion of the court were counted as unanimous decisions in Table 
3.  Decisions where at least one judge concurred in the judgment but 
not the opinion and no judge dissented were counted as decisions 
with concurrence in Table 3.  Decisions in which a judge dissented 
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Table 4 
Table 4 illustrates the disposition of precedential opinions and 
non-precedential patent opinions and orders based on the origin of 
the case. 
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Table 5 
Table 5 shows the origin and disposition of precedential opinions 
and non-precedential patent opinions and orders for cases on appeal 
from summary judgment. 
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Table 6 
Table 6 presents the frequency with which individual judges joined 
the opinion of the court for precedential opinions and non-
precedential patent opinions and orders.  Each opinion was analyzed 
to identify the panel members and whether each member joined the 
opinion of the court.  The number of panels in which each judge 
participated was then counted.  The number of panels in which each 
judge participated is presented in the “Total” column.  The number 
of occurrences in which each judge joined the opinion of the court is 
presented in the “Joined Opinion of Court” column.  The frequency 
with which each judge joined the opinion of the court was calculated 
by dividing the reported number of occurrences in which that judge 
“Joined Opinion of the Court” by the reported number panels in 
which that judge participated, i.e., “Total Cases.”  For the purposes of 
this analysis, a plurality opinion that announced the judgment of the 
court was counted as the opinion of the court. 
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Table 7 
Table 7 presents a profile of voting alignments between the judges 
in the precedential patent opinions of the Federal Circuit from Janu-
ary 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007. 
Each opinion was analyzed to identify the panel members and 
whether each member joined the opinion of the court, concurred 
with the opinion of the court, or dissented from the opinion of the 
court.  The data were then analyzed to determine the number of 
common panels in which each pair of judges participated.  For each 
pair of judges this number is reported in a cell labeled “CP.”  The 
data were further analyzed to determine the number of common 
opinions shared by each pair of judges in which that pair partici-
pated.  For each pair of judges the number of occurrences in which 
each pair of judges shared a common opinion is reported in a cell la-
beled “CD.”  The frequency with which each pair of judges shared a 
common opinion was then calculated by dividing the of number of 
occurrences in which each pair of judges shared a common opinion 
by the number of common panels in which each judge participated 
(i.e., CD/CP). 
A common opinion for the purposes of this analysis means that 
both judges joined the opinion of the court, concurred in the judg-
ment of the court or dissented with the opinion of the court.  A plu-
rality opinion that announced the judgment of the court was counted 
as the opinion of the court.  Opinions concurring-in-part and con-
curring-in-the-judgment were counted as concurrences.  Opinions 
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Table 7 (cont’d) 
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Table 8 
Table 8  lists the patent appeals broken down by precedential (“P”) 
opinions and nonprecedential (“N”) opinions and orders as desig-
nated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“CAFC”) on its daily log during the twelve-month period ending De-
cember 31, 2007. 
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Table 8 (cont’d) 
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Table 8 (cont’d) 
 
